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ABSTRACT 
This  Ph.  D.  dissertation  examines  the  seven  joy  statements 
in  the  Book  of  Qoheleth  (2.24-25;  3.12-13;  3.22;  5.17-19; 
8.15;  9.7-9;  11.8-9)  in  order  to  understand  their  literary 
nature  and  effects.  The  thesis  question  which  this 
dissertation  attempts  to  answer  is:  Can  scepticism  and 
ironic  correlations  be  found  in  the  joy  statements  of 
Qoheleth?  After  examining  the  thesis  question,  the 
conclusion  was  drawn  (thesis):  Even  if  there  is  no 
scepticism  in  the  joy  statements  of  Qoheleth,  one  must  be 
sceptical  about  any  interpretation  of  them.  In  other 
words:  Any  reading  of  the  joy  statements  in  Qoheleth  must 
be  viewed  as  indeterminate.  This  conclusion  was  drawn  not 
only  on  the  basis  of  the  literary  nature  and  effects  of  the 
joy  statements  alone,  which  were  indeterminate,  but  in  the 
light  of  scepticism  as  a  philosophy  and  because  of  possible 
correlations  with  irony. 
The  methodology  for  examining  the  thesis  question  is 
progressive.  Each  chapter  of  the  dissertation  provides 
additional  information  from  the  most  basic  upwards  in  an 
attempt  to  answer  the  question.  Each  chapter  and  section 
are  critically  assessed  and  conclusions  drawn.  The 
methodology  of  this  dissertation  is  as  follows: 
Chapter  one  provides  a  careful  analysis  of  key  terms 
in  Qoheleth:  ýZljl,  1117  M.  W1,  1M. 
Chapter  two  provides  a  detailed  exegesis  of  the  joy 
statements. ii 
Chapter  three  provides  a  form  critical  analysis  of  the 
joy  statements  with  special  attention  to  their  literary 
form  in  the  overall  literary  structure  of  the  book  and 
within  their  overall  (1.12-2.26;  3.1-15;  3.15-22;  5.7-6.9; 
8.1-10.20;  9.1-12;  11.7-12.7)  and  immediate  (2.17-26;  3.9- 
15;  3.18-22;  5.15-6.2;  8.10-17;  9.7-10;  11.8-9)  contexts, 
additional  exegetical  notes,  and  with  reference  to 
Qoheleth's  overall  content  and  ethos. 
Chapter  four  provides  an  overview  of  the  philosophy  of 
scepticism  and  the  view  there  is  a  sceptical  tradition  in 
the  Hebrew  Bible. 
Chapter  five  examines  the  three  main  interpretations 
of  the  joy  statements  as  editorial  glosses,  indicative 
carpe  diem  and  as  the  essence  of  Qoheleth's  message  of  joy. 
Chapter  six  examines  the  literary  form  of  irony  and 
whether  or  not  there  are  correlations  between  irony  and 
scepticism.  The  thesis  question  is  then  put  to  the  test  by 
examining  whether  or  not  the  exegeted  verses,  in  their 
overall  context,  correspond  to  the  basic  elements  of  irony 
and  scepticism. 
Finally,  a  conclusion  is  given  to  the  overall  contents 
of  this  Ph.  D.  dissertation. - 
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INTRODUCTION 
This  Ph.  D.  dissertation  did  not  begin  with  a  thesis  which 
would  govern  its  examination.  Rather,  it  began  with  a 
thesis  question  which  would  allow  the  examination  of  the 
data  to  progressively  contribute  to  an  understanding  of  the 
proposition  without  drawing  conclusions  before  hand. 
The  Oxford  Modern  English  Dictionary,  adopted  for  this 
dissertation,  defines  'thesis'  as  'a  proposition  to  be 
maintained  or  proved'.  1  The  O.  M.  E.  D.  defines  'question'  as 
'a  sentence  worded  or  expressed  so  as  to  seek  information' 
or  'doubt  about  or  objection  to  a  thing's  [subject's] 
truth'.  2  A  thesis  question  would  thus  be:  'a  proposition 
to  seek  information  on  a  certain  subject  which  is  in 
doubt';  and  one  should  add:  'a  question  out  of  which  a 
thesis  will  come,  i.  e.,  a  conclusion'.  In  the  case  of  this 
dissertation,  the  thesis  question  is:  Can  scepticism  and 
ironic  correlations  be  found  in  the  joy  statements  of 
Qohel  e  th? 
To  answer  this  question,  one  must  examine  the  literary 
nature  and  effects  of  the  joy  statements  in  Qoheleth.  The 
'literary  nature'  refers  to  the  'conceptual,  linguistic, 
grammatical  and  formal  qualities  of  literature'.  The 
definition  of  'literary  effect'  is  the  result  or 
consequence  of  the  use  of  conceptual,  linguistic, 
grammatical  and  formal  qualities  to  produce  a  desired 
effect  on  the  reader,  understanding  or  meaning  of  a 
particular  text,  i.  e.,  the  author's  literary  intent 
reflected  in  the  text's  literary  function'. 2 
The  various  tools  of  biblical  criticism  such  as  source 
criticism,  form  criticism,  tradition  criticism  and 
exegesis,  etc.,  all  have  a  symbiotic  relationship  with  one 
another:  they  all  originated  or  came  out  of  each  other  and 
they  all  feed  off  one  another  and  inform  one  another.  The 
distinctions  of  the  chapters  of  this  Ph.  D.  thesis  are, 
therefore,  somewhat  artificial,  but  necessary  for  breaking 
down  and  analysing  the  joy  statements  in  Qoh  eleth. 
Philosophical  analogies,  in  this  case  from  scepticism,  are 
used  in  conjunction  with  the  biblical  critical  tools  in 
order  to  elucidate  the  literary  form,  content,  function  and 
intent  of  the  joy  statements. 
Each  section  dealing  with  new  concepts  is  followed  by 
a  critical  assessment  of  them,  so  that  as  the  new  concepts 
are  progressively  applied  or  used  to  aid  understanding  of 
following  subjects  or  concepts,  an  awareness  of  the 
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  their  intrinsic  ideas  keep,  in 
check,  any  conclusions  which  may  follow.  'Critical 
assessment'  is  defined  in  conjunction  with  the  O.  M.  E.  D.  as 
'making  adverse  or  censorious  comments  which  lead  to 
judgments  concerning  the  quality  and  value  of  the  arguments 
in  question  and  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  conclusions'.  3 
Sometimes  these  critical  assessments  will  include 
additional  arguments  or  comments  from,  or  on,  the  scholars 
being  critically  assessed. 
Hopefully,  as  the  examination  of  the  thesis  moves  on 
chapter  by  chapter,  more  information  will  add  to  the 
understanding  and  interpretation  of  the  joy  statements  in 
Qoheleth.  In  other  words:  The  examination  of  the  thesis 3 
question  is  a  process  and  hopefully  each  chapter  will 
provide  cumulative  information  which  aids  in  a 
progressively  greater  understanding  of  the  literary  nature 
and  effects  of  the  joy  statements  in  Qoheleth. 4 
CHAPTER  ONE 
KEY  TERMS  IN  QOHELETH:  7nam,  min  fliii'1,1Zi' 
This  chapter  looks  at  the  linguistic  issues  of 
ýýý,  MINI 
111PI,  '111"  because  they  are  key  terms  in  Qoheleth  which  have 
implications  for  an  overall  understanding  of  the  book-1 
1.  THE  SEMANTIC  IMPLICATIONS  OF  7:  11  AND  1111  ril.  Ul 
IN  THE  HEBREW  BIBLE  AND  FOR  QOHELETH* 
The  Hebrew  root 
ýWjl 
appears  approximately  86  times  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible:  2  69  times  as  the  absolute  noun,  masculine, 
singular  (ý=r1)  ,37  times  in  the  construct  plural  (11L:  Jii) 
,45 
times  as  the  absolute  plural  (t7lý:  J')  5  and  5  times  as  the 
verb.  6  The  Hebrew  phrase  n11  1113"I  will  be  treated  in 
relationship  with 
ýWjl 
at  a  later  point  in  this  section. 
A  number  of  views  on  the  semantic  implications  of 
ý:  11'1 
will  be  examined  before  a  critical  assessment  is  carried 
out  on  them.  'Semantic'  refers  to  the  'connotations  and 
meaning  of  words'  and  'implications'  refer  to  'what  is 
implied  or  suggested  rather  than  by  formal  expression'.  7 
The  latter  will  be  examined  by  way  of  syntactical  and 
contextual  use  of 
ýWjl  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  and  Qoheleth. 
A. 
5Z  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  and  Cognate  Languages 
Defining  the  Hebrew  term 
5MM  is  a  difficult  task.  The 
semantic  range  of 
ýWl  is  extensive  and  has  been  translated 
in  a  variety  of  ways.  8  Etymological  evidence  of  the  word 5 
leads  to  a  literal  translation  something  like  'breath'  or 
'vapour'.  9 
These  renderings  are  further  supported  by  a  wide 
cognate  understanding  of  the  root 
ýWjl  in  these  terms: 
Jewish  Aramaic  (Babylonian)  'warm  breath',  'vapour';  Jewish 
Aramaic  (Targumim)  'breath',  'vanity';  Syrian  habala 
'vapour';  late  Egyptian  and  Ethiopic  hbl  'breath', 
'  wind'  . 
10  The  LXX  generally  renders 
ýVi  i  as  aTgOq  or  x£vog 
but  only  as  µatiai,  otii;  in  Qoheleth.  11  Burk  itt  thought 
5:  01 
might  be  from  the  original  Aramaic  X15:  71  which  means  to 
'exhale'  . 
12  Whitley,  along  the  same  line,  adds  that  M5:  14,1 
is  'therefore  suggestive  of  a  mere  waste  product  which 
rapidly  vanishes'"13 
Unpacking  all  of  the  semantic  nuances  of 
ý  :  11,1  is 
precarious  because  of  the  subtle  inter-relationships  which 
has  with  other  words.  Seybold  thinks  in  all 
probability  that 
ýW 
jl  was  of  onomatopoeic  origin.  14 
Following  Bertram,  15  the  onomatopoeic  origin  may  be 
indicated  by  the  constellation  of  the  root  letters,  weak 
vowels  and  the  absence  of  a  primary  verbal  root.  16  Seybold 
thus  says  that 
Diese  Tendenz  wird  begunstigt  durch  die  dem 
Onomatopoetikon  eigene  Aufnahmefahigkeit  und 
Offenheit  fur  neue  Festlegungen.  17 
('This  tendency  is  aided  by  the  capability  and  openness  of 
onomatopoeic  words  for  new  meanings').  He  further  adds 
that  'Das  Wort  besitzt  demnach  offene  Sinnbezirke' 
('Consequently,  the  meaning  of  the  word  [hevel]  is 
open')  . 
18  There  might  also  be  reason  to  think  that  the 
onomatopoeic  origin  may  be  related  to  the  semantic 6 
relationship  of 
ý:  Ij  ('breath')  in  parallelism  with  MI'l 
('wind  ').  19  There  are  many  examples  of  the  onomatopoeic 
relationship  of 
ý:  Iit  with  MI  but  a  classic  example  may  be 
Is.  57  . 
l3bc 
. 
20  Referring  to  idols  it  says, 
ý=ii  ii7'  r11T  MtV' 
nhD-1K1,  but  all  of  them  the  wind  will  lift,  a  breath  will 
take  away'.  The  pronunciation  of  ha-vel  gives  the 
onomatopoeic  effect  of  'breath',  or  in  the  case  of  Is. 
57.13c,  of  being  'blown  away'.  21 
The  example  of  Is.  57.13  introduces,  at  this  juncture, 
the  complicated  metaphorical  range  of 
ý  Wjl  in  inter- 
relationship  with  other  words  in  the  Hebrew  Bible.  Thus 
the  semantic  implication  of  'breath'  has  a  'fleeting'  or 
'insubstantial'  quality  about  it.  Consequently 
ý:  111  can 
act  as  a  metaphor  of  something  'empty'  or  'insubstantial', 
and  thus  in  a  derogatory  sense,  to  an  'idol'.  22  This,  in 
the  context  of  Is.  57.13,  may  provide  the  reason  why  idols 
can  be  so  easily  blown  away.  23 
The  semantic  implication  of  'empty'  in  ýWjl  is  further 
reinforced  by  a  close  syntactical  relationship  of 
ý:  Ii  with 
7ý`1  and  1iii1.24  The  concept  of  empty  can  carry  the  semantic 
implications  of  'vanity'  or  'meaninglessness'.  25 
The  semantic  implication  of 
5:  1  as  'fleeting'  is 
related  to  the  physical  nature  of  'breath'  or  'vapour'. 
Thus  in  its  metaphorical  sense  of  'fleeting'  the  semantic 
implication  can  be  that  of  'transitory'.  26  This  may  be 
related  to  the  concept  of  the  'breath  of  life'  in  Gen.  2.7. 
The  transitory  sense  of 
511 
may  be  best  exemplified  in  the 
use  of 
5:  I1  in  Genesis  4  to  represent  one  whose  life  was 
fleeting  or  'shortlived'.  27  5:  11  is  also  used  a  number  of 7 
times  in  the  Psalms  to  describe  the  transitory  nature  of 
life  as  related  to  the  '  breath  of  life'.  28 
ýWl  is  often  found  in  the  semantic  field  of  `17ý,  MV 
and  RIO  which  have  the  connotations  of  'deception', 
'deceit'  or  'falsehood'.  Sometimes  these  are  used 
altogether  in  the  context  of  idol  worship.  29  Sometimes  the 
concept  of  'emptiness'  or  'insubstantial',  as  related  to 
the  original  etymology  of  7:  I*jl  as  'breath'  or  'vapour',  has 
the  semantic  implications  or  metaphorical  value  of 
'worthlessness'.  30  This  value,  or  lack  of  value,  is  often 
a  semantic  implication  of 
5:  11  when  applied  to  idols.  31 
Thus  to  worship  worthless  idols  causes  the  worshipper  to 
become  worthless  themselves.  32  The  use  of 
ýWjl  in  this 
sense  can  also  apply  to  foreign  intervention.  33 
Seybold  also  argues  that  there  is  a  great  deal  of 
emotional  force  to  the  term 
ý=111.34 
He  seems  to  base  this 
on  the  evaluative  use  of  the  term,  especially  in  the  form 
of  laments,  polemics  against  idols  and  in  Ecclesiastes.  35 
He  also  thinks  that  because  of  its  onomatopoeic  origin, 
ý:  I'sl  has  an  open  range  of  meaning  and  the  potential  for  new 
meanings.  This  makes  it  a  good  candidate  for  a  keyword  or 
catchword,  e.  g.,  in  Ecclesiastes.  36 
The  complicated  inter-relationship  of 
ý:  Iljl  and  its 
various  nuances  provides  a  general  background  to  how 
Qoheleth  may  have  understood  and  used 
5tol  in  his  book. 
However,  in  hermeneutics  the  meaning  of  a  word  is 
discovered  not  only  by  its  literal  translation  and 
etymological  history,  but  by  how  the  author  used  the  word 
and  intended  it  to  be  understood.  37 8 
B.  Understandings  of 
ýZljl  in  Qoheleth 
Qoheleth  used  the  term 
ý=Ijl  38  times  in  his  book.  This  is 
almost  half  of  the  occurrences  of 
5=1  in  the  Hebrew  Bible. 
Moreover,  the  term  seems  to  have  a  strategic  or  evaluative 
purpose  in  the  Book  of  Qoheleth.  Therefore  understanding 
the  semantic  implications  of 
ý=Ojl  for  Qoheleth  will  aid  in 
understanding  the  meaning  of  his  book. 
If  one  consults  the  wide  variety  of  commentaries 
available  on  Qoheleth,  one  will  inevitably  find  a  wide 
variety  of  interpretations  of 
ý:  )Ijl  in  Qoheleth.  For 
example,  the  most  basic  translations  of 
ý=Ijl  include: 
'vanity',  'breathlike',  'ephemerality',  'transitory', 
'enigmatic',  'mysterious',  'meaningless',  'futility', 
'absurd'. 
Staples  has  provided  one  of 
treatments  of  Qoheleth's  use  of 
ý.  tß.  38 
Qoheleth  to  have  meant  by  $='M 
the  most  extensive 
He  ultimately  views 
'unknowable'  or 
'incomprehensible'.  39  Staples  postulates  this  by  a  study 
of  Qoheleth's  use  of 
ý=M 
to  describe  the  topoi  of  his 
book.  40  But  in  fact  it  is  not  the  topoi  themselves  which 
are  called 
ýWl  (because  they  have  inherent  benefits  to 
them).  Rather  it  is  because  humans  cannot  always 
understand  the  mysterious  nature  of  the  topoi  which  are 
'incomprehensible'.  Thus  it  is  this  'ignorance'  which  is 
branded  ý=I 
and  not  the  topoi  in  and  of  themselves. 
Whitley  thinks  that  Qoheleth  understood 
ti:  Ii  in  its 
basic  sense  of  'vapour'  but  with  a  variety  nuances.  41 
Qoheleth  essentially  used 
ý='jl  in  the  sense  of 9 
'evanescence'  or  'transitory';  though  Whitley  argues 
vigourously  that  Qoheleth  also  used 
ýW  1  extensively  to 
mean  what  is  'false'  or  'deceptive'  as  related  to  the  lack 
of  reward  for  toil.  42 
Seybold  understands  Qoheleth  to  have  known  and  used 
the  term 
5=71  in  all  its  various  nuances.  Thus  Qoheleth 
can  use  the  term  in  the  concrete  sense  of  'breath'  as 
related  to  the  'breath  of  life'  (e.  g.,  3.19,21);  in 
'breath-wind'  parallelism  (e.  g.,  1.14);  as  an  expression  of 
'worthlessness'  (e.  g.,  11.10);  in  lament  (e.  g.,  2.17);  in 
the  sense  of  'transitoriness'  (e.  g.,  6.12)  and  in  its  very 
emotional  sense  of  the  intensified  form  in  1.2  and  12.8. 
Seybold  thinks  that  how  Qoheleth  used 
ýWii  is  often  related 
to  other  keywords  such  as  '111",  jl  and  :  11M.  In  such 
cases,  the  semantic  implication  of 
ý:  1'71  is  that  of  'vain', 
in  the  special  sense  of  'Bedeutung  des  nicht  Zahlbaren' 
('that  which  does  not  count  or  matter').  43  Finally, 
Seybold  argues  that  the  dominant  use  of 
5=1  in  Qoheleth  is 
as  an  evaluative  statement  for  many  things  in  life.  These 
really  act  as  devaluative  statements  because  Qoheleth  is 
often  polemical  against  those  things  which  are  considered 
valuable  by  others.  The  polemical  use  of 
ý=I  by  Qoheleth 
exploits  the  emotional  dimension  of  the  term  to  the  full.  44 
Qoheleth's  use  of 
5:  11M  is  thus  his  catchword  and  nihilistic 
judgment  of  the  world  and  its  values.  45 10 
a)  The  LXX's  Understanding  of  7=  in  Qoheleth 
The  LXX  consistently  renders 
ý.  j  as  p  xtatotq  in  Qoheleth. 
µoctiato;  generally  means  'vain'  but  'denotes  the  world  of 
appearance  as  distinct  from  that  of  being'.  46  Bauernfeind, 
in  dealing  with  occurrences  of  µaiato;  in  Greek  literature, 
argues  that  gavx  OS  has  the  semantic  implication  of  'what  is 
against  the  norm,  unexpected,  offending  what  ought  to 
be'.  47  He  further  argues  that  µatiaio;  'retains  its 
comprehensive  metaphysical  undertone'48  and  adds: 
The  result  is  that,  in  accordance  with  the 
more  optimistic  or  sceptical  view  of  the  life 
of  the  one  who  uses  it,  its  range  may  be  narrow 
or  very  broad.  This  is  important,  since  it 
does  not  become  a  weak  and  quickly  fading 
formula.  When  it  is  used  and  when  it 
convinces,  or  begins  to  convince,  a  value  is 
assailed  and  a  part  of  supposed  being  begins 
to  sink  into  the  world  of  mere  appearance.  49 
Bauernfeind  says  that  the  understanding  of  µavato;  in  the 
LXX  is  'purely  lexically-that  it  is  constantly  used  for  the 
other  world'.  50  He  further  adds 
That  which  distinguishes  the  LXX  from  the 
Greek  tragedians,  the  certainty,  the 
instructive  calm,  with  which  the  sphere  of 
µatiato;  is  extended  to  all  the  lower  and  higher 
and  highest  values  attainable  by  man,  derives, 
not  from  a  historically  conditioned  joy  in 
negation,  but  primarily  and  exclusively  from 
faith  in  the  one  God.  Whether  this  God  for 
His  part  is  a  product  of  the  human  will  for 
negation,  or  whether  He  is  as  He  says  in  the 
OT,  is  itself  not  a  matter  for  investigation, 
but  for  faith.  51 
Balz  says  of  µatalo;  in  the  biblical  tradition  that  it 
...  refers  to  a  senseless  understanding  of 
reality  in  contrast  to  the  only  valid  reality 
of  God  or  to  skeptical  resignation  in  the  face 
of  God's  distance  from  this  world.  52 11 
According  to  these  scholars,  µatiato;  has  in  essence  the 
connotation  of  'vanity'  based  in  an  'other  worldliness', 
with  the  semantic  implication  of  heaven's  superior  reality 
in  contrast  to  the  obtuse  form  of  reality  in  this  world. 
They  also  view  Qoheleth  as  making  the  most  extensive  use  of 
il  (LXX  R  (XioirIS)  and  to  have  used  the  term  in  a 
despairing  way:  despairing  of  the  vanity  of  this  world  but 
pointing  to  God.  53 
b)  Fox's  Understanding  of 
5ZIJI  in  Qoheleth 
Fox's  work  in  assessing  Qoheleth's  use  of 
ý:  Ijl  is  very 
impressive.  He  takes  a  contextual  approach  and  provides  a 
philosophical  basis  for  his  rendering  of 
ý=jl 
as  'absurd'.  54 
In  Fox's  discussion,  he  refers  to  Camus'  classic 
description  of  the  word  absurd.  Commenting  on  Camus  he 
says  that 
...  the  essence  of  the  absurd  is  a  disparity 
between  two  terms  that  are  supposed  to  be  joined 
by  a  link  of  harmony  or  causality  but  are,  in 
fact,  disjunct.  The  absurd  is  an  affront  to 
reason,  in  the  broad  sense  of  the  human  faculty 
that  looks  for  order  in  the  world  about  us.  The 
quality  of  absurdity  does  not  inhere  in  a  being, 
act,  or  event  in  and  of  itself  (though  these  may 
be  called  "absurd"),  but  rather  in  the  tension 
between  a  certain  reality  and  framework  of 
expectations.  55 
In  discussing  the  semantic  range  of 
ý=  1,  Fox  argues 
against  a  strict  rendering  of  it  as  'incongruent',  'irony' 
or  'ironic'.  He  says  that 
... 
incongruities  and  ironies  may  be  merely 
puzzling  or  amusing;  the  absurd  is  never  that. 
Some  ironies  may  also  satisfy  a  sense  of  justice, 
as  when  a  man  is  caught  in  the  trap  he  has  set; 
the  absurd  never  does. 
...  [It]  is  not  merely 12 
incongruous  or  ironic;  it  is  oppressive,  even 
tragic.  The  divorce  between  act  and  result  is 
the  reality  upon  which  human  reason  founders;  it 
robs  human  actions  of  significance  and  undermines 
morality.  For  Qohelet  hebel  is  an  injustice.  56 
Fox  further  argues  that 
ý= 
jl  is  not  a  sense  of 
incomprehensibility.  While  elements  of  a  situation  may  be 
shrouded  in  mystery  and  some  incomprehensibility, 
...  to  call  something  "absurd"  is  to  claim  a 
certain  understanding  of  its  nature:  it  is 
contrary  to  reason.  To  call  something 
"incomprehensible"  is  to  avoid  a  judgment  of  that 
sort.  "Incomprehensible"  allows  the  possibility 
that  a  phenomenon  is  meaningful;  "absurd"  denies 
that  it  has  meaning  and  suggests  its  bitter 
implications  for  human  existence.  57 
Fox  further  adds  that  absurd  carries  the  emotional 
connotations  of  'alienation,  frustration,  resentment,  a 
stale  taste  of  repeated  and  meaningless  events,  even 
resentment  at  the  "gods"'  . 
58  Fox  will  go  on  to  argue  that 
the  emotional  dimension  of 
5:  1M  is  reinforced  by  the  close 
relationship  between  5Wi 
and  1i17  r11D1.59  He  argues  that 
because  ?  117  fl13  is  used  in  conjunction  with  the 
5=71 
judgments,  n17  1131  is  an  auxiliary  statement  of  the 
emotional  import  of  the  intellectual  5=71  judgments.  60 
There  is  a  logical  relationship  between  the  two  terms.  The 
phrase  n17  fl1VI  is  literally  translated  'chasing  after  the 
wind'  . 
61  It  can  also  be  rendered  the  desire  of  the 
spirit'  or  a  'vexation  of  spirit'.  But  1iii  rll.  Vl  is  quite 
obviously  a  metaphor  for  the  vexation  inflicted  on  anyone 
who  tries  such  a  futile  activity.  62  As  Fox  points  out:  The 
pursuit  of  the  wind  may  convey  the  notion  of  trying  to 
catch  something  which  cannot  be  caught,  and  thus  it  is 
futile  or  meaningless.  But  in  Qoheleth's  case,  the 13 
immediate  goals  were  achieved.  63  The  desired  goals  just 
turn  out  to  be  unpleasant. 
Thus  the  phrase,  as  Qohelet  uses  it,  points  to 
the  psychological  experience  of  the  pursuer 
rather  than  to  a  characteristic  (such  as 
elusiveness)  of  that  which  is  being  pursued.  64 
Perhaps  the  n1'l  1131  statements  are  a  wordplay  with  the 
futility  of  'chasing  after  the  wind'  having  the 
psychological  and  emotional  effect  of  a  'vexation  of 
spirit'.  In  any  case,  rendering  the  phrase  as  a  'vexation 
of  spirit'  is  sound  in  relationship  with  the 
ý=ftil 
judgments,  because  it  is  clear  that  many  life  situations 
distressed  Qoheleth  and  were  considered  bad.  65  Thus  the 
M"I  ii1.  V'I  statements  may  be  representative  of  the 
psychological  and  emotional  effects  of  the  ý:  Iii  judgments. 
Fox  is  not  denying  the  other  generally  recognised 
nuances  of 
5=1  in  Qoheleth.  But  since  Fox  is  arguing  that 
Qoheleth  was  building  his  case  around  the  term  ý=M,  he 
thinks  that  a  one  word  translation  of 
ýWjl  is  the  best  way 
forward  to  avoid  obscuring  Qoheleth's  point  (whatever  that 
may  be).  Thus  Fox  argues  that  'absurd'  is  the  best  one 
word  rendering  of  711  for  Qoheleth. 
2.  CRITICAL  ASSESSMENT  OF 
ýZl 
AND  1111  r113i1  IN 
THE  HEBREW  BIBLE  AND  FOR  QOHELETH 
The  previous  discussion  should  have  alerted  the  reader  to 
the  complicated  and  subtle  problems  of  determining  what 
5M'jI 
means  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  and  for  Qoheleth.  A  step  by 
step  critical  assessment  will  now  be  made  of  these 
linguistic  arguments. 14 
A.  7Wfl  in  the  Hebrew  Bible 
The  only  semantic  certainty  about 
ýZl  is  that, 
etymologically  and  as  cognate  languages  understood  it,  7=71 
means  'breath'  or  'vapour'.  That  is  where  the  certainty 
about  the  semantic  implications  of 
ý= 
end.  However, 
there  are  a  number  of  contexts  whereby  a  literal  rendering 
of 
ýWjl 
as  'breath'  or  'vapour'  would  make  no  sense. 
While  a  case  can  be  made  for  the  onomatopoeic  origin 
of  the  root 
ý  'jl 
,  on  the  basis  of  its  phonetic 
pronunciation  (ha-vel)  and  literal  understanding,  it  cannot 
be  proven. 
The  subtle  metaphorical  implications  of 
ýWjl 
are  even 
more  problematic  to  prove.  However,  the  notion  that 
ý='M 
carries  the  semantic  implication  of  'fleeting'  or 
'transitory'  has  some  credence,  on  the  basis  of  the 
physical  nature  of  'breath'  or  'vapour',  in  the  way  the 
term  is  grammatically  used  in  some  contexts:  breath  or 
vapour  quickly  fleet  away. 
While 
ý=`1 
can  be  syntactically  related  to  7'11  and 
1`in,  it  does  not  follow  that 
5=11 
means  what  they  mean. 
When  5='jl  is  used  in  sentences  with  7''7  and  )MI,  these  may 
all  stand  as  independent  adjectives  of  those  things  so 
described,  e.  g.,  Is.  30.7  and  49.4.  So  because  511  is  in 
the  same  semantic  field  or  in  syntactical  relationship  with 
other  words  does  not  mean  that  those  words  determine  or 
necessarily  alter  the  essential  meaning  of 
5VI, 
nor  does 
it  make 
5WI 
a  synonym  for  those  words.  One  could  argue, 
moreover,  if  one  took  a  rather  scientific  and  literalistic 15 
approach  to 
ýnl,  that,  at  least  physically, 
ýnl 
cannot 
mean  'empty'  or  'insubstantial',  because  breath  or  vapour 
still  constitute  some  physical  presence  and  not  'absence' 
as  those  two  terms  suggest.  The  most  that  can  be  said  of 
whatever  is  described  as 
ýWl  in  these  contexts  is  that 
they  are  of  small  or  fleeting  substance.  This  is,  however, 
obviously  too  literalistic  and  applies  a  scientific  rigour 
alien  to  the  ancient  Near  East. 
The  same  thing  can  be  said  of  the  value  judgment  of 
ý=T 
representing  'worthless'.  All  that  can  be  ascertained 
linguistically  of  those  things  evaluatively  described  as 
ý=  is  that  they  are  of  small  or  fleeting  value  but  not  of 
,  no  value'  (idols  do  have  a  physical  presence).  One  also 
would  expect,  moreover,  that  when  idol  worshippers  are 
accused  of  being  worthless  themselves,  the  verbal  form  of 
=M  would  be  in  the  Hiphil  stem  in  order  to  provide  a 
causative  semantic  implication  to  the  root.  But  this  is 
simply  not  the  case.  This  may  again,  however,  be  too 
literalistic  and  not  sensitive  enough  to  the  contextual 
uses  of 
ýnii 
.  Therefore,  the  semantic  implication  of 
5.  W1 
as  lacking  any  real  or  lasting  substance  ('empty')  may  have 
the  metaphorical  value  of  'worthless':  for  is  there  any 
worth  to  something  that  is  of  insignificant  and  quickly 
fleeting  substance? 
While  Seybold  makes  a  great  deal  about  the  emotional 
force  of 
ýMojl, 
which  he  says  is  'der  ganze  haebael  eigene 
emotionale'  ('the  emotional  force  proper  to  hevel'),  66  he 
in  no  way  explains  nor  justifies  this  semantic  implication 
of 
ý=I.  Seybold's  best  case  might  be,  if  he  is  correct  in 16 
his  genre  analysis,  the  use  of 
5=11  in  laments.  An  overall 
genre  recognition,  however,  does  not  necessarily  provide 
the  semantic  implications  for  specific  words  used  therein. 
In  the  case  of  the  laments  where 
5=1 
appears,  the  specific 
references  seem  to  be  to  the  transitory  and  limited 
duration  of  life.  67  Moreover,  one  cannot  prove  there  is 
emotional  value  to  a  term  because  of  its  context  alone.  In 
contradistinction,  terms  like  a3Vn,  68  1K 
, 
69  KýtV7°  clearly 
have  a  meaning  which  is  attached  to  the  emotional  dimension 
of  human  being.  The  same  cannot  be  said  of 
Notwithstanding,  the  emotional  force  of 
ý  =M  may  be  a 
semantic  implication  of  the  word.  Fox's  concept  of  n1l 
X13  being  an  auxiliary  statement  of  the  emotional  import 
of 
5 
may  lend  weight  to  Seybold.  But  a  context 
sensitive  analysis  can  only  ever  be  used  with  a  great  deal 
of  caution. 
B.  Understandings  of  7W  l  in  Qoheleth 
Staples  definition  of 
ý=%I  is  for  the  most  part  erroneous. 
Whitley  rightly  criticizes  Staples  for  providing  a  meaning 
for  ýM  71  which  is  not  based  on  linguistic  grounds.  71 
'Incomprehensible'  is  not  an  appropriate  understanding  of 
ýZ  l  for  two  basic  reasons.  One,  Staples  basis  for 
defining  ý=Ijl 
as  'incomprehensible'  is  related  to  a  faulty 
etymology  from  Canaanite  mystery  cults.  72  Two,  there  are  a 
number  of  situations  which  Qoheleth  described  as 
ý=Tl  but 
are  comprehensible,  e.  g.,  2.17-21. 17 
Qoheleth  may  have  used 
511 
with  all  of  the  previously 
discussed  semantic  implications,  i.  e.,  he  used  it  in 
different  ways  with  specific  reference  to  each  topos. 
However,  as  Fox  points  out,  a  multiple  rendering  approach 
to  translating 
ý=ii  in  Qoheleth  may  in  fact  obscure 
Qoheleth's  message  which  was  built  around  the  singular  term 
ýI1.  This  may  be  behind  the  LXX's  single  rendering  of 
ýýý 
as  µatatotT  when  other  appropriate  words  were  available  for 
different  contexts.  But  this  can  not  be  proven. 
Nevertheless,  it  may  be  that  Qoheleth  used 
5:  1'ol  in  such  a 
way  as  to  imply  its  original  sense  but  with  an  overall 
greater  meaning  suitable  for  the  theme  of  his  book. 
a)  The  LXX's  Understanding  of 
$I  in  Qoheleth 
One  must  remember  that  the  LXX  is  a  translation  of  the 
Hebrew  text  of  Qoheleth.  Since  all  translations  are 
interpretive  by  their  very  nature,  and  have  the  potential 
to  misunderstand  texts  and  mistranslate  terms,  some  caution 
needs  to  be  exercised  when  appealing  to  them.  Moreover,  as 
Barr  points  out  numerous  times  in  The  Semantics  of  Biblical 
Language,  Bible  dictionaries,  and  in  particular  those  with 
a  theological  slant,  often  have  the  tendency  to  be  overly 
interpretive  and  import  theological  meaning  into  words 
which  are  not  necessarily  a  part  of  the  word's  semantic 
implications.  73 
Bauernfeind  and  Balz  may  be  guilty  of  the  above. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  probably  some  validity  to  notion  of 
the  'vanity'  of  this  world  as  opposed  to  the  divine  realm 18 
on  the  basis  of  the  exploration  of  philosophical  and 
theological  issues  in  Greek  literature.  This  in  turn  may 
be  related  to  why  the  LXX  went  with  the  singular  use  of 
µatiaio'CT1S  in  their  translation  of  Qoheleth;  though  it  does 
not  follow  that  Qoheleth  used  it  in  this  sense,  nor  is 
there  any  evidence  of  a  concept  of  afterlife  in  his  book.  74 
But  one  should  be  cautioned  that  the  LXX  may  have  had 
another  agenda:  to  save  Qoheleth  for  the  canon  and  this  is 
why  they  went  with  µatato'r  ;  and  its  semantic  baggage.  75 
b)  Fox's  Understanding  of 
5=j  in  Qoheleth 
Fox  made  use  of  Camus'  philosophical  concept  of  'absurdity' 
in  order  to  draw  certain  analogies.  He  is  careful  not  to 
deny  the  other  known  semantic  implications  of 
511  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible  and  for  Qoheleth  but  makes  an  important  point 
with  regard  to  Qoheleth  building  his  case  around  the  term 
'hfl. 
Fox's  discussion  of  n11  MIDI  may  have  some  validity. 
Nevertheless,  finding  the  root  and  etymology  of  MIDI  is  a 
difficult  task.  X131  may  come  from  the  Aramaic  root  331. 
But  this  is  unlikely  because  D  VI  means  'to  break'  and 
makes  no  sense  of  111`)  !  1131  in  Qoheleth;  though  Fox  thinks 
it  does  following  the  Syrian  version  (thurapa'  drucha)  and 
the  Targum  (tebirut  rucha').  76  Nevertheless,  the  problem 
remains  because  V5V  1  is  never  conjugated  as  fl1.  V7  or  11'3r 
. 
77 
Some  scholars  have  postulated  the  root  11  which  means  to 
'answer',  'sing',  'busy  with,  or  'be  bowed  down, 
afflicted'.  78  But  this  is  unlikely  and  would  need  a  major 19 
textual  emendation  (adding  I  and  removing  ))  which  is 
unwarranted.  If  the  root  of  !  11V1  is  '13 
,  then  there  are 
many  possibilities:  to  'shepherd',  'feed  on',  'associate 
with'  (as  in  a  friend),  'desire'  or  'pursue'.  79  Most 
commentators  compare  Qoheleth's  n1l  fl1V7  with  Hos.  12.2: 
n'Ip  11  11  1i1ý  'JIMI3 
.  They  view  'MV  I  to  be  in  parallelism 
with  ¶1 
. 
n`il  is  well  known  to  mean  'pursue'  or 
'persecute'  "80  If  Qoheleth  has  a  conceptual  dependence  on 
Hos.  12.2  for  1111  111,  W1,1%.  V1  may  thus  come  from  the  root 
meaning  to  pursue'.  Therefore  n1l  fl1VI  would  be  the 
'pursuit  of  wind'  with  the  metaphorical  implication  of 
'futility'.  However,  fl1D'I  may  also  be  from  either  the 
roots  mVI  or  DWI  meaning  'bad',  'evil',  'distress'  or 
'affliction'.  81  Thus  in  conjunction  with  n1l  meaning 
'spirit',  the  phrase  means  'affliction  of  spirit'.  This  is 
the  Vulgate's  understanding  of  111)  Ii13I  :  afflictio 
Spiritus.  Fox  probably  has  a  sound  footing  for  his 
rendering  of  MI  Ii1311  as  a  'vexation  of  spirit'  on  the 
basis  of  word  play  and  in  relationship  with  the 
judgments. 
While  Fox's  notion  of  existential  absurdity  may  be  a 
modern  anachronism,  there  may  be  some  validity  to  it  for 
understanding  Qoheleth's  use  of 
5:  11.  Fox  could  have  found 
more  support  for  his  philosophical  approach  if  he  had 
examined  the  LXX's  use  of  µaiatoTqS  and  used  Bauernfeind's 
understanding  of  it  in  Greek  literature,  the  LXX  and 
Qohel  e  th  . 20 
3.  TEE  SEMANTIC  IMPLICATIONS  OF  '1fl'  IN  THE 
HEBREW  BIBLE  AND  FOR  QOHELETH 
The  Hebrew  root  Irl"  is  a  very  common  root  and  it  appears 
approximately  226  times  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  in  various 
forms.  82 
A.  711'  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  and  Cognate  Languages 
According  to  Kronholm,  'it  is  not  hard  to  determine  its 
[`1111I]  basic  meaning:  "be  extra,  surplus"  1  83  and  B.  D.  B. 
supports  Kronholm  with  'remainder',  '  excess', 
'preeminence'.  84  VIII,  which  refers  to  'string'  ,  'cord', 
'bow-string',  is  clearly  not  a  possibility  for  Qoheleth's 
use  of  Irl'  in  any  context.  85 
'In",  with  the  meaning  'remainder',  'surplus',  is  also 
found  in  the  cognate  Akkadian  root  wtr,  frequently  in 
economic  texts  but  also  in  astronomical  and  mathematical 
sources.  The  Akkadian  noun  atartu  means  'surplus'  in 
accounting  but  can  be  used  to  mean  'exaggeration'  with  the 
connotation  of  'lie',  i.  e.,  to  lie  by  means  of 
exaggeration.  The  Akkadian  adjective  atru  can  mean 
'excessive',  'extraordinary'  and  the  noun  atru 
'supplement',  'supplementary  payment'  or  more  generally 
'price',  'cost'.  86 
In  general,  cognate  appearances  of  1fl'  in  Syriac  itar, 
Ethiopic  tarafa,  Arabic  watara,  and  Ugaritic  ytr,  align 
with  usage  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  with  primary  reference  to 
'remainder',  'excess',  'surplus';  87  though  occasionally  7n4 21 
is  used  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  'with  implied  inferiority  in 
number  or  quality',  88  i.  e.,  from  a  negative  perspective. 
B.  7fl'  in  Qoheleth  and  the  LXX 
Iii'  appears  in  Qoheleth  18  times:  10  times  only  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible  as  the  masculine  absolute  noun  11)i1'  (1.3; 
2.11,13  [2x]  ;  3.9;  5.8,15;  7.12;  10.10,  11),  3  times  as 
the  qal  masculine  participle  '1?  11*'  (6.8,11;  7.11),  4  times 
as  the  qal  masculine  participle  ý1'  used  as  an  adverb 
(2.15;  7.16;  12.9,12)  and  1  time  as  the  masculine  absolute 
noun  1fl'T  (3.19).  89 
The  masculine  noun  111I1"  is  only  found  in  the  Hebrew 
Bible  in  Qoheleth  and  in  some  rabbinic  literature,  e.  g., 
Rabbah  Midrash  Ecclesiastes.  Fredericks  argues  that  the 
reason  why  the  absolute  ending  11  is  used  in  Qoheleth  with 
1f"  is  not  because  of  any  Aramaic  influence  but  rather 
because  of  the  abstract  nature  of  the  book;  90  this  is 
plausible  but  questionable. 
'In'ý  eventually  came  to  refer  to  that  which  is 
'leftover'  with  the  implication  of  'profit'  or,  in  a 
metaphorical  sense,  'advantage';  though  Scott  argues  that 
the  'difference'  from  a  transaction  relates  to  its  'value', 
and  in  the  case  of  the  rhetorical  question  1111Ii'-iii  : 
'Qoheleth  says  there  is  none'.  91  Schoors  follows  Scott  and 
Ginsburg  in  the  understanding  that  the  rhetorical  question 
71I1'M  requires  a  'strong  negation'. 
The  LXX  renders  Irl"  in  Qoheleth  consistently  as 
ieptaacta,  meaning  'to  be  present  overabundantly'  . 
92  The 22 
idea,  therefore,  of  Qoheleth's  use  of  I1'  to  mean  'surplus' 
is  thus  supported  by  the  LXX.  Hauck  argues  that  in  3.19 
the  Greek  phrase  irapa  iO  x  voq  is  used  for  the  noun  `1111iß  to 
mean  ""to  have  advantage  over"  others',  93  and  in  the  case 
of  3.19,  specifically  man's  advantage  over  the  animals. 
For  Ogden,  1.3  is  the  'programmatic  question' 
(ý1`1Iiýýýý)  of  Qoheleth,  the  question  Qoheleth  is  seeking  to 
answer;  which  Ogden  concedes  the  required  response  is: 
'there  is  no  yitron-and  leading  into  the  advice  that  life 
as  a  gift  from  God  must  be  enjoyed'.  94  The  programmatic 
question  appears  3  times  in  Qoheleth  all  with  reference  to 
work  and  its  profitability  (1.3;  3.9;  5.15). 
A  careful  examination  of  how  Qoheleth  used  the  term 
'IIi"  can  be  found  as  follows:  with  reference  to  work  and 
commercial  activity  where  a  rendering  something  like 
'profit'  or  'gain'  is  required  by  the  context  (1.3;  2.11; 
3.9;  5.8,  15;  10.11)  ;  where  an  'advantage'  over  against 
something  else  (2.13  [2x],  15;  3.19  [4111112];  6.8,11;  7.11, 
12;  10.10);  adverbially  (7.16)  and  finally  with  the  sense 
of  in  addition  to,  in  the  epilogue  (12.9,12). 
There  is  another  common  use  of  the  root  In'  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible  which  may  have  a  bearing  on  Qoheleth.  The 
noun  1111  can  mean  'remainder',  'remnant':  'This  remainder 
is  seen  primarily  from  a  negative  perspective,  implying 
that  what  is  left  is  less  in  number  or  quality'  (sic).  95 
Could  this  'poor  remainder'  be  the  primary  sense  in  which 
Qoheleth  used  7!  *',  perhaps  as  a  pun  on  the  economic  sense 
of  the  word  and  in  relation  to  the  rhetorical  question 
IV1rl'-i112  which  requires  a  strong  negation?  This  would 23 
certainly  correspond  to  the  negative  content  and  ethos  of 
his  book  and  the  hevel  statements.  This  'poor  remainder' 
is  used  some  95  times  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  (almost  half  of 
its  occurrences),  and  thus  Qoheleth  might  well  have 
intended  a  pun  between  the  positive  economic  sense  of  1fl' 
and  the  negation  of  his  programmatic  question,  negative 
evaluation  of  life  and  activities  under  the  sun  as  hevel. 
Ogden  has  done  a  careful  study  of  111'  in  Qoheleth,  and 
comes  to  a  unique  conclusion;  but  since  his  arguments  on 
7  11*1  are  integral  to  his  essential  message  of  joy 
interpretation,  they  will  be  dealt  with  in  chapter  five. 
4.  CRITICAL  ASSESSMENT  OF  'lfl'  IN  THE 
HEBREW  BIBLE  AND  FOR  QOHELETH 
The  extensive  evidence  of  7rl"  in  cognate  languages,  the  LXX 
and  the  Hebrew  Bible  (266  times)  leaves  little  doubt  that 
its  general  meaning  is  'surplus',  'excess',  'profit'  or 
'gain',  and  that  this,  in  the  commercial  context  of 
Qoheleth,  is  its  meaning  for  Qoheleth.  What  may  complicate 
matters  is  if  the  negative  sense  of  the  word  is  being 
alluded  to  with  regard  to  Qoheleth's  employment  of  the 
commercial  sense  of  Ing.  This  is  likely  in  conjunction 
with  the  negative  response  of  the  rhetorical  question 
JI'M11113  because  even  what  is  'left  over'  (profit)  appears 
to  have  little  benefit  'under  the  sun'  on  the  basis  of 
death's  leveling  effect  and  the  hevel  evaluations. 
Chapters  four  and  six  will  help  illuminate  the  possibility 
of  an  ironic  use  of  711ß  in  Qoheleth. 24 
Ogden'  s  view  that  11111"  i  t12  is  the  programmatic 
question  which  Qoheleth  sought  to  answer  is  questionable 
for  two  reasons.  First  of  all,  the  source  critical 
problems  of  Qoheleth  are  notoriously  difficult,  especially 
with  regard  to  1.2-3;  and  that  I111TI-1112  is  original  to 
Qoheleth  can  never  be  held  without  doubt  because  of  these 
source  critical  problems.  Secondly,  the  so-called 
programmatic  question  is  only  asked  three  times  (1.3;  3.9; 
5.15);  and  while  Ogden  might  have  a  case  for  1.3  being 
indicative  of  a  programmatic  question  for  the  book,  3.9  and 
5.15  appear  in  the  middle  of  the  book,  and  nowhere  near  the 
end  of  the  book,  as  one  would  expect  if  this  was  the  main 
question  the  author  was  trying  to  answer  (unlike  the 
evaluative  hevel  statements).  Ogden  is  clearly  wrong, 
moreover,  that  the  term  7fl'  does  not  have  any  'commercial' 
or  '  material'  sense  in  Qoheleth  (which  he  says  is  left  to 
the  term  j  ?  i) 
.  Qoheleth's  commercial  and  materialistic 
nature  is  clearly  evident  in  the  text  itself  (1.3;  2.1-11, 
17-23;  3.9;  4.4-9;  5.9-6.11;  7.11-12;  11.1-6)  and 
recognised  by  scholars  alike  (Dahood,  de  Jong,  Kugel,  Seow, 
Whybray,  et  al.  ).  96 
5.  CONCLUSIONS  REGARDING  7Zi1,  rii01  x1131,  Ir1' 
Qoheleth  may  have  intended  to  use  all  of  the  semantic 
nuances  of 
ý:  Il  within  a  context  specific  approach,  i.  e., 
with  a  variety  of  different  meanings  for  ý=jl 
as  related  to 
his  topoi.  But  it  is  more  likely  that  he  used  the  term 
ýWii 
as  a  running  play  on  words,  i.  e.,  he  used 
ýW`i 
to  play 25 
off  the  specific  topoi  he  discussed  and  imply  an  ultimate 
metaphorical  meaning.  Thus  Qoheleth  may  well  have  used  the 
term  in  a  very  loaded  sense,  i.  e.,  with  many  or  all  of  the 
above  mentioned  nuances  of  the  word,  but  ultimately  with 
the  loaded  implication  of  absurdity.  For  example,  death 
presents  an  enormous  problem  for  Qoheleth  and 
ýMii 
might 
well  be  related  to  the  'transitoriness'  of  a  fleeting  life; 
or  the  'emptiness'  of  life's  activities  may  also  be  related 
to  the  nuance  of  'meaningless',  and  in  the  loaded  sense  of 
5:  1ii  ultimately  imply  that  life  is  'absurd'.  Perhaps  1i1r 
fl13  1  is  a  play  on  words  with 
t7= 
whereby  the  futility  of 
'pursuing  the  wind'  has  the  psychological  effects  of  a 
'vexation  of  spirit'  and  is  thus  representative  of  the 
emotional  value  of 
ýiý  1.  Collectively  the 
ýW  1  and  ii1'I  i11V7 
statements  may  represent  the  'existential  absurdity'  of 
human  being  and  there  can  be  no  denying  that  the  hevel  and 
1111  n1DI  statements  are  of  a  negative  force  in  Qoheleth. 
Because  of  the  complicated  and  subtle  semantic 
implications  of 
ý:  M,  and  the  difficulty  in  ascertaining 
its  meaning  in  specific  contexts,  it  is  probably  not  valid 
to  render 
ýWl 
unilaterally  as  'absurd'  in  Qoheleth.  But 
Fox  may  be  right  that  multiple  renderings  of 
5:  11M  in 
Qoh  eleth  obscure  the  author's  message.  Therefore, 
following  Garrett's  advice,  97  it  might  be  best  to  simply 
transliterate  the  Hebrew  term 
ý= 
and  provide  an 
explanatory  note  of  all  the  semantic  implications  for  the 
reader  so  they  can  evaluate  each  use  for  themselves  and  in 
the  overall  context  of  the  book,  albeit  negatively.  Thus 
the  transliterated  term 
ý= 
could  be  understood  in  the 26 
context  of  the  loadedness  with  which  Qoheleth  used  it. 
This  applies  a  context  sensitive  approach  but  has  the 
benefit  of  a  unified  and  unilateral  recognition  of  this 
technical  term  for  Qoheleth  without  denying  its  multiple 
semantic  nuances  and  implications. 
The 
$Wl  judgments  are  often  'prolepticisms',  which 
are  a  rhetorical  device  with  the  literary  function  to 
announce  in  advance  the  conclusion  of  some  subject  under 
investigation;  98  and  in  the  case  of  Qoheleth,  the 
conclusion  or  value  judgment  (L  1)  of  the  various  topoi 
under  investigation,  e.  g.,  1.14;  2.1,17;  4.7;  7.15;  11.8. 
There  can  be  little  doubt,  on  the  basis  of  the 
extensive  use  of  III'  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  (266  times), 
cognate  languages  and  the  LXX  that  1fl'  means  'excess', 
'surplus'  or  'profit'.  It  is  also  clear  in  Qoheleth  that 
the  term  is  used  with  some  commercial  sense  but  also  in  the 
sense  of  'gain'  or  'advantage'.  There  can  also  be  little 
doubt  that  11`1ii"1112  is  a  question  of  Qoheleth  (1.3;  3.9; 
5.15)  which  he  was  trying  to  answer;  but  it  is  not  at  all 
clear  that  it  was  his  programmatic  question  and  there  is 
considerable  doubt  on  such  a  proposition. 
If  Qoheleth  is  sceptical  and  contains  ironies,  which 
chapters  four  and  six  will  show,  then  it  is  very  likely 
that  Qoheleth  used  the  term  'iti'  in  the  negative  sense  of 
'little  value'  or  'poor  quality'  (almost  half  of  the 
occurrences  in  the  Hebrew  Bible),  i.  e.,  as  a  pun  on 
commercialism,  materialism  and  the  utter  lack  of  profit  or 
gain  under  the  sun  in  conjunction  with  the  hev  el 
evaluations. 27 
CHAPTER  TWO 
EXEGESIS  OF  THE  JOY  STATEMENTS 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  examine  the  joy 
statements  through  a  detailed  exegesis  of  their  linguistics 
and  grammar  in  order  to  determine  their  linguistic  and 
grammatical  meaning. 
1.  QOHELETH  2.24-25 
Qoheleth  2.24-25  begins  with  the  stock  phrase  :  11t  1'K. 
This  introduces  a  comparison;  1  though  there  is  some  dispute 
that  its  literary  nature  is  interrogative  (cf.  Gordis). 
Z1b  rarely  carries  any  connotations  of  ethical  good  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible;  and  with  the  comparative  phrase  it  denotes 
what  is  'better'.  There  is  some  question,  however,  as  to 
why  the  comparative  112  is  omitted  before  ýn  M*10.  Some 
scholars  suggest  it  is  a  haplography  (Barton,  Fox,  Gordis, 
Whybray),  and  this  may  be  supported  by  the  textual  evidence 
of  Targum  Secundum  and  the  Syriac  where  the  IM  is  present 
(5n  WIOM);  but  the  above  scholars  go  too  far  when  they 
support  a  haplography  on  the  basis  of  the  comparative 
analogies  of  3.12  and  8.15  where  the  construction  is  CM  ID 
WM  Ilt  or  3.22  where  the  construction  is  7ýýi>  >1Lýi 
J'iM.  The  use  of  the  comparative  Iii  is  not  necessary  in 
Hebrew  and  :  11t  JIM  is  adequate  on  its  own  to  indicate 
comparison;  though  Whybray  suggests  that  its  absence  could 
be  interpreted  as  'man  derives  no  good  from  [enjoying  food 
and  drink]'  (cf.  also  Ginsburg).  Qoheleth's  erratic  Hebrew 28 
style  only  accentuates  this  problem.  Crenshaw  probably 
demonstrates  prudence  when  he  says  that  WM  J"M  indicates 
'relative  advantage:  not  "This  good,  "  but  "There  is  nothing 
better.  "' 
There  is  textual  variation  of  D1K:  1  in  Alexandrinus, 
Va  ti  canus  and  Codex  Ephraemi,  as  well  as  the  Peshi  t  ta, 
which  all  read  D`ibtý;  the  LXX  omits  any  preposition 
whatsoever.  6.12  and  8.15  demonstrate  a  similar,  though 
not  identical,  grammar:  CI  M5  tUD-71iß  and  VIN5  WV-11A 
respectively.  A  textual  emendation  is  probably  the  best 
solution  for  bIRM  in  2.24;  unless  in  this  particular 
instance  Qoheleth  was  indicating  some  deep  existential 
meaning,  perhaps  implying  instrumentality  in  the  =  of 
b`iM.  'Z:  '  There  is  nothing  better  in  humanity  than  ...  '. 
But  this  is  unlikely  and  may  simply  be  attributed  to  either 
Qoheleth's  erratic  Hebrew  style  or  a  spelling  mistake 
corrected  by  other  manuscripts. 
The  use  of 
ýDM 
and  1!  m  should  be  taken  in  their  most 
basic  sense  of  'eat'  and  'drink';  but  as  elsewhere  in 
Qoheleth  and  the  Hebrew  Bible, 
5  DM  may  carry  the  semantic 
force  of  'consume',  possibly  with  the  connotation  of 
'enjoyment'. 
The  next  clause, 
*MD>  >1t  1mM-Nt  71W11,11,  is 
problematic.  Crenshaw  suggests  that  the  use  of  the  hiphil 
with  'lM7 
,  and  in  connection  with  10IN  ('his  body'),  may 
indicate  the  'pampering  of  one's  body'  (citing  3.13,5.17 
and  6.6  as  other  examples);  but  neither  the  verb  itself  nor 
his  examples  can  sustain  this  view.  MR  11  often  carries 
the  connotations  of  'experience'  in  Qoheleth;  but  in  this 29 
context  probably  refers  to  'sight'  versus  'experience'. 
Its  use  with  direct  object  ft),  which  often  has  the  deeper 
meanings  of  'person',  'soul'  or  'self'  rather  than  just 
'body',  may  indicate  some  existential  nuance  here, 
especially  when  some  commentators  like  Gordis  and  Crenshaw 
view  the  sequencing  of  the  perfect  and  imperfect  verbs  in 
the  sentence  as  emphasising  the  present  and  expressing  a 
universal  truth.  However,  the  verb  and  direct  object 
probably  mean,  in  the  simple  sense  of  the  grammar,  'show 
himself'. 
Fox  contends  that  5MV 
'carries  heavy  negative 
connotations'.  He  rightly  begins  with  the  original  meaning 
of  the  noun 
513y 
which  means  'trouble'  or  'suffer',  but 
further  argues  that  it  carries  the  notion  of  'futile', 
'arduous  burdensomeness'  or  'toil'.  It  is  activity  which 
demands  effort  beyond  its  rewards,  and  as  such,  does  not 
adjust  itself  to  reality.  Fox  further  argues  that  121)  may 
be  a  metonym  for  the  'material  benefits'  or  'earnings'  of 
one's  toil;  though  Salters  disputes  this  in  his  Ph.  D. 
thesis.  2  Fox's  view,  however,  may  be  supported  by  the 
cognate  Assyrian  term  nimelu  which  means  'gain'  or 
'possession'.  The  use  of  WM  with  this  clause  may  be 
rendered  'beneficial'.  Midrash  Rabbah  Ecclesiastes  is 
surely  wrong  when  it  suggests  that  15  MD  should  be  read 
1M51D,  which  Cohen  translates  as  'his  world'. 
The  last  sentence  in  2.24  begins  with  the  emphatic 
constructions  it  and  'It  Ifl  t  1:  'This  too  I  saw'  .  Gordis 
rightly  points  out  that  the  subject  of  r1  comes  after  the 
verb  of  perception  in  the  subordinate  clause  R"M 
... 
4:  ). 30 
In  this  case  the  compound  subject  is  CVMýMi  1'77  ('  from  the 
hand  of  God').  The  implication  would  then  be  that  the 
ability  to  enjoy  life  (eating,  drinking,  work)  comes  from 
God.  This  may  be  further  supported  by  the  next  clause  in 
2.25;  if  a  textual  emendation  proves  acceptable  to  '12312. 
2.25  is  an  explanatory  clause  to  2.24  as  indicated  by 
the  'Z  preposition  (LXX  otit).  Its  literary  nature  is  a 
rhetorical  question,  as  indicated  by  the  interrogative  '7, 
and  anticipating  an  emphatic  negative  response  ('no  one'!  ), 
which  may  give  a  positive  endorsement  of  the  idea  of 
enjoying  life;  but  this  might  be  reading  too  much  into  the 
text. 
The  last  part  of  the  clause  is  highly  problematic. 
The  LXX,  Theodotion,  Syriac  and  the  Peshitta  all  read  C1n' 
as  i1l'1V*'  (ittýtin)  ;  whereas  textus  Graecus  ex  recensione 
Origenis,  Aquila  and  Symmachus  all  read  m111'  as  t11il 
(OctaEtiat) 
,'  experience  pain'  .  The  etymology  of  the  root 
m11  only  enhances  the  problematics.  As  Whybray  rightly 
points  out,  there  is  little  sense  in  understanding  Y1n  to 
be  from  the  root  meaning  'haste';  although  its  Akkadian 
cognate  hasu,  can  mean  either  'haste',  or  as  Ellermeier  has 
argued,  be  worried',  'anxious'  .3  This  might  be,  then, 
related  to  the  Targum'  s  use  of  Kft?  i  ('  anxiety')  .  Fox 
aligns  with  this  interpretation  and  links  'hurry'/'worry' 
with  'fret',  in  which  he  identifies  the  one  who  frets  with 
the  'sinner'  of  2.26  and  the  one  who  eats  as  the  one  whom 
God  favours.  There  are  late  Hebrew  and  Aramaic  roots  (O1n, 
mmn)  which  mean  'feel  pain',  'suffer';  but  these  do  not 
relate  to  'fear'  or  'apprehension'  (so  Gordis).  Another 31 
possibility  is  that  it  is  from  the  root  MM  meaning  'feel', 
'enjoy',  and  if  related  to  the  Arabic  root  hassa,  would 
make  good  sense  with  2.25  acting  as  a  coordinate  clause  to 
2.24.  Gordis  raised  other  possibilities  by  suggesting 
that,  in  relationship  with  the  next  explanatory  clause  in 
2.26  (which  speaks  of  both  the  ability  and  failure  to 
enjoy)  and  m1n  in  2.25,  t1n  'should  therefore  have  a 
significance  contrary  to  5DbVI.  This  therefore  implies 
that  t1n  should  be  understood  as  coming  from  the  root 
meaning  to  'fail  to  enjoy',  i.  e.,  'suffer'.  Whitley 
disagrees  with  all  of  the  above  interpretations  and  makes  a 
number  of  connections  with  the  Mandaic  and  rabbinic 
understanding  to  'feel  pain',  'meditate'  or  'consider',  and 
thus  renders  V  as  for  he  who  eats  and  considers'.  The 
Vulgate  paraphrases  it  as  et  deliciis  affluet  ut  ego  ('and 
abound  in  delights  as  I'). 
The  textual  evidence,  identification  of  the  root, 
etymology,  and  the  precise  meaning  of  0111,  are  ambiguous.  4 
One  should  also  note  that  like  the  versation  of  bibles,  the 
presence  of  the  sof  passuq  at  the  end  of  2.24  is  a 
subjective  and  arbitrary  decision  of  the  Massoretes.  It 
should  probably  be  ignored  since  the  three  clauses  of  2.24- 
25  appear  to  be  coordinate.  The  best  option,  if  2.24-25 
are  coordinate,  is  then  to  view  MM  as  coming  from  the  root 
meaning  to  'enjoy'.  This  is  on  the  basis  that  'because 
this  too  is  from  the  hand  of  God'  (2.24b  M'r  n'iiý  Mljl  i'12  ID 
ii1-ffa) 
,  and  implies  that  even  the  ability  to  enjoy 
one's  material  benefits  comes  from  God  (so  Crenshaw,  Fox, 
Gordis,  Whybray). 32 
An  equally  thorny  problem  as  the  rendering  of  m11,  is 
what  to  do  with  *T2M  r"  ('without  me'  ),  and  in  particular, 
the  first  person  singular  pronomial  suffix  '4).  A  number  of 
solutions  are  possible.  The  first  is  to  accept  it  on  face 
value,  as  it  stands  in  the  text,  and  render  it  'from  me'. 
This  presents  certain  difficulties,  however.  Who  is  'me'? 
Two  possibilities  present  themselves.  One,  the  book 
resumes  the  first  person  royal  fiction  of  Solomon,  with  the 
effect  that,  as  the  greatest  of  all  hedonists,  only  'with 
me',  in  my  fashion',  can  one  truly  enjoy  themselves.  But 
this  is  a  highly  unlikely  interpretation. 
The  second  possibility,  a  rather  unique  one,  was 
advocated  by  Ginsburg  who  says  that: 
..  Coheleth  places  himself  in  the  position 
of  the  labourer,  and  says,  "If  I  toil,  who 
should  enjoy  the  fruit  of  my  toil  more 
than  I?  ".  5 
He  backs  up  this  rather  remarkable  idea  by  quoting  Rashi: 
who  is 
entitled  to  eat  my  labours,  and  who  should  hasten  to 
partake  of  them,  except  I?  '  ).  6  He  further  quotes  Ibn  Ezra 
who  says:  42=)  1r11m  ý1Dxý  '1mai  m11  m  o'fl  ('  is  there  any 
one  so  entitled  to  eat  it  as  I  am?  ').  While  this  is  an 
interesting  solution  to  the  problem,  the  immediate  context 
of  2.24-25  argues  against  such  a  notion  of  a  first  person 
singular  pronoun.  Therefore,  another  solution  must  be 
found. 
The  third  solution,  favoured  by  Dahood  and  followed  by 
Whitley,  is  to  view  the  final  yod  as  a  Phoenician  form  of 
the  third  person  pronoun.  But  Dahood's  evidence  has  been 33 
strongly  challenged  by  Schoors,  7  and  in  particular,  Zeit 
has  raised  serious  doubts  on  Dahood's  statistical  evidence 
on  the  basis  of  a  contextual  analysis  of  his  examples.  8 
The  most  common  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  first 
person  singular  pronoun  is  textual  emendation.  A  number  of 
manuscripts  like  the  LXX  (avtioo),  Coptic,  Syriac,  Jerome 
and  the  Peshitta  all  read  1ý  (the  third  person  'him')  with 
the  antecedent  being  'God'  in  2.25a;  and  in  the  immediate 
context  of  2.24-25  and  in  relationship  with  the  rhetorical 
question,  this  seems  like  the  best  solution. 
A  reasonable  translation  of  2.24-25,  in  the  light  of 
the  above  exegesis,  and  with  some  textual  emendation 
(especially  '11212  in  2.25),  would  then  be:  'There  is  nothing 
better  for  a  man  than  to  eat  and  drink,  and  show  himself 
his  work  is  beneficial.  I  saw  that  this  too  is  from  the 
hand  of  God  -  because  who  can  eat  and  enjoy  without  him?  '. 
2.  QOHELETH  3.12-13 
The  root  DTI  means  to  'know'  but  often  carries  the 
connotations  of  'experience',  and  in  the  case  of  the 
experienced  wise  man,  a  'knowledge  based  out  of 
experience'.  The  use  of  the  first  person  is  typical  of 
Qoheleth  and  the  above  connotations:  he  'knows  from 
personal  experience';  or  as  Whybray  suggests:  'he  realised' 
(from  personal  experience). 
The  stock  phrase  =1t  JIM  appears  here,  and  unlike 
2.24,  with  the  coordinate  construction  CH  'D  clearly 
indicating  comparison. 34 
The  textual  apparatus  of  B.  H.  S.  suggest  that,  as  in 
2.24,  =  should  read  b  1M  ;  though  the  LXX  (£v  ao'totq)  ,  the 
Peshitta  and  Vulgate  all  support  the  Massoretic  Text.  This 
provides  a  singular  noun  appropriate  for  the  singular 
pronoun  at  the  end  of  the  sentence;  though  Hertzberg 
defends  the  Massoretic  reading:  the  b  suffix  could  be 
understood  as  a  corporate  pronoun,  i.  e.,  this  man 
represents  the  community  of  humanity.  The  fact  that  the 
sentence  ends  with  a  singular  pronoun  makes  this  a  dubious 
reading;  but  there  are  two  Hebrew  manuscripts,  Kennicott 
(Vetus  Testamentum  Hebraicum)  and  Cum  Variis  Lectionibus  II 
(552),  9  as  well  as  the  Targum,  which  read  bIM:  1.  Driver 
explained  13:  1  as  an  abbreviation  of  bIN:  I.  10  Gordis  has  an 
ingenious  explanation  for  n=  in  3.12.  He  views  both  the  n 
and  the  Z  as  dittographies:  the  from  =10  and  the  b  from 
the  'D,  the  old  style  script  of  which  looks  like  D. 
While  this  is  a  bit  of  a  stretch,  Gordis'  conclusion  is 
true:  the  deletion  of  =  makes  for  a  perfect  sentence:  'to 
enjoy  and  to  do  good  in  life'.  Whybray  thinks  that  no 
emendation  is  necessary. 
As  Gordis  points  out,  from  the  opposite  in  II  Sam. 
12.18  (r1  i'  1,  'be  miserable'),  there  is  no  need  to  view 
=1b  I'11=7  as  the  Grecism  ED  7tpa=-tv  ('  to  succeed'  or  '  to 
fare  well');  though  Whitley  argues  for  some  reflection  of 
it.  MIM  probably  carries  no  moral  connotations  (cf.  7.20) 
but  simply  means  to  do  'good'  in  the  sense  of,  as  Whybray 
puts  it,  'realise  happiness'.  The  =  probably  carries  the 
temporal  force  of  'while'  in  TINIZ  :  'while  he  lives'. 35 
3.13  probably  emphasises  the  previous  thought  in 
3.12,  as  indicated  by  the  emphatic  use  of  M.  Ginsburg 
concludes  that  this  statement  is  still  governed  by  the 
original  'fl  1'  in  3.12.  There  is  an  anomalous  use  of  the 
imperfect  followed  by  waw  reversives  ('iIrIV  and  71M'l) 
. 
Waw  reversives  are  not  uncommon  in  Qoheleth  (see  2.24; 
possibly  4.11;  5.5,6;  12.1,2,3,4,5,6);  11  and  it  is 
not  certain  what  to  make  of  them  other  than  putting  them 
down  to  Qoheleth's  erratic  Hebrew  style. 
Whybray  is  surely  correct  when  he  says  that  'every 
man'  is  qualified  by  the  relative  pronoun 
attached  to  7:  Wl  ('every  man  who  ..  .  '):  enjoyment  is  not 
to  be  universally  had,  but  for  those  who  can  experience 
enjoyment,  and  this  is  indeed  the  gift  of  God  (W'T  is  used 
as  the  copula  between  n1*9  and  i1flt) 
. 
Crenshaw  views  3.13  as  Qoheleth  defining  what  'faring 
well,  means  by  using  the  same  formula  he  gave  in  2.24. 
There  may  be  an  analogy  between  3.13  and  Robert  Burn's 
Selkirk  Prayer. 
Some  ha'e  meat  and  canna'  eat; 
And  some  wa'd  eat  that  want  it. 
But  we  ha'e  meat,  and  we  can  eat; 
And  may  the  Laird  be  thank-ed. 
The  idea  being:  There  are  many  disabilities  (physical  or 
want)  which  prevent  the  enjoyment  of  the  basic  things  of 
life  (eating  and  drinking)  but  for  those  who  can  enjoy  them 
-  this  is  the  gift  of  God. 
On  the  basis  of  the  above  exegesis,  a  reasonable 
translation  of  3.12-13  would  then  be:  'I  know  that  there  is 
nothing  better  for  them  than  to  enjoy  and  do  good  while  one 36 
lives.  Moreover,  every  man  who  eats  and  drinks  and  sees 
good  in  all  his  work  -  this  is  the  gift  of  God'. 
3.  QOHELETH  3.22 
The  waw  conjunction  on  11'K11  is  probably  an  emphatic  and 
conclusive  So,  :  12  'So  I  saw  that  ..  .  '.  The  Peshitta 
adds  =  after  Z1b,  as  in  3.12:  It  is  either  a  dittography 
on  the  Peshi  t  to  's  part,  or  the  Peshi  t  to  presumed  in  the 
case  of  3.22a,  that  it  is  a  haplography  on  the  part  of  the 
Massoretic  Text  (between  `  tHM  and  :  11M)  based  on  the  syntax 
of  3.12.  Gordis  views  10:  1  in  3.12  as  a  dittography  between 
ýý  and  ý1t  ;  but  this  is  unlikely  because  I*'M  comes  in 
between  them  and  adds  nothing  to  the  sense  of  the  clause. 
The  phrase  'VAM  :  11t  I'M  is  simply  an  alternative  form  of 
the  comparative  statement  'there  is  nothing  better  than 
from  which  ..  .  ';  though  the  VNIZ  is  unnecessary. 
The  preposition  n  can  and  often  does  carry  the 
connotation  of  'from',  both  in  Qoheleth  and  elsewhere  in 
the  Hebrew  Bible.  There  is  no  need  to  appeal  to  Dahood13 
and  Phoenicianisms  on  this  point  since  there  are  plenty  of 
other  exegetes  who  understand  this  connotation  of  :  1,  e.  g., 
Ibn  Ezra,  Luther,  Ginsburg,  Castelli.  14  The  on  1ýtY= 
probably  means  'from  his  work',  or  'from  his  earnings'. 
The  explanatory  clause  introduced  by  'n,  refers  to 
17ý1i 
. 
7ý1"ý  generally  relates  to  'portion'  with  the 
implication  of  'assigned  portion',  i.  e.,  a  portion  which  is 
one's  right  or  obligation,  as  in  an  'inheritance'.  Given 
Qoheleth's  rather  deterministic  viewpoint,  it  is  likely 37 
that  7$1i  implies  some  sense  of  '  one's  lot' 
.  The 
demonstrative  pronoun  also  acts  as  the  copula:  'because 
that  is  his  lot'. 
The  "D  of  3.22b  introduces  the  overall  explanatory 
clause  for  the  joy  statement  which  is  a  rhetorical 
question,  as  indicated  by  the  interrogative  particle  '42. 
The  M  is  redundant  on  the  particle  M  ?  2,  which  is  simply 
'what'. 
1"7  nM  has  evoked  a  number  of  interpretations. 
Literally  it  means  '  after  him';  though  Fox,  following 
Podechard,  15  argues  that  1''111H  should  be  rendered 
'afterward',  with  reference  to  'what  will  happen  to  the 
individual  in  his  future  lifetime'.  Podechard  uses  a 
number  of  subtle  arguments  against  the  two  standard 
interpretations:  'after  him'  meaning  what  will  happen  to 
the  individual  after  death  or  'after  him'  meaning  what  will 
happen  on  earth  after  the  individual's  death.  The  former 
would  not  be  a  natural  way  to  refer  to  an  individual's 
existence  in  sheol,  for  that  would  be  'present'  not 
'after'.  Podechard  argues  against  the  latter 
interpretation  by  saying  one  would  not  be  interested  in 
what  happens  on  earth  after  death  (and  he  could  have  added 
the  unlikelihood  of  one's  ability  to  relate  to  this  world 
after  death);  though  if  the  joy  interpreters  are  right,  he 
is  wrong  and  this  would  then  be  an  impetus  to  enjoy  life  in 
the  present.  Even  though  Fox  wants  to  follow  Podechard,  he 
must  concede  some  inference  of  ignorance  'after  death'  in 
3.22,  and  thus  ends  up  qualifying  his  support,  which  in 
turn  has  the  effect  of  supporting  the  interpretation  that 38 
'after  him'  means  'after  death'.  Podechard's 
interpretation  should  be  rejected  because  it  is  contrary  to 
the  natural  meaning  of  the  grammar  and  idea  of  the 
preceding  verse  (3.21):  death  is  what  is  referred  to  and  to 
talk  of  the  individual's  future  in  this  life  would  be 
contrary  to  the  basic  sense  of  the  discussion  in  3.18-22 
which  is  on  death. 
The  rhetorical  question  anticipates  the  negative 
response  'no  one!  ':  an  emphatic  denial.  Paraphrastically 
3.22  could  be  rendered:  'Man  should  enjoy  his  work,  or  the 
material  benefits  of  his  work,  because  that  is  his  lot:  for 
no  one  can  show  him  what  will  happen  after  he  dies'.  The 
rhetorical  question  anticipating  this  emphatic  denial  of 
future  knowledge  post  mortem,  provides  the  impetus  to  enjoy 
one's  work  and  the  fruits  of  one's  labour.  Thus,  some 
existential  carpe  diem  is  exhorted  in  3.22  on  the  basis 
that  no  one  knows  what  death  will  bring:  'therefore  make 
the  best  of  things  now  while  you  can!  '. 
On  the  basis  of  the  above  exegesis,  a  reasonable 
translation  of  3.22,  would  then  be:  'So  I  saw  that  there  is 
nothing  better  for  a  man  than  to  enjoy  his  work  -  for  that 
is  his  lot.  For  who  can  bring  him  to  see  what  will  happen 
after  him?  ' 39 
4.  QOHELETH  5.17-19 
The  particle  "MIM  is  used  to  draw  attention  to  some  thing, 
and  in  the  case  of  5.17,  what  Qoheleth  has  'seen'  cvmn), 
or  perhaps  more  appropriately,  what  he  has  'realised' 
(again  through  personal  experience),  and  this  is  emphasised 
by  the  emphatic  'I».  Fox,  however,  translates  the  particle 
of  attention  as  'here':  'Here  is  what  I  have  seen  to  be 
good:  ..  .  '. 
The  second  phrase,  IV-70M  X10,  is  made  difficult  to 
understand  because  it  lacks  a  subject  of  its  own,  the 
double  use  of  It*  with  VI'IMT-)VK  and  the  accentuation  of 
the  Massoretic  Text.  It  is  unnecessary  and  improbable  that 
M01-lebt  :  1iß  is  the  Grecism  xa),  o;  xayaOoq  ('  fine'  and 
'good');  which  Whitley  points  out  would  be  fl"  X10. 
The  exact  meaning  of  the  adjective  MW  is  problematic 
for  the  overall  clause:  Is  it  to  be  taken  literally  as  in 
'beautiful',  'fair';  or  should  it  be  understood  more 
dynamically  like  'appropriate',  'becoming'?  Either 
'beautiful'  or  'appropriate'  suit  the  immediate  context  of 
5.17.  Crenshaw  sees  the  latter  meaning  as  in  3.11;  but 
Gordis  may  be  right  when  he  says:  'Apparently  we  have  here 
an  idiom  heightening  the  effect,  like  "good  and  proper,  " 
"dulce  et  decorum,  "  etc'. 
There  are  a  number  of  possible  translations  for  the 
opening  clause:  'Behold,  that  [which]  I  saw  was  good,  which 
was  beautiful';  or  'I  saw  what  was  good,  what  was  even 
beautiful';  or,  if  one  takes  Whitley's  advice  and  disregard 
the  Massoretic  accentuation:  'Behold  that  which  I  have 40 
discovered  is  good,  that  it  is  becoming  to  eat  and  drink'; 
though  the  LXX  translates  the  clause  as  l  O1  Ft8Ov  £'y(O  a'yaeov  o 
Catit  xaXov  ('  Behold  I  have  seen  good  which  is  beautiful  ')  . 
Nevertheless,  one  must  supply  a  subject  and  conjunction  for 
the  second  clause  consistent  with  the  3.  m.  s.  pronouns  of 
the  verse:  'Then  I  realised  it  is  good,  even  beautiful,  for 
a  man  to  eat  and  drink  and  ..  '. 
The  use  of  the  imperfect  with 
ý12D  is  problematic.  If 
one  was  to  see  the  'fruits  of  their  labour'  or  'material 
benefits'  of  one's  work  presumably  one  would 
have  had  to  have  already  done  the  work  (the  idea  of  the 
perfect).  Thus, 
ýb.  VNm  ('which  he  will  work  for')  is  poor 
grammar.  But  it  is  not  unusual  for  Qoheleth  to  use 
imperfects  where  perfects  are  needed  and  vice-versa.  16 
English  punctuation  can  be  critical  for  translation 
and  understanding  the  sense  of  a  verse.  This  is  especially 
true  for  5.17.  In  addition,  the  use  of  ltbt  in  the  f  irst 
clause  may  indicate  a  temporal  relationship17  rather  than  a 
relative  relationship:  this  may  explain  the  unusual 
construction  emphasised  by  the  particle  of 
attention  r)ii  ('  then  I  realised')  .  The  second  ItH  may  be 
acting  as  a  coordinate  to  the  clause  and  not  as  a  relative 
pronoun  (so  Ogden)  and  may  yield  the  translation:  'Then  I 
realised  [it]  is  good,  even  beautiful,  to  eat  and  drink  and 
see  the  good  in  all  his  work  [or  material  benefits]  which 
he  worked  for  under  the  sun'. 
As  many  commentators  correctly  notice,  '11DOM  is  an 
accusative  of  time,  that  of  paucity  (Barton,  Crenshaw, 
Ginsburg,  Gordis;  cf.  Dt.  33.6;  Job  16.22).  1'n  is  clearly 41 
a  spelling  mistake  with  a  haplography  of  one  of  the  yods, 
which  fragmentum  codicis  Hebraici2  corrects  to  1"ii.  The 
clause,  10'1ýK  1  )"T-1121  "1100M,  requires  some 
temporal  preposition  like  'during'  (perhaps  the  M  of 
temporality)18  to  make  sense  of  the  Hebrew  clause:  'during 
the  few  days  of  his  life  God  gives  him'. 
The  final  clause  of  5.17,  17ý11  1411-'D,  is  a  stock 
phrase  or  idea  of  Qoheleth  (see  2.10,  21;  3.22;  5.18;  9.6, 
9;  11.2)  with  K11  doing  double  -duty  as  the  demonstrative 
pronoun  and  the  copula:  'because  that  is  his  lot'. 
5.18  The  ba  of  5.18  is  probably  a  conjunctive 
'moreover':  Qoheleth  wants  to  qualify  his  previous 
statement  in  5.17;  and  Whybray  views  this  qualification  as 
one  which  corrects  any  impression  from  Qoheleth's  previous 
discussion  that  wealth  is  an  evil  in  and  of  itself. 
The  definite  article  with  131M  indicates  that 
should  be  understood  as  referring  to  any  man'  and  not 
'every'  (cf  .  LXX  gag  av9pwiro;  )  :  'any  man'  is  an  example 
amongst  humanity;  the  relative  pronoun  I  VM  may  be  the 
objective  'whom',  but  it  probably  has  the  temporal  force  of 
'when,:  'when  any  man  ...  '. 
VIM=  is  perhaps  an  Aramaic  loan  word,  possibly  from 
the  cognate  Akkadian  nikasu  or  the  Syrian  nekse 
'possessions',  'treasure'.  I  tai  ('wealth')  and  IC)= 
('possessions')  are  likely  to  be  a  merismos  for 
'abundance'. 
IVI  0111,  from  the  root  M1  t,  usually  means  '  domineer' 
or  'be  master  of';  but  the  cognate  Assyrian  salatu  means  to 
'have  power'  ('empower'),  and  this  is  the  sense  of  Mýt  in 42 
5.18  with  the  causative  force  of  the  hiphil  and  the  nuance 
of  'enable'.  Crenshaw  seems  to  follow  Gordis'  analogy  from 
the  Yiddish  idiom  that  'a  miser  has  no  power  over  his 
possessions':  for  Crenshaw  too  implies  that  it  is  the  miser 
who  does  not  have  the  power  to  enjoy  his  wealth;  but  the 
verse  makes  no  reference  to  misers  and  it  is  simply  'any 
man  whom  God  empowers  to  enjoy  his  wealth'. 
Fox  claims  that  1N=  'is  partitive  ['from  it'],  a 
nuance  ignored  by  most  translations'.  He  is  probably  right 
as 
5ý  M5  should  be  seen  as  'consume',  perhaps  with  the 
nuance  or  connotation  of  'enjoy';  but  his  secondary  point 
that  'In  Qohelet's  view  you  need  not  consume  all  you  own' 
seems  invalid  because  it  cannot  be  sustained  by  the  text 
nor  by  his  obscure  connection  to  2.21-26  where  the  hard 
earned  material  benefits  go  to  the  inheritor.  rix  m5, 
literally  to  'carry',  'lift'  or  'take'  but  metaphorically 
'accept',  in  the  overall  grammar  of  the  verse,  indicates  a 
sense  of  'contentment'  in  relationship  with  one's  lot 
'to  take  his  lot',  'to  accept  his  lot'  [in  life]. 
Some  manuscripts  in  fragmenbum  codicis  Hebraici  have  It 
instead  of  Vii,  whilst  others  support  the  Massoretic  Text 
with  j!. 
Whybray's  interpretation  of  5.18  is  unwarranted: 
..  God  when  he  bestows  riches  on  a  person  also 
bestows  the  power  to  enjoy  them.  It  is 
implied,  however,  that  this  enjoyment  depends 
on  the  recipient's  willingness  to  see  them 
in  their  true  character  as  the  gift  of 
God  ... 
19 
This  is  a  completely  subjective  interpretation  which  the 
grammar  of  5.18  will  not  sustain;  and,  as  6.2  points  out, 43 
God  does  not  necessarily  supply  the  power  to  a  person 
('enable')  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  material  possessions. 
Crenshaw's  interpretation,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be 
supported  by  the  grammar  of  5.18: 
In  Qohelet's  affirmations  about  God,  the  notion 
of  divine  gift  loses  its  comforting  quality. 
The  gift  comes  without  rhyme  or  reason;  it  falls 
on  individuals  indiscriminately.  20 
5.19  is  an  explanatory  clause  as  indicated  by  the 
opening  ':  ) 
. 
7Di  generally  means  to  '  remember'  or  '  call  to 
mind';  and  B.  D.  B.  further  adds  'usu.  as  affecting  present 
feeling,  thought,  or  action';  though  B.  D.  B.  makes  no 
connections  with  Qoh.  5.19  on  this  point.  Nevertheless, 
this  nuance  is  probably  implied  in  5.19  because  its 
immediate  context  is  one  which  deals  with  the  state  of  mind 
or  feelings  of  a  man  given  the  gift  of  joy  by  God. 
ýý7ý  ('not  much'  )  is  a  strange  way  to  indicate 
paucity  (cf.  5.17  `IDOM)  ;  but  with  1'ß'I1  *'M*I-rlM  should  be 
idiomatically  rendered  the  'few  days  of  his  life'  as 
opposed  to  literally  'not  many  days  of  his  life'.  The  LXX 
renders  the  clause  Ott  ov  it0?  OC  µvr  Or  Etiat  iaq  11µ£pa;  'cii;  CM; 
avtiov  ('for  he  shall  not  much  remember  the  days  of  his 
life  ')  linking  the  11=171  M  with  uni;  though  the  literary 
effect  would  be  the  same  as  the  above  :  the  gifted  man  is 
oblivious  to  the  brevity  of  life. 
The  whole  interpretation  of  5.19  hinges  on  the  highly 
problematic  M1fl2 
.  The  LXX  (lrEpiair(X  aDtOV)  ,  the  Targum  and 
Syriac  have  1ISii;,  some  manuscripts  have  M*Iý  MI  and  the 
Vulgate  occupet  -  but  all  of  these  understand  the  root  to 
be  '1Y,  'to  distract'  or  'occupy'.  There  are,  however,  a 
number  of  possibilities:  'afflicted',  'humility', 44 
'poverty',  'sing',  'answer',  'respond',  'reveal',  even 
'cohabit'.  But  what  root  best  makes  sense  in  the  immediate 
context? 
Gordis  argues  that  the  root  that  makes  the  best  sense 
is  'answer'  (contra  Fox),  which  he  adds  'possesses  the 
connotation  "answer  for"',  citing  examples  in  Gen.  41.16; 
Hos.  2.23,24.  He  thus  renders  the  clause  as  'God  provides 
(i.  e.  man)  with  the  joy  of  his  heart';  or  as  Ginsburg  puts 
it:  'bestows  upon  him  joy,  as  it  were,  in  answer  to  his 
desire'.  However,  the  use  of  1)3  in  Qoheleth  (1.13;  3.10) 
is  probably  a  strong  clue  that  it  should  be  similarly 
rendered  here  as  'occupy';  which  is,  with  the  use  of  the 
hiphil,  the  strongest  cognate  meaning  of  13  in  Syriac. 
The  whole  clause  could  thus  be  rendered:  'because  God 
occupies  his  heart  with  joy'  (cf.  the  discussion  on  Lohfink 
and  71W  in  chapter  five). 
A  reasonable  translation  of  5.17-19,  in  the  light  of 
the  above  exegesis,  would  then  be:  'Then  I  realised  that  it 
is  good  and  beautiful  for  a  man  to  eat  and  drink  and  see 
good  in  all  his  work  which  he  worked  for  under  the  sun  - 
during  the  few  days  of  his  life  which  God  gave  him  - 
because  that  is  his  lot.  Moreover,  when  God  gives  a  man 
wealth  and  possessions  -  and  enables  him  to  consume  them, 
to  accept  his  lot  and  be  happy  in  his  work:  this  is  the 
gift  of  God.  For  he  does  not  remember  much  the  days  of  his 
life  -  because  God  occupies  his  heart  with  enjoyment'. 
Unlike  the  previous  joy  statements,  the  joy  statement 
in  5.17-19  is  ambiguous  as  to  its  exact  meaning.  The  most 
complicating  factor  is  the  ambiguity  surrounding  God  as  the 45 
'giver  of  joy',  i.  e.,  his  selectivity  (cf.  6.2)  and  the 
deterministic  aspect  of  one's  lot. 
S.  QOHELETH  8.15 
A  number  of  scholars  view  the  waw  conjunction  on  VIMMm1  in 
8.15  as  the  waw  conclusivum  (Aalders,  Geier,  Ogden);  21 
though  Lohf  ink  disagrees  and  puts  VIMIM  on  the  level  of 
*1117MN  in  8.14.  It  would  be  hard  to  disagree  with  Geier, 
Aalders,  et  al.  that,  the  waw  conjunction  is  a  conclusive 
'so',  when  8.15  logically  concludes  the  pericope  of  8.1-14 
which  ends  ominously;  though  the  LXX  uses  Kat.  Whybray  is 
probably  justified  when  he  says  that  the  use  of  the  piel 
stem  with  M=0  indicates  an  intensification  of  the  joy 
statement.  This  may  be  supported  by  the  addition  of  extra 
stock  phrases,  clauses  and  ideas  from  previous  joy 
statements  here  in  8.15:  a  better-than  saying,  mftii  i11ii1, 
addition  of  the  infinitive  MIMV5  and  the  accompaniment 
(115)  of  joy  in  work. 
I1  generally  means  to  'laud'  or  'praise'  but  can 
also,  in  a  secondary  sense,  mean  'commend'  or 
'congratulate'  .  Barton,  Crenshaw  and  Fox  utilise  the 
primary  sense  of  'praise';  though  Fox  views  the  waw 
conjunction  as  conclusive  in  the  first  clause  of  8.15:  'So 
I  praised  pleasure'.  Ogden  and  Whybray  view  n=t  in  its 
sense  of  'commend';  and  if  the  waw  conjunction  is 
conclusive,  as  it  appears  to  be,  then  the  first  clause  is 
best  translated  as:  'So  I  commend  joy',  or,  perhaps  better: 
'So  I  commend  enjoyment'  .  The  following  `JON  should  be 46 
viewed  as  the  explanatory  conjunction  'because'  (so  Gordis; 
Lxx  on)  . 
The  waw  conjunction  is  redundant  in  the  English 
translation  of  1111  since  W11  is  used  in  adverbial  sense 
with  both  a  temporal  and  conclusive  force  of  'then';  though 
Crenshaw  renders  it  as  'and  it 
..  .  '.  Gordis  says  that 
X11  'refers  to  the  actions  described  in  the  preceding 
infinitives';  and  while  he  is  probably  correct,  this  does 
not  make  it  easy  to  incorporate  those  ideas  in  the 
following  clause.  Another  solution  is  to  view  the 
antecedent  to  KIM  as  r:  'Then  enjoyment  ... 
Ginsberg  views  1ý17*'  as  a  gross  corruption  of  1ýý1i;  22 
but  there  is  no  textual  evidence  to  support  this. 
Zimmermann  finds  the  use  of  M15  'very  strange'  because  the 
verb  is  usually  used  in  the  sense  of  'joining'  human  beings 
in  some  way.  Thus,  the  translator  would  have  done  better 
to  retain  the  original  Aramaic  r=rT':  'and  he  combine  it 
(joy)  in  his  work';  but  clearly  this  is  Zimmermann's 
attempt  to  sustain  his  dubious  Aramaic  original  theory  for 
Qoheleth.  As  Whitley  points  out: 
sj1ý  is  used  in  Ben  Sira  4112  (Hiphil  1*ý) 
in  the  sense  of  a  name  accompanying  one,  while 
it  is  again  used  in  the  Mishna  (Aboth  69 
Piel  part.  )  of  pearls  and  precious  stones  not 
"accompanying"  one  to  the  grave.  23 
Regardless,  the  context  in  8.15  indicates  that  the 
connotation  of  the  'joining'  is  one  of  'accompany':  'Then 
enjoyment  will  accompany  him  in  his  work,  all  the  days  of 
his  life  which  God  gives  to  him  under  the  sun'.  According 
to  B.  H.  S.,  some  manuscripts  have  `11DDM  (paucity)  for  'h' 
(cf.  5.17). 47 
A  reasonable  translation,  on  the  basis  of  the  above 
exegesis,  would  then  be:  'So  I  commend  the  enjoyment  of 
life:  because  there  is  nothing  better  for  a  man  under  the 
sun  than  to  eat,  drink  and  be  happy.  Then  joy  will 
accompany  him  in  his  work  -  all  the  days  of  his  life  which 
God  gives  him  under  the  sun'. 
Whybray  is  probably  correct  when  he  sees  an 
intensification  of  the  joy  statement  here  in  8.15;  but  the 
problem  may  be  the  deterministic  aspect  of  'God's  giving'; 
though  this  does  not  seem  to  be  as  ambiguous  here  as  it  did 
in  5.17-19. 
6.  QOHELETH  9.7-9 
9.7  presents  a  number  of  difficult  grammatical  problems. 
It  begins  with  two  imperatives  together  followed  by  a  third 
in  the  first  clause.  These  are  the  first  imperatives  used 
in  the  joy  statements  thus  far.  Crenshaw  may  be  correct 
when  he  says  that 
Until  now,  Qohelet's  comments  on  enjoying  life 
have  taken  the  form  of  advice  (2:  24-26;  3:  12-13, 
22;  5:  17-19  [18-20E];  8:  15;  but  note  7:  14,  "be 
happy").  Now  he  switches  to  imperatives  (1ek, 
'ekol,  sateh),  conveying  a  greater  sense  of 
urgency  issuing  from  Qohelet's  reflection  on  the 
power  of  death  to  extinguish  powerful  emotions.  24 
But  the  exact  relationship  of  the  imperatives  raises  a 
number  of  questions.  Do  `jý  and 
ýDM  belong  together  ('Go 
and  eat')  ?  Or  does  ýDM  belong  with  1111  ('  eat  in 
enjoyment)  ?  Or  is  the 
5DR 
an  emphatic  combination  as  in 
'consume  with  the  implication  of  enjoy'  -  thus  simply 
'enjoy'?  Why  is  the  third  imperative  7n  separated  from 48 
the  other  two?  Perhaps  it  is  the  15  which  is  out  of  place 
and  simply  used  as  an  emphatic  imperative  to  back  up  the 
following  two;  though  Ginsburg  suggests  that  it  has  'an 
inferential  force,  i.  e.,  this  being  the  case,  go  then, 
&c.  '.  He  is  probably  correct.  The  most  logical 
syntactical  relationship  would  be:  'Go,  eat  your  food  with 
joy  and  drink  your  wine  with  a  glad  heart!  '  :  11t  =ý  is  a 
common  Hebrew  idiom  meaning  'glad'  or  'happy  heart'  (cf. 
Est.  5.9;  1  Kgs.  21.25  :6  =t'  'cheer  the  heart';  Ruth  3.7). 
But  Barton  surely  reads  too  much  into  the  text  when  he 
says,  in  comparison  with  its  opposite  in  Prov.  26.23  (VI 
:  6),  that  there  is  an  element  of  "good  conscience"  in  the 
phrase'. 
The  explanatory  clause  is  typically  introduced  with  ':  ) 
followed  by  the  adverb  InZ.  The  verb  7121  is  used  to  refer 
to  God  accepting  offerings  on  the  altar  (Dt.  33.11;  II  Sam. 
24.23;  Am.  5.22).  There  is  considerable  debate  on  the 
exact  meaning,  or  perhaps  more  correctly,  the  correct 
reference  of  I=.  The  root  from  biblical  Hebrew  for  I= 
relates  to  be  many',  'much';  and  in  its  secondary  sense, 
when  related  to  time,  'a  great  length  of  time'  or 
'already'.  This  seems  to  be  the  etymological  meaning  of 
the  Syriac  root;  but  as  both  B.  D.  B.  and  Fredericks  point 
out:  that  connection  is  dubious.  Regardless  of  its 
etymological  origin,  ="D,  when  related  to  time,  refers  to 
'  duration  previous  to  an  event'  I.  It  is  the  concept  of 
'previous'  which  is  in  question.  This  may  have 
implications  for  the  theology  of  the  verse.  Ginsburg, 
relating  9.7  to  the  previous  discussion  on  God  indulging 49 
the  wicked  (perhaps  a  dubious  interpretation  of  9.1-6), 
says: 
God,  who  indulges  the  wicked,  must  surely  have 
long  since  been  pleased  with  our  works; 
we  must  therefore  not  be  troubled  with  it  now.  25 
Thus,  I»  would  have  temporal  implications  for  the  works 
done  previously,  and  consequently,  for  the  present.  The 
N.  I.  V.  is  grossly  negligent  in  its  translation  of  the 
clause  as  for  it  is  now  that  God  favours  what  you  do', 
changing  the  noun  ýýmý  into  the  verb  'do'.  Ginsburg, 
however,  says  that  the  grammar  and  syntax  will  not  allow 
for  'your  work'  to  be  the  reason  for  'God  being  pleased 
with  your  work',  which  he  says  would  require  the  Hebrew: 
But  he  is  surely  wrong  when  it 
is  clear  by  the  direct  object  marker  that  'your  works'  are 
the  object  of  '  God'  s  being  pleased'  (`ý'  31iý-nK  n'  hrc  iýý). 
Since,  however,  this  leaves  a  problem  regarding  how  the 
verse  fits  in  with  the  previous  pericope:  what  should  one 
do  with  it? 
The  easy  solution  would  be  to  say  it  is  an  editorial 
gloss;  but  Ogden  would  interpret  it  to  mean  that  enjoyment 
of  the  basics  of  life  is  God's  predetermined  will  (cf.  his 
view  of  1ýýn):  the  issue  is,  according  to  Ogden,  whether  or 
not  one  receives  it  gladly  from  God  -  and  it  is  difficult 
to  refute  this  grammatically  since  this  is  the  explanatory 
clause.  This  interpretation,  nevertheless,  has  enormous 
problems  in  relationship  with  the  previous  pericope  9.1-6, 
statements  in  the  following  verses  of  the  joy  statement 
itself  (its  immediate  context),  and  other  statements  in  the 
book  (cf.  5.17-19;  6.2;  8.15);  or  as  Crenshaw  points  out: 50 
Justification  for  joyous  eating  and  drinking 
rests  in  the  divine  disposition,  which  9:  1 
declares  to  be  unfathomable.  26 
9.8  The  apparel  of  white  and  oil  were  both  pragmatic 
and  symbolic:  white  kept  one  cool  in  the  heat  and  exhibited 
either  a  wealthy  or  festive  disposition;  and  the  oil,  which 
may  be  perfumed  and  act  as  a  moisturizer,  had  a  similar 
function  (cf.  II  Sam.  12.20;  Ps.  23.5;  45.8;  Prov.  27.9; 
Est.  8.15).  Later  on,  white  clothes  came  to  symbolise  the 
garments  worn  in  the  world  to  come  (B.  Shab.  114a;  Rev. 
3.4-5;  7.9)  .  The  phase  1'1V-5»  imports  the  idea  of  being 
'continuously  festive'  and  perhaps  even  implying 
'ostentation';  though  this  latter  idea  is  dubious. 
9.9  The  imperative  1MI  should  be  viewed  as 
'experience'  rather  than  'see'  in  the  context  of  9.9;  and 
the  notion  of  'enjoy'  for  1K1  is  unwarranted  and  reading 
too  much  into  the  text  (contra  Barton,  Fox,  Ginsburg, 
Ogden). 
When  Hebrew  wants  to  use  the  generic  1  for  wife,  it 
generally  uses  the  article.  The  LXX  does  not  help  the 
situation  by  preserving  the  Greek  generic  equivalent 
without  the  article  (yov(xttxo;  ) 
.  Dahood  defends  'wife,  on 
the  grounds  of  the  Phoenician  fl  K,  which  even  without  the 
article  means  'wife'  . 
27  But  Hebrew  does  not  always  use  the 
article  with  1  mt  to  indicate  'wife',  as  Whitley  argues 
(see  Gen.  21.21;  24.3,37;  Lev.  20.14);  though  Crenshaw 
takes  exception  to  Whitley  on  this  point  saying  that  his 
examples  indicate  that  the  woman  was  not  yet  the  wife  but 
betrothed.  This,  however,  leaves  the  problem  that  Qoheleth 
was  advocating  'wild  licentious  behaviour  with  any  woman 51 
one  fancied';  a  notion  that  the  Wisdom  of  Solomon  attacks 
in  2.9.  Jerome  understood  this  clause  in  9.9  to  mean: 
quaecumque  tibi  placuerit  faeminarum  ejus  gadue  complexu 
('whosoever  among  women  shall  please  you,  rejoice  in  her 
embrace').  A  number  of  scholars  do  advocate  the  generic 
sense  of  'woman'  in  9.9  (Barton,  Ginsburg,  Schoors),  and 
thus:  'love  any  woman  you  fancy'.  A  rather  long  quotation 
from  Ginsburg  might  elucidate  the  argument. 
To  festive  enjoyments  are  to  be  added  the 
gratifications  with  those  who  are  "the 
delight  of  man,  "  which  formed  an  essential 
part  in  Eastern  pleasures  (vide  supra,  ii.  8). 
The  discrepancy  which  some  have  found  between 
the  recommendation  here  to  enjoy  life  with 
women,  and  the  assertion  made  in  vii.  26-28 
about  their  wickedness  and  the  mischief  arising 
from  intercourse  with  them  [a  dubious 
interpretation],  proceeds  from  overlooking  the 
different  stages  of  the  argument.  Here,  in  the 
resume,  Coheleth  has  reached  that  point  from 
which  he  could  see  no  moral  government  at  all,  no 
retributive  justice,  and  nothing  left  for  man  but 
momentary  enjoyment  and  the  gratification  of 
every  desire  which  is  calculated  to  impart 
pleasure.  Whereas,  there,  in  the  disquisition, 
Coheleth  has  passed  this  stage,  and  gone  on  to 
the  prudent  or  common-sense  view  of  life,  which 
enjoined  moderation,  and  therefore  precluded 
every  indulgence  which  was  incompatible  with  that 
view.  28 
In  other  words:  There  is  no  contradiction  between 
Qoheleth's  apparent  misogynist  statements  in  7.26-28  and 
his  call  here  to  enjoy  women.  It  could  be  further  argued, 
moreover,  that  the  advice  in  7.26-28  on  women  was  to  avoid 
entanglement  by  women  and  here  in  9.9  to  exploit  women  for 
male  gratification  -  and  these  two  ideas  would  be 
compatible  if  Qoheleth  was  a  misogynist.  29  No  proof  can  be 
given  that  1M  refers  to  wife,  and  therefore,  the  exact 
meaning  of  this  statement  will  always  remain  ambiguous. 
Nowhere  does  Qoheleth  refer  to  'wife  and  children'  as  a 52 
part  of  the  'pursuit  of  happiness';  though  it  is  possible 
that  there  is  irony  here,  perhaps  in  relation  to  7.26-28. 
9.9b  has  textual  problems  with  some  manuscripts  like 
LXX  (codex  Alexandrinus)  and  the  Targum  which  omit  the 
second  JýW`t  'W  ýD;  but  others  like  LXX  (codex  Vaticanus) 
and  the  Vulgate  retain  it.  The  Peshitta  is  remarkable,  as 
Gordis  points  out,  because  it  retains  the  second 
5D  but  omits  the  entire  clause  'ImM  ji7Z'jI 
... 
15  Irl, 
indicating  a  homoioteleuton  'which  could  not  have  happened 
unless  the  eye  of  the  translator,  or  scribe,  had  leaped 
from  the  first  151  to  the  second'.  This  is  probably 
sound  evidence  for  supporting  the  Massoretic  Text;  but  a 
number  of  scholars  (Crenshaw,  Fox,  Ginsburg,  Gordis)  see 
the  poetic  or  rhetorical  value  of  repetition  at  work  here 
in  9.9.  ý:  11  might  well  have  the  nuance  of  'fleeting'  here. 
An  identifiable  subject  for  IM  is  lacking;  but  it  probably 
refers  to  God  as  elsewhere  in  Qoheleth. 
The  explanatory  clause  for  9.9b  introduced  by  'In  seems 
cumbersome.  Some  texts  read  M'11  for  K11,  which  would  then 
refer  to  the  woman  as  'your  lot'  rather  than  the  'enjoyment 
of  life'  as  a  whole  implied  by  H11;  but  this  would  be  an 
anomaly  unprecedented  in  Qoheleth  where  'enjoyment'  and 
'lot'  go  together  (cf.  3.22;  5.17-18).  The  noun 
EMD 
may 
indicate  the  material  benefits  of  one's  work  and  the  verb 
y  may  emphasise  the  'means'  of  obtaining  with  the 
implication  of  both  being  a  part  of  one's  lot  to  be  enjoyed 
(cf.  3.22;  5.17-19;  8.15). 
A  reasonable  translation  of  9.7-9,  in  the  light  of  the 
above  exegesis,  would  then  be:  'Go,  enjoy  your  food  and 53 
drink  your  wine  with  a  glad  heart  -  because  God  is  already 
pleased  with  your  works.  Let  your  clothes  be  white  at  all 
times  and  let  not  oil  be  lacking  on  your  head.  Enjoy  life 
with  a  woman  you  love  -  all  the  days  of  your  hevel  life 
which  God  gave  you  under  the  sun  -  all  your  hevel  days  : 
because  this  is  your  lot  in  life  and  in  the  material 
benefits  which  you  worked  [for]  under  the  sun'. 
Perhaps  nowhere  else  in  Qoheleth,  is  the  meaning  of 
571 
so  pertinent  for  interpreting  what  this  statement 
means.  Earlier  it  was  argued  that 
ýnl  is  likely  to  be 
used  as  a  very  loaded  term  in  Qoheleth,  with  mostly 
negative  connotations  ('fleeting',  'insubstantial', 
'absurd'),  and  the  doubling  up  of 
5ZI1 
may  represent  an 
intensification  of  negative  frustration  in  life  for 
Qoheleth.  A  number  of  commentators  (Ginsburg,  Ogden, 
Whybray)  view  Qoheleth's  advice  here  in  9.7-9  as  a 
concession,  i.  e.,  in  the  light  of  the  harsh  realities  of 
life  demonstrated  in  9.1-6,  one  should  make  the  most  of  the 
good  things  in  life.  Thus  Ogden  interprets  the  verse  to 
mean  'that  the  sage  knows  how,  under  God,  to  enjoy  life  in 
this  world  of  ironies';  but  the  ironies  or  ambiguities  of 
the  verse  should  urge  caution,  and  its  interpretation  is 
not  so  straightforward  linguistically  and  grammatically  as 
some  of  the  other  joy  statements  (cf.  2.24-25;  3.12). 
Indeed,  the  joy  statement  of  9.7-9  might  be  the  most 
sublime  thus  far;  in  contradistinction  to  Ogden  who  views 
the  imperatives  in  9.7-10  as  empowering  the  carpe  diem  joy 
statements.  In  conjunction  with  the  negative  nature  of 
5V1, 
as  well  as  the  'lot'  (deterministic)  statements,  it 54 
might  well  be  that  the  imperatives  are  far  from  empowering 
carpe  diem  and  indeed  might  well  be  empowering  the 
ambiguity  of  the  joy  statements  or  indicating  irony  or 
sarcasm. 
7.  QOHELETH  11.8-9 
The  joy  statement  in  11.8-9  is  perhaps  the  most  complicated 
one.  This  is  not  only  because  of  its  grammar  but  also  in 
terms  of  its  interpretation. 
Ogden  views  the  use  of  the  two  jussives  1'1  '  and  'Al:  )T' 
as  the  'theme-setting'  verbs  of  the  pericope  he  marks  off 
as  11.7-12.8.  Four  imperatives  follow  in  11.9-10.11.8 
may  be  an  explanatory  statement  or  causal  clause  related  to 
11.7  as  indicated  by  the  use  of  'D.  11.7  essentially  tells 
the  audience  that  'light  is  sweet  and  it  is  good  to  see  the 
sun'.  The  N.  I.  V.  is  possibly  right  when  it  renders  the  CM 
'.  "D  construction  of  11.8  as:  'however  many  years  a  man  may 
live';  but  while  this  makes  good  sense  in  the  context  it 
would  be  an  anomalous  rendering  flattening  the  explanatory 
nature  of  the  CM  'D  construction  and  in  fact  making  11.8  an 
independent  statement  from  11.7;  though  the  LXX  preserves 
the  bM  ':  )  construction  literally  as  otn«xi  .  Nevertheless, 
an  explanatory  clause  introduced  by  'because'  or 
'therefore'  (so  Artom)  does  not  make  much  sense:  How  does 
the  'sweetness  of  light'  or  'seeing  the  sun'  relate  to  the 
length  of  life?  The  'D  could  then  be  viewed  as  coordinate 
and  thus  11.7  and  11.8  are  two  independent  statements 
coordinating  one  idea:  reasons  why  one  should  enjoy  life. 55 
Therefore,  the  N.  I.  V.  's  rendering  the  ti9  'D  construction  as 
indeterminate  is  probable:  'However  many  years  a  man  may 
live'.  Crenshaw  is  mistaken  when  he  says  that  bIO  is 
feminine  and  that  the  pronomial  suffix  of  ný»  does  not 
match  it. 
The  deficit  of  grammatical  mood  in  the  Hebrew  verbal 
system  can  be  hazardous  for  translation.  11*n'f  probably  has 
the  subjunctive  mood:  'However  many  years  a  man  may  be',  or 
perhaps  a  better  dynamic  equivalency  would  be:  'However 
many  years  a  man  may  live'.  The  same  problem  of  mood  also 
applies  to  what  are  often  viewed  as  the  jussive  verbs  in 
11.8:  rI  '  and  IDi".  While  the  jussive  may  be  indicated  by 
the  use  of  the  apocopated  form  of  the  imperfect,  ?  Mm'  and 
'Dig  simply  take  the  imperfect  form  and  not  the  apocopated 
form.  Their  context  in  11.8,  however,  indicates  that  it  is 
appropriate  to  interpret  them  as  jussives:  they  are  third 
person  commands  to  'enjoy'  (on  the  basis  of  11.7  and  11.8a) 
and  'remember'  (the  shortness  of  one's  life);  though 
DeWette  and  Noyes  view  them  as  simply  indicative:  'because 
if  a  man  live  many  years  he  rejoices  in  them  all'.  But 
this  contradicts  the  previous  view  of  Qoheleth  that  long 
life  is  not  necessarily  a  blessing  (cf.  5.16;  6.12;  9.9) 
and  misses  the  import  of  the  third  clause  to  remember  how 
short  life  is;  and,  as  Ginsburg  points  out,  the  verbs  are 
obligatory  relative  to  the  previous  ideas  in  11.7,8. 
1  is  often  used  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  as  a  metaphor 
for  death  or  sheol  (cf.  I  Sam.  2.9;  Job  10.21;  17.3;  Ps. 
88.13;  Prov.  20.20).  M  11M,  an  hiphil  infinitive  absolute, 
is  used  adverbally  to  simply  mean  'many';  and  in  the 56 
explanatory  clause:  'for  they  will  be  many',  referring  to 
the  days  of  darkness. 
Qoheleth's  use  of  the  perfect  K  is  another  example 
of  the  erratic  nature  of  his  Hebrew  style:  clearly  the 
reference  to  'many  days  of  darkness'  is  in  the  future; 
though  the  LXX  preserves  the  perfect  sense  (Epxo1Evov) 
. 
There  is  a  slight  problem  with  what  the  hevel  statement  is 
in  reference  to:  Is  it  the  future  in  general  or  post 
mortem?  It  is  most  likely  to  be  after  death  and  or  sheol. 
The  Vulgate  may  be  influenced  by,  or  used  as  a 
pretext,  the  rabbinic  interpretation  (cf.  Rabbah  Midrash 
Ecclesiastes),  for  its  translation:  si  annis  multis  vixerit 
homo,  et  in  his  omnibus  laetatus  fuerit,  meminisse  debet 
tenebrosi  temporis,  et  dierum  multorum,  qui  cum  venerint, 
vanitatis  arguentur,  praeterita  ('if  a  man  live  many  years, 
and  has  rejoiced  in  them  all,  he  ought  to  remember  the  dark 
time,  and  the  many  days  wherein,  when  they  shall  come,  the 
things  passed  shall  be  accused  of  vanity').  Rabbah  Midrash 
Ecclesiastes  interprets  11.8  as  being  related  to  Torah  and 
the  messianic  age: 
The  Torah  which  a  man  learns  in  this  world 
IS  VANITY  in  comparison  with  the  Torah 
[which  will  be  learnt  in  the  days]  of  the 
Messiah. 
Rashi  and  Rashbam  understand  11.8  to  refer  to  the  status  of 
the  person  (sinner  or  saint)  and  as  a  caution  to  avoid  sin. 
Ibn  Ezra  simply  sees  the  absurdity  of  one  being  brought 
into  the  world;  and  Gordis  challenges  his  interpretation 
saying: 
The  final  clause  is  not  a  moralizing  phrase, 
when  a  man  understands  that  the  days  of 57 
darkness  are  coming,  all  the  pleasures  of  life 
will  become  worthless  in  his  eyes"  (Ibn  Ezra), 
but,  on  the  contrary,  a  justification  for 
seeking  enjoyment  in  this  world.  30 
Holden  and  Stuart  understand  11.8  to  be  a  reminder  that 
even  if  there  is  enjoyment  in  this  world,  one  also  suffers. 
Whybray  understands  the  verse  wholeheartedly  as  positive: 
Qoheleth's  intention  here  is  not  to  introduce 
a  note  of  gloom  to  negate  or  qualify  the 
cheerful  note  struck  in  v.  7,  but  to  use  the 
backdrop  of  inevitable  death  to  highlight  the 
positive  opportunities  for  joy  in  this  life.  31 
But  Whybray's  interpretation  begs  a  number  of  questions:  Is 
11.7  really  'cheerful'  or  is  this  a  subjective 
interpretation  applied  to  the  text?  Is  the  thought  of 
death  not  gloomy?  Is  not  the  adversative  1  on  7:  )i"1 
(perhaps  an  interpretation  itself)  indicative  of  a 
challenge  or  qualification?  The  only  answer  to  these 
questions  can  be  affirmative,  or  at  least,  indicative  of 
the  ambiguity  surrounding  the  interpretation  of  11.8. 
11.9  '11MM  refers  to  a  'young  man',  and  perhaps, 
related  to  the  idea  of  'chosen  one'  with  the  implication  of 
being  in  his  '  prime'  (so  B.  D.  B.  ;  LXX  EDýpatvov)  .  The  flI 
ending  on  1i1111MI  is  indicative  of  late  biblical  Hebrew; 
but  as  Barton  points  out  there  is  an  Aramaic  equivalent 
(MI1iý) 
.  Edi  do  Bombergiana  Tacobi  ben  Chajjim  lacks  the 
connecting  yod  on  j'II'11**'I=  and  yet  includes  the  connecting 
yod  on  Ii11111M.  This  is  not  a  serious  textual  problem  and 
can  probably  be  explained  on  the  grounds  of  a  combination 
haplography  with  I'V15"t  and  a  dittography  with  `-1i1rrr 
, 
i.  e.,  mixing  the  two  words  and  the  connecting  yod  up.  The 
t  of  j'Iii1*I=  probably  has  a  temporal  force:  'while  you  are 
Young 58 
Loader  thinks  that  the  switch  from  third  person 
commands  to  proper  imperatives  (second  person)  is  an 
indication  of  intensification  of  the  commands;  and  he  is 
possibly  right. 
The  use  of  the  hiphil  with  IT  in  the  second  clause  is 
confusing.  What  does  J=7  IVIVI1  mean?  Some  manuscripts 
have  ýbý1"32  The  hiphil  probably  does  carry  the  causative 
force  and  the  jussive  mood  is  indicated  by  the  immediate 
context:  'Let  your  heart  be  good'.  Is  there  some  moral 
connotation  to  Wt  here?  Probably  not;  if  so  it  would  be  a 
first  in  Qoheleth.  The  nuance  is  probably  that  of  'glad', 
and  therefore:  'Let  your  heart  be  glad'. 
The  third  clause  of  11.9  also  begins  with  an 
imperative:  'Go  in  the  ways  of  your  heart'.  A  number  of 
manuscripts  like  the  LXX,  the  Syriac  and  the  Vulgate  all 
understand  or  read  MR11=1  instead  of  IM112:  11.  OM  occurs 
in  6.9  and  Ginsburg  suggests  that  the  reason  why  the  plural 
is  used  here  in  11.9  is  to  conform  to  'ýý1;  but  if  iit'il  is 
in  a  construct  relationship  with  the  dual  I'ID,  then  it  is 
only  appropriate  that  1M1  M  be  plural;  though  the  LXX 
preserves  the  singular  verb  (opaact).  Gordis  argues  that 
the  qere  should  be  preferred  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  used 
'In  the  abstract  sense  of  "sight,  "  "desire,  "  it  does  not 
occur  elsewhere'.  The  is  probably  directional  in  the 
sense  of  'after';  therefore,  'go  after',  which  could  be 
rendered  'follow';  and  the  =  with  the  construct  phrase 
1'1'3  'k17  could  be  rendered  dynamically  'whatever  your 
eyes  see'  (so  N.  I.  V.  ).  Some  scholars  like  Crenshaw  and 
Gordis  view  the  heart  and  eyes  as  the  'organs  of  desire'; 59 
though  Ogden  renders  =  as  'mind'  saying  that  'we  are 
reminded  of  Qoheleth's  notion  that  pleasure-seeking  is  an 
intellectual  pursuit'.  This  seems,  however,  rather  far- 
fetched  and  an  attempt  to  import  into  the  text  something 
which  is  not  there.  11.9b  may  be  a  response  to  Num.  15.39 
(so  Salters)33  which  is  an  admonition  not  to  follow  one's 
heart  and  eyes,  i.  e.,  'desire';  and  Ginsburg  says  that 
Moses  prohibits  illicit  gratifications,  whilst 
Coheleth  recommends  innocent  pleasures,  which 
pleasures  are  to  be  in  harmony  with  our 
preparation  for  a  future  account  of  all  our 
doings  at  the  bar  of  judgment.  34 
Ginsburg  also  points  out  that,  in  the  light  of  rabbinic 
problems  with  Qoheleth's  heterodoxy  (cf.  Rabbah  Midrash 
Ecclesiastes),  the  LXX  attempted  to  alter  the  intended 
meaning  of  11.9  by  adding  the  adjective  a  uoxog  and  the 
particle  of  negation  1T  :  xat  i£putcxt  t  Ev  oSotq  xap&iaq  (you  aµwµog 
xai  µil  £v  opa6Et  o0O&41wv  (You;  which  Ginsburg,  along  with  the 
Vulgate  and  the  Syriac,  rightly  reject  as  dishonest. 
Ginsburg  further  points  out  that  Rashi,  Rashbam  and  Ibn 
Ezra  are  against  this  arbitrary  treatment  of  the  text  and 
view  the  statement  as  'ironical'. 
A  number  of  scholars  view  11.9c  as  an  editorial  gloss 
saying  that  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  immediate  context 
of  11.9  and  the  overall  mentality  of  Qoheleth  (Barton, 
Galling,  McNeile,  Zimmerli).  Gordis  is  surely  wrong  when 
he  views  the  I  conjunction  on  the  imperative  1t  as 
consecutive  (despite  the  support  of  the  LXX,  the  Vulgate 
and  Peshitta).  Clearly  this  is  an  adversative  use  of  the 
waw  conjunction  in  order  to  contrast  the  previous  two 
clauses  and  provide  a  warning  against  pure  hedonism  -  which 60 
seems  consistent  with  Qoheleth's  view  of  the  enjoyment  of 
life,  moderation  and  wisdom  vis-a-vis  folly  (cf.  2.24-26; 
3.12-13;  5.17-19;  7.15-18;  9.7-9).  It  is  unlikely, 
therefore,  that  11.9c  is  a  gloss. 
A  reasonable  translation  of  11.8-9,  in  the  light  of 
the  above  exegesis,  would  then  be:  'However  many  years  a 
man  may  live,  let  him  enjoy  them  all;  but  let  him  remember 
the  days  of  darkness  -  for  they  will  be  many.  Everything 
to  come  is  hevel.  Be  happy,  young  man,  while  you  are 
young;  and  let  your  heart  be  glad  during  the  days  of  your 
youth.  Follow  the  ways  of  your  heart  and  whatever  you  eyes 
see;  but  know  that  for  all  these  things  God  will  bring  you 
into  judgment'. 
6.  CONCLUSION  TO  THE  EXEGESIS  OF  THE  JOY  STATEMENTS 
A  reasonable  translation  of  the  joy  statements  in  Qoheleth, 
in  the  light  of  the  above  exegesis  and  some  textual 
emendation,  would  then  be: 
1.2.24-25:  'There  is  nothing  better  for  a  man  than 
to  eat  and  drink,  and  show  himself  his  work  is  beneficial. 
I  saw  that  this  too  is  from  the  hand  of  God  -  because  who 
can  eat  and  enjoy  without  him?  '. 
2.3.12-13:  'I  know  that  there  is  nothing  better  for 
them  than  to  enjoy  and  do  good  while  one  lives.  Moreover, 
every  man  who  eats  and  drinks  and  sees  good  in  all  his  work 
-  this  is  the  gift  of  God'. 61 
3.3.22:  'So  I  saw  that  there  is  nothing  better  for  a 
man  than  to  enjoy  his  work  -  for  that  is  his  lot.  For  who 
can  bring  him  to  see  what  will  happen  after  him?  ' 
4.5.17-19:  'Then  I  realised  that  it  is  good  and 
beautiful  for  a  man  to  eat  and  drink  and  see  good  in  all 
his  work  which  he  worked  for  under  the  sun  -  during  the  few 
days  of  his  life  which  God  gave  him  -  because  that  is  his 
lot.  Moreover,  when  God  gives  a  man  wealth  and  possessions 
-  and  enables  him  to  consume  them,  to  accept  his  lot  and  be 
happy  in  his  work:  this  is  the  gift  of  God.  For  he  does 
not  remember  much  the  days  of  his  life  -  because  God 
occupies  his  heart  with  enjoyment'. 
S.  8.15:  'So  I  commend  the  enjoyment  of  life:  because 
there  is  nothing  better  for  a  man  under  the  sun  than  to 
eat,  drink  and  be  happy.  Then  joy  will  accompany  him  in 
his  work  -  all  the  days  of  his  life  which  God  gives  him 
under  the  sun'. 
6.9.7-9:  'Go,  enjoy  your  food  and  drink  your  wine 
with  a  glad  heart  -  because  God  is  already  pleased  with 
your  works.  Let  your  clothes  be  white  at  all  times  and  let 
not  oil  be  lacking  on  your  head.  Enjoy  life  with  a  woman 
you  love  -  all  the  days  of  your  hevel  life  which  God  gave 
you  under  the  sun  -  all  your  hevel  days:  because  this  is 
your  lot  in  life  and  in  the  material  benefits  which  you 
worked  for  under  the  sun'. 
7.11.8-9:  'However  many  years  a  man  may  live,  let 
him  enjoy  them  all;  but  let  him  remember  the  days  of 
darkness  -  for  they  will  be  many.  Everything  to  come  is 
hevel.  Be  happy,  young  man,  while  you  are  young;  and  let 62 
your  heart  be  glad  during  the  days  of  your  youth.  Follow 
the  ways  of  your  heart  and  whatever  you  eyes  see;  but  know 
that  for  all  these  things  God  will  bring  you  into 
judgment'. 
There  can  be  little  doubt,  linguistically  and 
grammatically,  that  a  number  of  the  joy  statements,  or 
clauses  thereof,  are  indicative  of  what  they  appear  to  be 
on  face  value:  carpe  diem  joy  statements;  though  there  are 
various  other  forms  such  as  rhetorical  questions  and 
imperatives  mixed  with  ambiguous  statements  or  clauses 
which  make  interpreting  them  hazardous.  If  the  joy 
statements  should  be  considered  in  the  indicative  and 
imperative  moods,  the  question  then  arises:  What  should  one 
make  of  them,  i.  e.,  how  should  they  be  interpreted?  A  form 
critical  analysis  of  the  joy  statements  might  inform  such  a 
question. 63 
CHAPTER  THREE 
FORM  CRITICISM  OF  THE  JOY  STATEMENTS  AND 
ADDITIONAL  EXEGETICAL  NOTES 
This  chapter  will  use  form  criticism  in  order  to  understand 
the  literary  nature  of  the  joy  statements  and  provide 
additional  exegetical  notes  which  inform  the  process  of 
form  criticism. 
Form  criticism  has  traditionally  dealt  with  four 
aspects  of  biblical  texts:  literary  structure  (which 
demarcates  individual  pericopes  and  Gattungen),  genre  or 
Gattung  (which  looks  at  the  specific  types  of  literary 
forms  or  genres  in  a  given  text),  historical  setting  (Sitz 
im  Leben),  and  literary  function  or  intention  (what  is  the 
form  attempting  to  convey  literarily?  ).  1  The  historical 
setting  of  Qoheleth  has  proven  an  elusive  and  contentious 
subject  which  will  prove  irrelevant  in  this  literary 
analysis  of  the  joy  statements. 
This  chapter  will  focus  on  a  detailed  analysis  of  the 
Gattungen  of  the  joy  statements  in  the  overall  context  of 
pericope  in  which  they  are  found  and  the  immediate  context 
surrounding  the  joy  statement,  as  well  as  their  possible 
literary  function  or  intention. 
Additional  exegetical  notes  will  be  given  as 
appropriate  to  the  joy  statements  in  their  overall  and 
immediate  contexts;  and  it  should  be  noted  that  it  is  often 
difficult  to  distinguish  the  literary  nature  or  Gattungen 
without  proper  exegesis  informing  the  process  of  form 
criticism.  The  crudity  of  Hebrew  grammar  and  the  inflexion 64 
of  verbal  stems,  inevitably  lead  to  confusion  regarding 
their  exact  nature  and  grammatical  relationship  to  other 
words  in  sentences.  Unlike  Greek,  where  the  inflexions  of 
the  verbal  stems  provide  concrete  evidence  of  mood,  Hebrew 
does  not  have  this  luxury. 
While  each  joy  statement  may  well  be  a  self-contained 
statement  (a  matter  which  form  criticism  might  well 
challenge  or  call  into  question),  it  is  important  to  note 
that  they  are  often  a  series  of  clauses  and  sentences  which 
take  different  literary  forms  within  the  one  statement. 
For  sure,  there  are  some  indicative  forms;  but  there  are 
also  questions,  and  perhaps  even  scepticism  or  irony  - 
matters  which  can  only  be  determined  in  the  book's  overall 
literary  structure  and  content  (and  will  be  dealt  with  in 
chapter  six)  -  and  even  then  'determination'  may  be  a 
dubious  or  elusive  concept,  as  scepticism  (in  chapter  four) 
might  well  show. 
Dell,  in  her  form  critical  analysis  of  the  Book  of 
Job,  finds  parallels  with  Ecclesiastes.  She  says  that 
Ecclesiastes,  like  Job,  can  be  divided  up  by 
working  with  various  genre  levels.  The  quest 
to  find  an  overall  genre  for  the  book  has  been 
almost  as  fruitless  as  the  search  for  an  overall 
genre  for  Job.  ...  There  has  been  more  success 
in  recognizing  various  subgenres  for  Ecclesiastes 
than  in  recognizing  an  overall  genre.  2 
Some  overall  genres  for  Qoheleth  from  comparative 
literature  are  the  'Royal  Testament',  as  in  the  Instruction 
for  Merikare  and  the  Instruction  of  Amenemophet;  3  though 
Dell  would  ultimately  categorize  Qoheleth  as  'Protest 
Literature'.  4  Ellermeier  suggests  that  Qoheleth  is  a 
mashal  broken  down  into  the  two  main  subgenres  of  'sayings' 65 
and  'reflections';  5  and  Braun  views  Qoheleth  to  essentially 
be  comprised  of  three  main  genres:  'Meditative  Reflection' 
(betrachtende  Reflexion),  'Meditation'  (Betrachtung)  and 
'Instruction'  (Belehrung).  6 
Part  of  the  problem  in  determining  an  overall  genre 
for  Qoheleth  is  the  fact  that  there  are  so  many  different 
forms  in  the  book.  Loader  analyses  some  thirteen  different 
forms  or  Gattungen:  royal  fiction,  Wahrspruch  and  maxim, 
the  tob-saying,  comparison,  metaphor,  parable,  allegory, 
observation,  self-discourse,  woe-saying  and  benediction, 
antilogion,  rhetorical  question  and  admonition.  7  The  sheer 
number  of  different  forms  in  Qoheleth  makes  for  hazardous 
interpretation.  Careful  attention  will  now  be  given  to 
form  criticism  of  the  joy  statements. 
1.  QOHELETH  2.24-25 
There  is  nothing  better  for  a  man  than  to  eat  and  drink, 
and  show  himself  his  work  is  beneficial.  I  saw  that  this 
too  is  from  the  hand  of  God  -  because  who  can  eat  and  enjoy 
without  him? 
A.  The  Overall  Context  of  the  Pericope  1.12-2.26 
The  first  joy  statement  comes  in  the  overall  context  of  the 
royal  testament  of  Qoheleth  1-2  (so  Barton,  Crenshaw,  Dell, 
Loader,  Whybray).  As  Loader,  following  Ellermeier,  points 
out:  the  royal  fiction  may  be  limited  to  1.12-2.11  because 
this  is  the  only  pericope  in  which  the  royal  fiction  is 66 
specifically  mentioned  (1.12)  and  used  in  the  book  except 
for  the  superscription;  but  Crenshaw  and  Whybray  both  see 
the  fiction  extending  to  2.26  -  and  in  this  regard  they 
should  be  considered  right:  1.1  opens  with  the  allusion  to 
Solomonic  authorship  (the  motto,  thematic  question  and 
first  poem  obviously  do  not  belong  to  the  royal  fiction) 
and  this  is  later  picked  up  again  in  1.12-18  on  the  j1%IIi'4 
of  intellectual  pursuits  (wisdom)  and  2.1-26  on  pleasure, 
achievements  (building  projects),  wisdom,  work  and  estates 
-  all  of  which  relate  to  the  pursuits  and  lifestyles  of 
kings. 
1.12-2.26  is  also  understood  to  be  the  Gattung  of 
reflection,  whereby  the  author  reflects  on  some  aspect  or 
aspects  of  life  and  often,  though  not  necessarily  always, 
draws  some  conclusion  or  conclusions;  and  this  in 
contradistinction  from  the  observation  which  typically 
utilises  the  use  of  the  first  person  "I  III  or  11i  1  and 
does  not  draw  any  conclusions;  though  some  dispute  still 
remains  as  to  the  exact  use  of  these  terms  and  concepts.  8 
Moreover,  as  Loader  points  out,  1.12-2.26  is  not  a  group  of 
independent  literary  units  on  various  top  of  but  one 
pericope,  which  he  labels  the  'Worth(lessness)  of  Wisdom'.  9 
He  could  have  further  added  that  it  is  a  collection  of 
observations  (his  terminology)  in  one  setting:  the  royal 
setting  or  on  aspects  of  royal  life.  Thus,  2.12-16  is  not 
an  independent  unit,  in  the  sense  of  being  isolated  (so 
Ellermeier),  but  rather  is  an  excursus  on  the  royal  theme 
of  the  pursuit  of  wisdom  (which  also  provides  the  means  for 
generating  wealth  and  pleasure)  in  the  light  of  the  vanity 67 
of  work  and  material  benefits  in  2.1-10  (cf.  2.12  which 
explicitly  uses  'b) 
, 
10 
The  opening  phrase  of  2.24  :  11t  I"bt  is  also  known  as  a 
'better-than'  saying  (tob-Spruch),  whereby  some  comparison 
is  made  between  one  aspect  of  life  and  another,  often 
indicated  by  the  use  of  112  in  the  sentence;  though  not 
always  (cf.  exegesis  and  3.12,22;  8.15).  11 
Clearly  by  the  use  of  the  tob-Spruch  form  Qoheleth  was 
trying  to  make  some  comparison.  The  comparison  is 
correlated  to  the  pericope  in  2.17-23:  a  very  negative 
observation  of  Qoheleth  indeed!  Qoheleth  used  a  conclusive 
waw  conjunction  to  say:  'So  I  hated  life'  (b"MM-fl 
'i1M  1) 
.  Why?  'Because  of  the  evil  work  upon  me'  01ftWil 
, 05y  D  "I  ýb) 
.  The  phrase  15D  3iß  could  also  be  rendered 
'evil  upon  me';  but  this  is  unlikely  and  more  probable  that 
the  adjective  37  qualifies  the  noun  MmD  IZ  instead.  The 
conclusive  reflection  in  2.17-23  was  in  turn  a  response  to 
Qoheleth's  negative  evaluation  of  pleasure,  materialism  and 
wisdom  in  2.1-16.  The  proleptic  conclusion  to  2.17-23  in 
2.17c  is  that  'everything  is  hevel  and  a  vexation  of 
spirit'.  The  wordplay  on  1111  111D1  ('chasing  the  wind'  and 
'vexation  of  spirit')  may  be  present  because  of  the 
possible  pun  in  1tV.  V?  Z  which  can  reflect  the  'means'  and 
'ends'  ('material  benefits')  of  work  elaborated  on  in  2.18, 
which  are  both  evaluated  as  hevel.  2.23,  which  closes  the 
pericope  of  2.17-23,  is  also  a  dreadful  conclusion  or 
evaluation  of  'work  under  the  sun':  'For  all  his  days  are 
painful  (  WIMMDi2)  and  his  occupation  vexing  (VI1  ODD)  - 
even  at  night  he  cannot  sleep.  This  too  is  hevel'.  There 68 
may  also  be  a  pun  with  fly  reflecting  work  and  affliction. 
The  sheer  number  of  negative  ideas  and  terms  used  in  2.17- 
23  lead  Qoheleth  to  his  statement  in  2.24-25,  which 
probably  includes  2.26. 
B.  The  Immediate  Context  2.17-26 
The  first  sentence  of  2.24  demonstrates  the  problematics  of 
verbal  inflexions  which  do  not  specify  mood.  By  its 
immediate  context  2.24a  appears  to  be  in  the  indicative 
mood,  'a  simple  statement  of  fact'  :  12  'There  is  nothing 
better  for  a  man  than  to  eat  and  drink,  and  show  himself 
his  work  is  beneficial'.  One  should  note,  however,  that  it 
is  the  author's  statement  of  fact  in  the  literary  sense  and 
not  necessarily  a  fact  based  in  reality. 
Both  the  Gattungen  of  royal  testament  and  reflection 
epitomise  the  first  person  ego.  2.24b  is  a  reflection 
correlated  to  2.24a  and  again  appears  to  be  indicative:  'I 
saw  that  this  too  is  from  the  hand  of  God'.  The  difficulty 
is  the  IN212  of  2.25;  but  as  has  already  been  argued  in  the 
exegesis,  the  emendation  to  the  third  person  singular 
pronoun  'him',  is  warranted.  2.25  provides  the  explanatory 
clause  put  in  the  Gattung  of  a  rhetorical  question  as 
indicated  by  the  use  of  'D  and  the  interrogative  particle 
112:  'because  without  him  [God]  who  can  eat  and  enjoy?  '  The 
rhetorical  question  demands  an  emphatic  no  one!  '. 
What  is  the  role  of  2.26  in  determining  the  meaning  of 
2.24-25?  Clearly  2.26  properly  belongs  with  2.24-25  on  the 
basis  of  the  ':  )  introducing  a  motive  clause;  though  some 69 
scholars,  like  Barton  and  McNeile,  view  2.26  as  an 
editorial  gloss  of  a  pious  chokmatic  commentator.  The  use 
of  the  perfect  verbs  are,  again,  probably  to  be  taken  as 
imperfect.  Crenshaw  argues  that  Qoheleth's  use  of  =1b  and 
MMM5,  a  participle  with  the  inseparable  preposition 
ý, 
are  emptied  of  any  'moral'  content,  saying  that  here  they 
simply  represent  the  concepts  of  'fortunate'  and 
,  unfortunate';  but  Whybray  points  out  that  there  are  231 
occurrences  of  the  verb  MÜ1i  and  356  of  the  noun  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible  (see  Qoheleth  7.20,  26;  8.12;  9.2),  '  where  the 
meaning  is  undoubtedly  "  sin"'  . 
13  Gordis  views  XMIM  as 
synonymous  with  'fool',  the  one  displeasing  to  God'  vis-a- 
vis  the  '  one  who  pleases  God'  (IT115M1  'nth  =1th),  and  thus 
a  contrast  between  the  'wise'  and  the  'fool'. 
The  positive  motive  for  carpe  diem,  it  seems,  is  that 
'God  gives  to  the  man  who  is  good  before  him:  wisdom, 
knowledge  and  joy';  the  adversative  and  negative  motive: 
,  but  to  the  sinner  he  gives  the  affliction  to  gather  and 
collect  so  as  to  give  to  the  one  who  is  good  before  God'. 
What  brings  the  whole  positive  interpretation  of  2.26  into 
question,  as  either  a  pious  gloss  or  simply  a  statement  of 
fact  which  contradicts  2.21  (so  Ogden  and  Whybray),  is  the 
negative  evaluation  of  2.26ab  in  2.26c:  'hevel  and  a 
vexation  of  spirit'.  This  is  an  amazing  twist  to  the 
motive  statement.  This  negative  evaluation  of  the  motive 
clause,  if  not  the  whole  pericope  and  its  negative 
evaluation  of  pleasure,  achievements,  materialism,  wisdom, 
estates,  work,  retributive  justice,  raises  doubts  as  to  the 
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clause  -  and  calls  into  question  the  straightforward 
indicative  interpretation,  on  face  value,  as  a  carpe  diem 
joy  statement. 
The  question,  therefore,  must  be  asked:  Why  would 
retributive  justice,  a  standard  of  traditional  wisdom 
circles,  be  so  negatively  evaluated?  The  answer  might  be, 
in  conjunction  with  Qoheleth's  other  statements  on  the  lack 
of  retributive  justice  shown  by  God  (see  3.16;  4.1-3,13- 
16;  5.7-16;  6.1-2;  7.13-18;  8.9-10,14;  9.1-2,11-12;  9.13- 
10.1),  that  2.24-25  is  not  an  indicative  statement  but  an 
ironic  statement  -  with  the  idea  being:  'Enjoy  life  (if  you 
can!  [irony])  but  do  not  count  on  it:  Look  at  God's 
capricious  way  in  which  he  deals  with  sinner  and  saint 
alike!  '  (cf.  also  2.12-16).  So  the  joy  statement  of  2.24- 
25,  and  even  the  motive  statement  of  2.26  which  is  properly 
a  part  of  that  joy  statement,  cannot  be  adequately 
evaluated  in  isolation  from  the  rest  of  the  pericope,  the 
book  and  its  themes. 
From  the  Gattungen  analysis  of  2.24-25,  a  number  of 
conclusions  can  be  drawn.  First  of  all,  2.24-25  is  a  part 
of  the  larger  Gattung  of  royal  testament.  Within  the  royal 
testament  are  a  number  of  different  Gattungen  (e.  g.  , 
reflection  and  observation),  which  in  turn  contain  a  number 
of  sub-Gattungen  (e.  g.,  indicative  statements,  rhetorical 
estions)  in  a  number  of  pericopes  (1.12-18;  2.1-11;  2.12- 
. I- 
16;  2.17-23),  which  in  turn  lead  to  the  author's  final 
analysis  (or  reflection)of  his  observations  (2.24-26). 
The  exact  literary  nature  of  the  joy  statement  has 
come  into  question  because  the  overall  context  in  1.12- 71 
2.26,  the  immediate  context  of  2.17-23  and  including  the 
motive  statement  of  2.26  and  its  grammatical  connection  to 
2.24-25,  all  call  into  question  an  indicative 
interpretation  of  joy  statement;  though  when  isolated  in 
exegesis,  the  linguistics  and  grammar  support  such  an 
interpretation.  For  this  reason,  the  joy  statement  of 
2.24-25  is  possibly,  if  not  probably,  an  ironic  statement 
not  an  indicative  statement. 
2.  QOHELETH  3.12-13 
I  know  that  there  is  nothing  better  for  them  than  to  enjoy 
and  do  good  while  one  lives.  Moreover,  every  man  who  eats 
and  drinks  and  sees  good  in  all  his  work  -  this  is  the  gift 
of  God. 
A.  The  Overall  Context  of  the  Pericope  3.1-15 
The  joy  statement  in  3.12-13  comes  after  a  poem  on  the 
times  of  everything  under  the  heavens  in  3.1-8;  that  it  is 
poetry  is  indicated  by  the  bicolon  antithetical  parallelism 
used  in  it.  As  Loader  rightly  points  out:  The  poem  is 
isolated  by  the  concluding  hevel  and  vexation  of  spirit 
statement  of  2.26  and  the  rhetorical  question  of  3.9.14 
The  poem,  whether  attributable  to  Qoheleth  or  not,  seems  to 
deal  with,  as  Loader  puts  it:  'the  contents  of  time'.  15 
The  interpretation  of  this  poem  and  its  contents  of 
time,  however,  has  proven  an  elusive  exercise.  Hoffmann 
interprets  chapter  3  of  Qoheleth  as  subtle  irony. 72 
Blenkinsopp  views  3.2-8  to  be  quoted  by  Qoheleth,  of  which 
he  added  the  title  3.1  and  a  brief  commentary  on  the  poem 
in  3.9-15.16  His  interpretation,  however,  seems  far- 
fetched  on  the  basis  that  he  views  the  ideas  of  the  poem  to 
have  been  borrowed  from  Stoic  philosophy  by  a  'stoicizing 
Jew'  and  on  the  dubious  translation  of  II1?  * 
as  to  put  an 
end  to  one's  life',  which  he  argues  brings  II1Mý  into  line 
with  a  literal  rendering  of  1*ý  as  'to  beget'  or  'to 
bring  a  child  into  the  world'  -  thus  connecting  the  poem 
with  the  Stoic  idea  of  suicide.  17  But  the  antithetical 
parallelism  of  I'1"155  with  I11i25  suggests  that  M55  should  be 
rendered  to  be  born'  and  does  not  necessarily  require  the 
reflexive  niphil  (contra  Blenkinsopp,  Crenshaw):  the 
erratic  nature  of  the  Hebrew  verbal  system  is  well  known 
and  the  literal  rendering  would  upset  the  poetic  idea  of 
polar  opposites. 
The  introductory  statement  of  3.1,  however,  seems  to 
capsulise,  or  at  least  adequately  introduce  the  poem's 
theme.  As  Crenshaw  rightly  points  out:  The  concept  of 
opposites  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  often  indicates  completeness 
or  totality.  18  Ib'  generally  means  'be  fixed'  or  'appointed 
time';  though  often  thought  to  be  exclusively  a  late  Hebrew 
loanword  from  Aramaic,  Fredericks,  as  does  B.  D.  B.,  point 
out  that  its  Akkadian  cognate,  simanu,  occurs  from  1800 
B.  C.  E.  on.  Fredericks  further  says  that 
The  need  for  a  parallel  and  near-synonymous  term 
to  pair  with  113,  could  have  been  the  reason  for 
selecting  this  word  from  a  common  semitic 
word-stock.  Its  meaning  of  "appointed  time"  as 
opposed  to  "time"  in  general  (11D)  specifies  the 
providence  of  God  in  a  most  exact  expression.  19 73 
The  use  of  IMi,  in  conjunction  with  the  contents  of  the 
poem,  indicates  that  there  are  'fixed  times'  or  'seasons' 
for  all  activities  in  the  world:  'a  time  to  be  born,  and  a 
time  to  die',  etc.  Surely  there  is  a  connection  between 
this  poem  and  the  creation  poem  of  1.4-11  which  also 
addresses  the  same  rhetorical  question  in  3.9  of  'what 
profit  is  there  to  one's  toil?  '.  In  the  case  of  the  poem 
in  1.4-11,  the  rhetorical  question  in  1.3  is  put  to  rest  by 
the  seemingly  monotonous  and  meaningless  activity  of 
creation;  in  3.1-8  there  is  the  same  lack  of  human  control 
in  the  activities  of  the  world  which  are  determined  by  God 
(cf.  3.9-14);  though  Garrett  argues  against  this 
interpretation  of  3.1-8  by  saying: 
Ecclesiastes  is  not  concerned  about  questions 
of  "cyclic"  versus  "linear"  time.  These 
verses  concern  not  divine  providence  or 
abstract  notions  of  time  but  human  mortality.  20 
But  Garrett  does  not  specify  the  reasons  for  this  view;  nor 
can  he:  death  is  but  one  event  in  a  man's  life,  and  life 
from  birth  to  death  has  many  other  events  as  indicated  in 
the  poem.  The  literary  purpose  of  the  poem  in  3.1-8,  then, 
seems  to  be  to  use  creation,  and  its  activities  determined 
by  God,  as  an  illustration  to  prove  the  inadequacy  and 
impotency  of  humans  to  alter  the  fixed  course  of  events 
(cf.  a  similar  illustrative  use  of  1.4-11  and  11.7-12.7). 
As  Crenshaw  rightly  points  out: 
Ancient  sages  believed  that  there  was  a  right 
time  and  a  wrong  time  for  everything,  and  they 
devoted  considerable  energy  to  discerning 
proper  times.  21 
This  was  the  whole  driving  force  behind  astrology. 
Qoheleth  apparently  used  this  poem  in  3.1-8  as  a  pretext 74 
for  his  following  rhetorical  question  in  3.9  and  commentary 
in  3.10-14.  Fox  argues  that  the  rhetorical  question 
properly  belongs  to  the  poem  as  its  conclusion  anticipating 
a  negative  response,  and  3.10-14  are  the  commentary  on  the 
poem  which  deals  with  the  implications  of  the  poem  and  the 
guiding  rhetorical  question.  The  poem,  however,  is 
obviously  a  poetic  Gattung  and  the  rhetorical  question 
really  belongs  to  the  Gattung  of  discourse. 
B.  The  Immediate  Context  3.9-15 
The  immediate  context  of  the  joy  statement  in  3.12-13 
raises  certain  questions  or  problems  concerning  the 
demarcation  of  the  pericope:  Is  it  from  3.9-14  or  3.9-15? 
A  number  of  commentators  (Crenshaw,  Gordis,  Ogden,  Whybray) 
all  view  the  pericope  running  from  3.1-15,  obviously 
inclusive  of  the  poem.  The  distinctions  of  pericopes  are 
probably  artificial,  and  the  poem  can  be  included  with  the 
commentary;  but  3.1-8  is  clearly  a  poetic  Gattung  and  3.9- 
15  is  discourse  using  a  variety  of  Gattungen.  3.15c 
remains  problematic;  but  is  probably  transitional  and 
should  be  interpreted  with  3.16-17  (so  Garrett);  though 
Salters  comes  to  no  firm  conclusions  on  the  matter  but 
simply  outlines  the  various  interpretations.  22 
There  are  the  Gattungen  of  observation  (3.10)  and 
reflection  (3.11).  An  observation  is  when  one  simply 
observes  some  phenomenon  in  the  universe  without  passing 
comment  or  evaluating  it.  A  reflection  is  where  one 75 
actually  thinks  about  certain  phenomena  and  explores, 
comments  and  evaluates  them. 
Qoheleth  observes  the  'affliction'  (r1)  God  has  given 
man;  and  reflects  that  he  'makes  all  things  beautiful  in 
its  time'.  3.  lla  could  also  be  rendered:  'He  [God]  made 
everything  beautiful  in  his  time'.  There  are  three  good 
reasons  why  the  antecedent  of  the  pronomial  suffix  1 
attached  to  f1  could  be  God  himself  and  not  those  things 
created.  First  of  all,  the  pronomial  suffix  1  is  a  third 
person,  masculine,  singular  pronoun  and  may  have  a 
grammatical  and  conceptual  connection  to  the  subject  of  the 
verb,  which  is  also  third  person,  masculine  and  singular. 
Secondly,  created  'things'  do  not  determine  their  own 
completion  date.  Thirdly,  that  God  is  creator  is  clear 
from  the  text  ('1K  in  3.10  is  the  antecedent  to  the 
subject  of  the  verb  71fDD  in  3.11),  and  must  therefore,  be 
seen  as  the  antecedent  to  the  pronomial  suffix.  This  makes 
the  most  grammatical  sense  of  the  statement.  Thus,  God 
both  creates  and  is  sovereign  in  his  creative  processes; 
though  Fox  argues  that  'everything'  in  3.11  resumes  the 
'everything'  of  3.1;  and  this  is  quite  an  attractive  and 
persuasive  argument. 
From  this  reflection  comes  a  second  and  third 
reflection  in  3.  llbc:  'God  has  set  eternity  (Dhu)  in  their 
hearts',  and  consequently  man  cannot  comprehend  or  take  in 
all  that  he  has  done  from  beginning  to  end'  .  The 
interpretation  of  n5D  has  reeked  havoc  amongst 
commentators.  The  LXX  renders  it  at(j)va.  Barton  argues 
vigourously  against  McNeile,  et  al.  that  it  cannot  possibly 76 
mean  'eternity'  in  this  context;  though  he  does  not  dispute 
Qoheleth's  use  of  the  term  elsewhere  as  such  (1.4,10; 
2.16;  3.14;  9.6;  12.5).  23  Barton  further  argues,  on 
etymological  grounds,  that  the  root  C35  D  often  has  the 
sense  of  'hidden'  or  'unknown'  and  is  used  in  this  sense  in 
12.14.  Gordis  argues  along  rabbinic  lines  that  1051)  is 
used  in  the  mishnaic  sense  of  'world',  i.  e.,  'love  of  the 
world'  (so  Rabbah  Midrash  Ecclesiastes),  and  he  gets  some 
backup  from  the  Vulgate  which  renders  it  et  mundum  tradidit 
disputatione  eorum  ('he  [God]  has  handed  over  the  world  to 
their  contention')  on  the  basis  of  a  textual  emendation  of 
=Z  to  =`*  from  the  root  Wl  (cf.  Job  31.13  [N.  I.  V. 
'grievance']).  But  Barr  says  that  Gordis'  interpretation 
'requires  the  rather  difficult  amplification  as  the  "love 
of  the  world"';  24  and  Fredericks  adds,  concerning  Gordis' 
attempt  to  refute  this  by  saying  'love'  is  implied  in  th,  25 
that  this  is  loading  the  word  too  heavily  with  a 
subjective  preference'.  26  But  as  Ginsburg  points  out, 
concerning 
th3  in  the  Hebrew  Bible,  it  usually  refers  to 
an  unspecified  time  in  the  future  and  thus  'eternity',  and 
in  the  case  of  3.11,  it  is  probably  in  antithesis  with  fly 
or  JMi  which  is  a  specific  or  limited  period  of  time:  for 
these  and  other  reasons  he  should  be  considered  correct. 
Perhaps  there  is  even  a  pun  on  the  roots  býD  for 
'ignorance'  and  eternity  related  to  man's  inability  to  know 
or  relate  to  the  future;  and  Qoheleth  certainly  advocates 
this  idea  in  his  book  (cf.  3.22c;  6.12;  9.11-12).  These 
reflections  immediately  lead  to  the  joy  statement  of  3.12- 
13. 77 
For  all  intents  and  purposes,  there  only  appears  to  be 
one  Gattung  inside  this  reflection  Gattung  in  the  joy 
statement  of  3.12-13:  indicative  statement.  That  'fl3  1'  is 
used  implies,  as  previously  noted,  'experiential 
knowledge',  and  thus  strengthens  the  indicative 
interpretation:  Qoheleth  knows  for  sure,  on  the  basis  of 
experience,  that  this  is  good  and  the  gift  of  God.  As  far 
as  he  was  concerned,  this  is  a  simple  statement  of  fact. 
The  following  statements  in  3.14-15  also  seem  to  support 
the  indicative  interpretation  on  the  basis  that  they 
demonstrate  a  rationale  for  enjoying  life:  time,  events  and 
eternity  all  overtake  humanity,  but  God's  eternal  nature 
persists  regardless.  In  addition,  3.12-13  does  not  have 
the  encumbrances  of  the  dubious  rhetorical  question  on 
God's  nature  and  the  hevel  and  vexation  of  spirit  statement 
of  2.24-25  which  brought  that  joy  statement  into  question. 
On  the  basis  of  the  context,  one  can  probably  say  that  an 
indicative  interpretation  of  3.12-13  is  a  sound  one.  So, 
on  the  basis  of  form  criticism,  3.12-13  is  what  it  appears 
to  be  on  face  value:  an  indicative  carpe  diem  joy 
statement. 
3.  QOHELETH  3.22 
So  I  saw  that  there  is  nothing  better  for  a  man  than  to 
enjoy  his  work  -  for  that  is  his  lot.  For  who  can  bring 
him  to  see  what  will  happen  after  him? 78 
A.  The  Overall  Context  of  the  Pericope  3.15-22 
The  joy  statement  of  3.22  comes  shortly  after  the 
indicative  joy  statement  in  3.12-13.3.15  appears  to  be  in 
the  poetic  mode  as  indicated  by  the  Hebrew  parallelism. 
3.15ab  appears  to  be  synthetic  parallelism  stating  that 
'whatever  is  has  already  been,  and  that  to  be  already  has 
been'.  Qoheleth  used  the  interrogative  particle  with  the 
preposition  as  an  indefinite  pronoun  'whatever', 
and  not  as  an  interrogative  (so  Fredericks,  Ginsburg, 
Schoors).  As  has  already  been  noted,  3.15c  presents 
considerable  difficulties  for  commentators.  It  too  appears 
to  be  in  the  poetic  mode;  but  its  exact  relationship  with 
3.15ab  is  unclear.  It  looks  like  another  synthetic  stich 
adding  to  the  idea  of  the  in  3.15ab;  but  it  is  also  likely 
to  function  as  a  transitional  statement  for  the  following 
pericope,  relating  the  past  with  future  divine  judgment  in 
3.16-17. 
3.16  is  an  observation  Gattung  as  indicated  by  the  use 
of  *II'1"M'I;  followed  by,  what  is  in  essence,  a  synonymous 
parallelism  made  up  of  two  antithetical  parallelisms: 
observing  that  where  judgment  is,  so  is  wickedness.  3.17 
is  a  reflection  Gattung  as  indicated  by  *'=ý:  I  *PM  *OMMM  ('  So 
I  said  in  my  heart 
..  .  ')  and  an  evaluation;  whether  or 
not  what  follows  is  poetic  or  simply  discourse  is  debatable 
-  but  it  might  well  relate  the  concept  of  divine  judgment 
in  3.16-17  with  the  poem  of  3.1-8  and  appropriate  times. 79 
B.  The  Immediate  Context  3.18-22 
Loader  argues  that  the  pericope  properly  runs  from  3.16-22 
on  the  basis  that  3.16  properly  begins  a  new  reflection,  as 
does  4.1,  and  thus  his  demarcation  between  3.16-22.  Fox 
too  connects  this  pericope  with  3.16-17,  saying  that 
Inasmuch  as  everything  has  a  time,  Qohelet 
reasons,  divine  judgment  must  too  come  to  pass. 
But  this  thought  is  small  comfort,  because 
if  the  sentence  is  death,  the  universiality 
of  death  makes  that  sentence  meaningless  as 
punishment.  27 
But  it  is  difficult  to  see  the  connection  between 
jurisprudence  and  the  death  penalty  here.  Again,  the 
demarcations  of  the  pericopes  might  be  somewhat  artificial 
for  the  purpose  of  analysing  the  Gattungen  of  a  given  joy 
statement.  3.18  does  not  begin  with  a  conjunctive  1;  but 
its  use  of  'fl1  M  probably  indicates  continuity  with  what 
precedes  it  in  3.16-17;  though  the  N.  I.  V.  perhaps  goes  too 
far  by  translating  it  as  'also'  ('I  also  thought  ..  '). 
3.18  also  begins  another  new  reflection  discourse 
through  to  3.21,  as  indicated  by  the  use  of  IP1`1MM.  The 
interpretation  of  3.18  and  the  following  pericope  hinges  on 
the  understanding  of  n`1Z  ý. 
Most  manuscripts  and 
commentators  take  iß1=5  from  the  root  11:  1,  which  usually 
means  to  'purify'  (e.  g.,  Ez.  20.38;  Job  33.8),  but  in  later 
Hebrew  could  mean  'select',  'choose'  (e.  g.,  I  Chr.  7.40; 
9.22;  Neh.  5.18).  The  LXX  renders  11Z  as  81axptvE1;  but 
though  Whitley,  following  Barton,  argues  that  the  LXX 
understood  11=  in  the  secondary  sense  of  'choose',  it 
seems  difficult  to  understand  how  the  LXX  could  when  the 
Greek  equivalent  for  'select',  'choose',  would  be  mXeyw; 80 
though  Ginsburg  explains  the  LXX's  rendering  as  a 
substitution  for  M  UP  in  the  preceding  verse.  The  Targum 
and  Vulgate  probably  are  closer  to  the  mark  when  they 
render  WIZ5  as  JIM"Na25  (,  test',  '  try')  and  probaret 
('prove')  respectively.  The  Peshitta  understood  nftl:  15  to 
be  from  the  root  M7:  1,  'create';  but  this  is  far-fetched  on 
the  basis  that  it  does  not  suit  the  context.  'Proved'  is 
probably  the  best  rendering  of  11:  1  in  the  context.  The 
other  problem  with  bl=ý  is  the  inflexion:  Is  the 
5 
preposition  indicating  emphatic  preposition  on  the  finite 
verb,  the  infinitive  or  the  introduction  of  indirect 
speech?  Gordis  prefers  the  emphatic  preposition  on  a 
finite  verb  interpretation  with  apocopated  form  on  the 
basis  of  similar  grammatical  uses  in  Akkadian,  Ugaritic  and 
Arabic,  and  thus  he  renders  it:  'He  surely  has  tested 
them'.  This  grammatical  inflexion  is  recognised  in  9.4: 
=10  KIM  'n  ýýý  T'ý  ('for  indeed  a  living  dog  is  better 
.. 
.  ').  The  infinitive  interpretation,  as  Whitley  points  out, 
would  mean  that  the  clause  lacks  a  finite  verb;  but  this  is 
not  uncommon  in  Hebrew,  and  may  moreover,  be  seen  as  coming 
under  the  'Ii`1iM  introduction  to  the  reflection.  The  t3 
suffix  likewise  has  created  controversy:  Is  it  simply  the 
third  person  masculine  plural  pronoun  '  they',  '  them'  or 
should  it  be  emended  to  something  like  Mt  as  in  3.  17? 
There  is  no  reason  to  emend  it,  however,  and  the  clause 
makes  better  sense  when  rendered:  'God  tested  them'  or  'God 
proved  to  them'.  Finally,  with  regard  to  the  syntax  of 
3.18,  where  does  (LXX  1rEpi  XxXt(X;  )  belong:  with  the 
first  clause  or  the  second?  '1:  11  is  probably  best  rendered 81 
here  in  the  sense  of  the  'affairs'  or  'matters'  of  the 
'sons  of  man'  ('humanity');  though  Fox  suggests,  rather 
strangely,  that  perhaps  a  word  is  missing  in  between  these 
first  two  clauses  but  for  unspecified  reasons.  The  first 
two  clauses  should  be  rendered:  'I  said  in  my  heart 
concerning  matters  of  humanity:  "God  proved  to  them  ..  "'. 
The  next  clause  of  3.18,131ý  IsIM  1  MMMI-nlg  t11btlý1, 
also  proves  difficult.  The  Massoretic  Text  (so  too  the 
Targum)  views  11*1ý1  as  the  gal  infinitive;  but  the  LXX 
(Kati  tiov  S&t4(xl) 
,  the  Peshi  t  to  and  the  Vulgate  all  read  it  as 
the  hiphil  The  two  possible  understandings  of 
the  clause,  depending  on  how  one  reads  the  verb,  would  be 
either  that  the  infinitive  belongs  with  the  preceding 
infinitive  with  God  as  their  subject  (hiphil:  'surely  God 
has  tested  and  shown')  or  that  the  subject  remains  Qoheleth 
(qal:  'I  said  to  my  heart  concerning  the  matters  of 
humanity 
..  .  and  [I]  saw  that  they  are  beasts') 
.  Whitley 
further  adds  that  1  n'th  i  nI=ý  would  then  be  in  the  nature 
of  a  parenthesis,  and  may  not  even  be  original'.  28 
The  final  phrase  of  3.18,  nM  ýM  1211  IMMFbIMm,  is  also 
notoriously  difficult.  III  1  is  often  considered  a 
dittography  with  'MM71:  1,  and  this  is  very  reasonable  on  the 
grounds  that  two  pronouns  are  not  necessary  (bl,  *  ý1); 
though  the  LXX  represents  the  phrase  in  its  entirety  (ix 
iov  SEt4ai,  on  aviot  x  vii  Etat)  ,  but  the  LXX  translators  thought 
Ci  i5  belonged  to  the  following  line  (xai  W,  aviotS  aovavTqµ(x)  . 
The  rather  morbid  subject  matter  of  3.18-21  is  mostly 
comprised  of  indicative  statements,  including  a  hevel 
statement  in  3.19f.  3.20  possibly  makes  use  of  a  quotation 82 
or  allusion  to  the  poetic  Gattung  found  in  Gen.  2.7  (1"1 
VIM5  =  'breath  of  life'),  as  in  other  parts  of  the  Hebrew 
Bible  (cf.  Gen.  3.19c,  7.15;  Ps.  104.29),  as  well  some  form 
of  wisdom  concept  like  the  human  constitution  as  'dust' 
(cf 
.  Sir.  40.11)  ;  and  3.21  takes  the  Gattung  of  an 
unanswerable  rhetorical  question.  The  literary  intent  or 
function  of  3.18-21  seems  to  be  for  God  to  'show'  or 
'prove'  to  humans  that  they  are  mortal  and  that  this  makes 
'everything'  in  life  hevel  (3.19). 
The  general  Gattung  of  3.22  is  that  of  reflection, 
whereby  the  ideas  in  the  previous  pericope  are  evaluated, 
as  indicated,  again,  by  ''!  VMl1,  with  a  reflective  and 
conclusive  '  so'  .  Both  3.22ab  appear  to  be  indicative 
statements,  at  least  as  far  as  Qoheleth  was  concerned.  The 
last  clause  of  3.22,  an  explanatory  clause  as  indicated  by 
the  'ý  conjunction,  takes  the  Gattung  of  a  rhetorical 
question  and  inevitably  has  the  literary  effect  or  intent 
of  'inducing  mystery',  and  thus,  perhaps,  ambiguity  into 
what  was  being  said  (cf.  chapter  six). 
The  subject  matter  (mortality),  the  hevel  statement 
and  the  unanswerable  rhetorical  question  of  3.18-21,  can  be 
seen,  again,  to  illustrate  the  rationale  for  the  carpe  diem 
joy  statement.  The  purpose  clause,  given  in  the  Gattung  of 
a  rhetorical  question,  which  requires  an  emphatic  negative 
response,  underlines  the  mystery  of  existence  and  the 
ambiguity  of  life  post  mortem  which  may  also  illustrate  the 
reason  for  the  carpe  diem  joy  statement  (so  Loader). 
However,  the  inverse  might  also  be  true  since  the  mystery 
of  the  questions  asked  might  also  render  the 83 
appropriateness  or  ability  to  enjoy,  under  such  ambiguous 
circumstances,  bevel.  Surely  the  hevel  statement  in  3.19 
also  has  ramifications  for  the  joy  statement  in  such 
circumstances. 
4.  QOHELETH  5.17-19 
Then  I  realised  that  it  is  good  and  beautiful  for  a  man  to 
eat  and  drink  and  see  good  in  all  his  work  which  he  worked 
for  under  the  sun  -  during  the  few  days  of  his  life  which 
God  gave  him  -  because  that  is  his  lot.  Moreover,  when  God 
gives  a  man  wealth  and  possessions  -  and  enables  him  to 
consume  them,  to  accept  his  lot  and  be  happy  in  his  work: 
this  is  the  gift  of  God.  For  he  does  not  remember  much  the 
days  of  his  life  -  because  God  occupies  his  heart  with 
enjoyment. 
A.  The  Overall  Context  of  the  Pericope  5.7-6.9 
The  pericope  of  5.7-6.9  deals  with  the  subject  of  wealth 
and  its  implications.  5.7-8  takes  the  Gattung  of  an 
observation  019"111 
... 
MR)  of  oppression  and  its 
political  context.  Since  the  statements  are  simple 
observations  they  are  probably  in  the  indicative  mood. 
5.7-8  are  probably  a  part  of  5.9-6.9  because  the  political 
realm  provides  the  infrastructure  for  making  profits.  5.8 
is  one  of  the  most  notoriously  difficult  verses  in  Qoheleth 
to  translate.  If  the  noun  1  1111"  is  used  as  a  predicate 
adjective  with  an  adversative  conjunction,  and  MIS  is  the 84 
copula,  the  opening  clause  would  then  be:  'But  the  land  is 
profitable  for  all'.  The  second  clause  is  the  problematic 
one;  but  clearly  there  is  some  sense  of  mutual  advantage 
for  the  land  (a  metaphor  for  the  people)  and  the  king. 
'11M  iiýýýi  112  could  be  literally  rendered  'a  king  to  a 
cultivated  field',  with  the  literary  intent  of  the  second 
clause  to  predicate  the  first  and  indicated  in  English  by 
way  of  a  comma:  'But  the  land  is  profitable  for  all,  a  king 
to  a  cultivated  field'.  Thus  the  saying  is  poetic  and 
takes  the  literary  form  of  a  synthetic  parallelism  with  the 
literary  effect:  'Just  as  the  land  is  profitable  to  the 
people,  so  too  is  a  cultivated  field  to  a  king'.  Perhaps 
there  is  some  kind  of  word  play  between  'land'  ('the 
people')  and  'cultivated  field'.  The  sense  of  the  verb 
'IZyM  cannot  be  in  question  (LXX  trot  aypov  Etp7aaJEVOV;  so  too 
reads  the  Peshitta)  even  though  there  is  an  attempt  to  do 
so.  Whitley  is  far  off  the  mark  when  he  thinks  that  1:  1M 
should  be  construed  with  1512  rather  than  with  `i`1iV5  :  'a 
cultivated  king'(?  ).  Whatever  else  might  be  a  part  of  the 
interpretation,  the  sense  of  mutual  profitableness  is 
certainly  there  (cf.  Barton,  Ginsburg,  Gordis,  Whitley). 
5.7-8  make  the  transition  from  religious  matters  to 
economics  and  divine  activity,  or  lack  of  activity, 
therein. 
It  is  difficult  to  discern,  at  every  point,  what 
specific  Gattungen  are  being  used  in  5.9-17.  At  times  it 
appears  that  a  poetic  Gattung  is  being  used  as  indicated  by 
the  parallelism  in  some  of  the  statements;  though  it  is 
also  clear  that  they  also  take,  for  the  most  part,  the 85 
Gattungen  of  reflection.  There  is  also  the  evaluative  use 
of  rhetorical  questions  anticipating  emphatic  negative 
responses  (5.10c,  15c).  The  joy  statement  of  5.17-19  is 
framed  by  two  reflections  on  either  side  of  it:  5.15-16  and 
6.1-2. 
Qoheleth  began  with  a  proleptic  reflection  in  5.15a: 
iiý11i  i  'TIT-MI  ('  and  this  too  is  a  sick  evil')  .  The 
antecedent  to  'MT-Ml  is  obviously  related  to  Qoheleth's 
previous  reflection  in  5.12-14  which  deals  with  the  fact 
that  one  cannot  secure  material  benefits  for  either  an  heir 
or  oneself  because  of  fate  and  death.  There  is  the  poetic 
Gattung  in  5.15b  as  indicated  in  the  parallelism  of  Jý*#  ID 
M=e  ('  as  every  man  comes,  so  he  departs  ')  .IM. 
V  is 
from  a  rather  rare  root  meaning  'near'  or  'juxtaposition'; 
and  in  7.14  there  is  the  use  of  IITIIM3  as  'together  with 
this'  .  The  LXX  reads  11MV-5D  as  (o)ai£p  y(xp)  and  the 
phrase  is  used  to  make  a  comparison  between  ('just  as  .. 
so  ..  .  ')  the  'coming  and  going  of  a  man'  with  'toiling 
for  the  wind'  (so  Whybray).  The  rhetorical  question,  111* 
i  13VOO  15  11111'-1iß  ('what  profit  for  him  who  works  for 
wind?  '),  again  requires  the  emphatic  negative  response 
'nothing!  '. 
The  final  statement  before  the  joy  statement  of  5.17- 
19  in  5.16  may  either  take  the  Gattung  of  poetry  (so 
N.  I.  V.  )  or  as  a  simple  indicative  statement.  The  LXX, 
Syrohexaplaris  and  Coptic  versions  all  read 
ýý1  ('grief') 
-17 
for  5DR"  in  the  clause 
5DN"  10M  ('  in  darkness  he  eats'  ; 
LXX  EV  ßxotiEt  scat  Ev  lrEVOEt:  '  in  darkness  and  grief')  ,  which 
makes  the  use  of  the  synonym  ODD  ('grief',  'vexation') 86 
repetitive  and  redundant.  The  Peshitta,  Targum,  Vulgate 
and  LXX  all  read  the  verb  Dyý  as  the  noun  DSiý  (LXX  KatOvµw 
P  and  anger'];  Vulgate  in  curis  mul  tis  ['  in  many  cares,  ]); 
the  3.  m.  s.  suffix  on  1Iý1  is  an  obvious  dittography  off  of 
p2P1. 
Gordis  and  Ginsburg  (contra  Whybray),  following  Ibn 
Ezra,  go  to  great  lengths  to  give  an  interpretation  of  5.16 
as  that  of  an  illustration  of  the  'miser'  who  is  so  cheap 
he  will  not  pay  for  lighting  and  eats  alone  to  avoid 
expenses.  But  there  is  no  indication  from  the  overall 
(5.10-16)  or  immediate  (5.15-16)  contexts  that:  one,  'any 
man'  does  have  wealth;  because  two,  it  is  not  certain  that 
one  can  have  wealth  outside  of  fate;  three,  it  appears  that 
the  man  seems  to  work  for  nothing  because  death  ultimately 
squanders  any  material  benefits  by  not  allowing  him  to  take 
them  with  him;  and  four,  that  toiling  for  the  wind 
indicates  the  lack  of  11Irl"  and  thus  demonstrates  the  every 
day  frustrations  of  eking  out  a  living  as  represented  in 
5.16.  There  is  also  no  warrant  for  a  number  of 
commentators  who  view  the  pericope  from  5.9-19  as  dealing 
with  a  miser  of  wealth  (contra  Fox,  Ginsburg,  Gordis). 
Nevertheless,  this  pericope  of  assorted  statements,  both 
poetic  and  discourse,  provide  the  overall  context  in  which 
comes  the  lead-in  of  5.16  to  the  joy  statement  of  5.17-19. 
Whybray  says  of  this  lead-in: 
Whatever  may  be  the  correct  interpretation  of 
the  verse  in  detail,  it  is  clear  that  Qoheleth's 
intention  was  to  emphasize  the  futility  of  an 
obsessive  devotion  to  money-making  by  piling 
up  a  series  of  exaggerated  expressions  of  misery, 
thus  providing  an  effective  contrast  to  his 
recipe  for  happiness  in  the  verse  which 
follows.  29 87 
Despite  the  questionable  statements  regarding  'misery', 
Whybray's  comments  here  have  much  to  commend  to  them. 
There  may  be,  however,  a  number  of  reasons  to  doubt  or 
question  the  so-called  contrast  with  5.17-19. 
6.1-2  (which  could  be  extended  to  6.9),  and  its  place 
in  the  literary  structure  immediately  following  the  joy 
statement,  might  well  be  the  main  reason  to  doubt  the 
straightforward  carpe  diem  interpretation  of  5.17-19,  along 
with  being  enveloped  by  two  such  negative  reflections  (5.16 
and  6.1-2).  6.1-2  takes  the  Gattung  of  a  reflection: 
Qoheleth  makes  a  moral  evaluation  related  to  the  nature  of 
God  (6.2).  Salters  says  of  6.1f. 
In  6.1f.  Qoheleth  is  concerned  to  show  that  one 
of  the  greatest  evils  he  has  observed  is  the  fact 
that  some  men  are  not  given  the  ability  to  enjoy 
what  wealth  and  substance  they  have.  They  seem 
to  be  constitutionally  incapable  of  taking  any 
enjoyment  from  the  good  things  which  are  at  their 
disposal.  30 
Salters  also  argues  that  the  main  question  that  Qoheleth 
was  trying  to  answer  for  himself,  which  a  number  of 
commentators  like  Jerome  and  Rashi  try  to  answer  for  him, 
is:  'Why  are  some  wealthy  men  unable  to  enjoy  their 
substance?  ';  and  Salters  should  be  considered  correct  on 
this  point.  There  are  a  number  of  tricky  grammatical 
problems  to  unpack  before  one  can  assess  the  literary 
effect  of  6.1-2  on  the  joy  statement  of  5.17  -19. 
Some  twenty  Hebrew  manuscripts  have  'j*1n  following 
13  ;  but  this  is  probably  a  scribal  accommodation  to  link 
6.1  with  the  reflections  of  5.12  and  5.15  (so  Gordis, 
Whybray).  6.1-2,  nevertheless,  should  probably  be  viewed 
as  'another'  reflection  of  Qoheleth  along  the  lines  of 88 
5.10-16.  This  raises  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the 
joy  statement  is  an  editorial  gloss  which  disrupts  the 
literary  structure.  But  that  is  unlikely.  The  fact  that 
Qoheleth  used  the  adjective  1Z1  to  describe  the  frequency 
of  the  evil  he  has  seen,  indicates  that  a  rendering  of  it 
as  'common'  or  'prevalent'  is  acceptable,  if  not  the  best 
choice  (so  Gordis);  this  argues  against  Fox  who  views  6.1-2 
as  an  anomaly.  Salters  argues  that 
ý:  )M  must  also  be  taken 
in  its  more  dynamic  sense  of  'enjoy'  rather  than  just  'eat' 
or  'consume'  on  the  basis  that  these  more  literal 
interpretations  are  inadequate  for  the  context  in  6.2.  So 
Qoheleth  made  clear  in  6.2  that  God  may  give  a  person  all 
the  food,  drink  and  wealth  that  one  could  want  -  and  still 
deprive  them  of  the  joy  of  it  all.  31  Salters  also  says 
that  'The  implication  is  that  God  is  to  blame,  since  he  is 
the  author  of  it'.  He  further  adds  that 
As  a  result  of  this  fierce  accusation,  there  have 
been  attempts  in  the  history  of  the  exegesis  of 
this  passage  to  justify  God's  action  on  the 
grounds  that  such  a  man,  as  here  referred  to, 
does  not  deserve  to  enjoy  his  wealth.  32 
Salters  demonstrates  how  the  Targum  interprets  the 
withholding  of  the  power  to  enjoy  on  the  basis  of  the  man's 
sin  (1IrMln  ý1) 
with  the  commentary  '  all  this  his  sins  have 
brought  upon  him,  because  he  effected  no  good  with  it 
[i.  e.,  the  wealth],;  whereas  Jerome  and  Rashi  blame  the 
man's  greed  or  misery;  and  Mendelssohn,  following  Rashbam, 
simply  underplay  the  role  of  God  in  the  situation,  placing 
the  words  in  the  mouth  of  an  objector.  But  Qoheleth  gave 
his  negative  moral  evaluation  of  God  as  giver  of  food, 89 
drink  and  wealth  but  no  power  to  enjoy  them  in  6.2e:  'This 
is  hevel  and  a  sick  evil  '  (W  '1  DI  'ýi11  ýni1  Vii) 
. 
One  cannot  but  feel  that  there  is  a  tone  of  bitterness 
in  Qoheleth's  view  of  God  as  giver  of  food,  drink  and 
wealth.  This  may  be  implied  in  the  fact  that  these 
explicit  statements  come  always  in  response  to  very 
negative  circumstances  he  was  discoursing  on.  33  Also,  the 
determinism  of  God  in  his  gifts  seemed  to  be  disturbing  to 
him.  This  may  be  more  acute  coming  from  a  wisdom  model 
where  an  orderly  creation  was  the  basis  for  human  control 
of  destiny.  34 
That  Qoheleth  was  in  conflict  with  traditional  wisdom 
circles  is  undeniable.  35  4.7-8;  5.9-16  and  6.1-2  present 
considerable  problems  for  their  view  that  the  good  get  good 
things  and  enjoyment  in  life  and  the  bad  get  bad.  36 
However,  Qoheleth's  view  is  quite  clearly  the  way  things 
actually  are  the  world;  though  he  did  seem  to  sympathise 
with  the  above  mentioned  wisdom  principle.  37  Consequently, 
he  seemed  troubled  by  the  fact  that  bad  things  happen  to 
good  people,  and  this  is  confirmed  in  6.1-2.  So  whatever 
Qoheleth's  view  of  God  as  giver  of  food,  drink  and  wealth 
may  have  been,  it  does  not  seem  to  be  as  positive  as  many 
think  it  is  on  face  value.  While  there  may  be  some 
intrinsic  value  to  traditional  wisdom  principles,  they  do 
not  seem  to  be  so  because  God  makes  them  so.  They  seem  to 
be  concessions  to  Qoheleth's  hard  determinism.  38 90 
B.  The  Immediate  Context  5.15-6.2 
5.17-19  takes  the  Gattung  of  reflection,  making  an 
evaluation  in  the  light  of  the  previous  reflections  in 
5.10-16.  The  Gattung  of  all  the  sentences  seem  to  be  in 
the  indicative  mood. 
A  number  of  conclusions  can  be  drawn  about  the  joy 
statement  in  the  light  of  the  above  form  criticism  and 
exegetical  notes.  There  are  a  number  of  reasons  why  the 
indicative  nature  of  the  joy  statement  should  be  called 
into  question,  or  present  considerable  doubts,  as  to  its 
exact  literary  nature,  effects  and  intent.  The  issue, 
between  5.15-16  and  the  joy  statement  in  5.17-19,  then 
becomes:  How  can  one  eat  and  drink  in  joy  (5.17-19)  if 
there  is  no  11711"  to  toil  and  if  all  one'  s  eating  and 
drinking  is  in  darkness,  vexation,  affliction  and  anger? 
While  Whybray's  interpretation  of  5.10-16  as  a  contrast  for 
the  joy  statement  has  much  to  commend  to  it,  there  are  a 
number  of  reasons  which  argue  against  it,  or  make  it  appear 
dubious.  First  of  all,  Qoheleth  states  that  the  evil  of 
6.1-2  is  prevalent  upon  man;  of  course  the  veracity  of  such 
a  statement  might  well  be  in  question.  Notwithstanding, 
the  idea  in  6.1-2  on  the  sovereignty  or  capricious 
determinacy  of  God  has  the  literary  effect  of  turning  the 
joy  statement  of  5.17-19  into  either  sarcasm  or  a  joke: 
'Enjoy  if  you  can  but  that  all  depends  upon  God  -  and  he  is 
fickle'.  This  leads  to  either  an  acute  contradiction  or 
the  carpe  diem  statement  being  contingent  either  upon  fate 
or  God  for  individual  cases:  thus  not  'everyone'  can  enjoy 91 
life,  work  and  its  material  benefits  (even  if  they  are 
lucky  enough  to  have  them).  Secondly,  the  negative 
evaluations  of  the  hevel  and  'sick  evil'  statements 
throughout  the  overall  context  of  the  pericope  running  from 
5.7-6.9.  The  joy  statement  is  enveloped  in  the  ideas  of 
5.15-16  and  6.1-2,  then,  have  the  literary  intent  or  effect 
of  either  irony,  sarcasm,  a  joke,  or  certainly  a 
contradiction  or  ambiguity.  6.1-2,  moreover,  is  acutely 
subversive  to  the  idea  of  the  carpe  diem  joy  statement; 
though  it  may  be  argued  inversely  that  the  joy  statement(s) 
is/are  subversive  of  the  rest  of  the  pericopes.  But  this 
is  highly  unlikely,  especially  in  the  overall  and  immediate 
contexts  of  5.17-19  where  the  literary  structure  of  6.1-2 
following  5.17-19  indicates  that  6.1-2  is  subversive  of  the 
joy  statement  and  not  vice-versa  because  it  follows  and 
envelops  the  joy  statement  -  which  has  the  literary  effect 
of,  in  a  very  real  sense,  swallowing  it  up.  Perhaps 
nowhere  else  in  Qoheleth  is  the  joy  statement  so  ambiguous 
because  of  the  powerful  effect  of  the  literary  structure 
surrounding  5.17-19. 
S.  QOHELETH  8.15 
So  I  commend  the  enjoyment  of  life:  because  there  is 
nothing  better  for  a  man  under  the  sun  than  to  eat,  drink 
and  be  happy.  Then  joy  will  accompany  him  in  his  work  - 
all  the  days  of  his  life  which  God  gives  him  under  the  sun. 92 
A.  The  Overall  Context  of  the  Pericope  8.1-10.20 
If  the  overall  context  of  8.15  is  inclusive  of  8.1-10.20, 
dealing  with  politics  in  general,  39  then  there  may  be  an 
unprecedented  number  of  different  Gattungen  in  this 
pericope.  Thus,  it  would  be  impossible  to  deal  extensively 
with  them  all  in  relation  to  8.15.  Therefore,  it  may  be 
apposite  at  this  time  to  explain  the  literary  construction, 
or  the  anomalies  of  the  literary  construction,  of  the 
political  treatise  in  8.1-10.20. 
Loader  is  correct  to  say  that  8.1  actually  belongs 
with  the  previous  wisdom  pericope  of  7.23-8.1,  or  perhaps 
even  7.1-8.1.  Clearly  8.2  begins  another  pericope  dealing 
with  politics  which  takes  the  Gattung  of  reflection  or 
instruction  (in  which  commands  and  prohibitions  are  the 
main  sub-Gattungen40);  but  Loader  is  surely  wrong  to  break 
the  pericope  up  between  8.2-9  and  8.10-15  -  for  8.10 
obviously  continues  to  deal  with  the  injustice  of 
oppression  in  politics,  and  then  deals  with  jurisprudence 
in  8.11-14,  and  all  jurisprudence  is  related  to  the  state 
or  politics  (theodicy  excepted).  The  joy  statement  in  8.15 
might  indicate  that  it  is  in  fact  a  literary  ellipsis  in 
Qoheleth's  political  treatise  in  8.1-10.20;  this  could  also 
explain  the  joy  statement  in  9.7-9.  An  ellipsis  may  be 
indicated  because  8.16-17  may  be  a  comment  on  the 
injustices  of  life  in  8.9-14  whereby  Qoheleth  asserted  that 
no  one  can  really  make  sense  of  the  way  life  is  in  the 
world.  Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  joy 93 
statement  is  immediately  followed  by  rather  ambiguous 
statements  regarding  wisdom's  efficacy. 
9.  la  begins  with  another  'n  clause  indicating 
continuation  on  the  same  political  theme  as  before  in  8.1- 
14  and  16-17.9.1a  is  not  as  Whybray  assumes,  a  summary  of 
8.16-17.41  Rather,  9.1a  is  a  transitional  sentence  which 
links  the  previous  political  treatise  in  8.1-14,16-17  with 
what  follows  in  9.1-6.  The  "D  is  a  conjunctive  and 
conclusive  so.  The  ':  )  clause  of  9.1  rejoins  Qoheleth's 
political  treatise,  where  he  picks  back  up  on  the  theme  of 
the  good  and  wicked  of  8.12-14,  described  as  a  senseless 
situation  in  8.16-17.  Qoheleth's  conclusion  of  that 
reflection  of  8.1-14  and  16-17  comes  in  9.1b.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  Qoheleth  was  perplexed  if  not  painfully  vexed 
over  the  issues  of  theodicy  and  human  injustice.  42 
Qoheleth  settled  for  a  rather  fatalistic  view  of  these 
matters  in  9.1-2.  Furthermore,  that  Qoheleth  might  have 
been  emotionally  vexed  over,  the  capriciousness  of  God's 
dealings  with  humanity  and  human  injustice,  may  be 
evidenced  in  the  emotional  aspect  to  9.  lab  in  9.  lc.  'Love' 
(=19)  and  '  hate  '  (O  V)  are  strong  words  in  this  context. 
The  reality,  at  least  insofar  as  Qoheleth  was  concerned,  is 
that  no  one  knows  whether  God  loves  them  or  hates  them. 
Qoheleth  illustrated  this  point  in  9.2  by  saying  that  the 
good  and  the  bad  share  the  same  '1  ('fate',  'destiny'). 
This  destiny  could  either  be  the  oppression  and  injustice 
of  a  base  world,  or  death,  or  both.  Both  are  more  likely 
due  to  the  literary  structural  position  between  the 
injustices  of  the  world  in  9.1-2  and  death  in  9.3-6. 94 
The  fact  that  God  does  not  redress  these  injustices 
only  compounds  the  political  issue  with  the  issue  of 
theodicy.  Qoheleth's  evaluation  of  human  destiny  to  suffer 
the  injustices  of  a  base  world  at  the  hands  of  a  capricious 
and  arbitrary  God  in  9.3a  is  that: 
inn  111K  11  1j  'D  OMM11 
Iirir  IUM-`1tH  5DI  DI  711'  ('This  is  the  evil  in  everything 
which  is  done  under  the  sun:  one  fate  for  all  [death]  ')  . 
That  humanity  must  suffer  oppression  and  injustice  of  both 
politics  and  God  makes  everything  in  life  evil.  43 
The  joy  statement  in  9.7-10  will  be  dealt  with  in  the 
next  section;  but  how  9.11-12  fit  into  the  literary 
structure  of  Qoheleth  is  a  mystery.  9.11-12  might  well  be 
a  dislocated  fate  statement;  or  perhaps  9.11-12  might 
possibly  go  with  the  illustration  of  9.13-16.  Maybe  9.11- 
12  relate  to  both  9.7-10  and  9.13-16.  In  that  case,  9.11- 
12  is  transitional,  indicating  fate  is  in  control  and  it  is 
unpredictable:  no  one  can  predict  the  future.  After  this, 
its  literary  function  might  be  to  foreshadow  the  event  of  a 
city's  siege  and  the  fact  that  'bad  times'  ('oll  )l  Ply)  can 
fall  upon  people  'unexpectedly'  (CKft),  and  that  political 
wisdom  can  be  usurped  by  base  folly  in  such  unexpected 
situations.  Thus,  wisdom  is  impotent  or  of  limited  value 
in  predicting  or  having  any  lasting  effect  in  political 
situations  (so  Loader).  That  Qoheleth  almost  equated 
foolishness  and  folly  with  human  baseness  may  find  its  best 
support  in  9.13-10.7  by  way  of  negative  examples. 
Many  scholars  consider  10.1-20  to  be  a  collection  of 
unrelated  aphorisms  or  aphorisms  comparing  wisdom  with 
folly.  44  However,  if  one  closely  scrutinises  the  content 95 
of  10.1-20  it  becomes  apparent  that  a  number  of  statements 
relate  directly  to  politics  (see  10.4-7,16-17,20)  and 
some  may  be  illustrations  in  poetic  Gattung  of  how  to  do 
and  not  to  do  political  work  (see  10.2-7,8-15,18-19). 
Moreover,  there  are  certain  wisdom  themes  in  play  which 
interconnect  these  aphorisms  under  the  rubric  of  politics 
in  8.1-10.20. 
The  number  of  Gattungen  within  the  overall  pericope  is 
impressive:  instruction  which  often  used  the  Gattung  of 
imperative  (8.2-6),  imperatives  and  synthetic  parallelism 
(8.3-4),  followed  by  more  synthetic  parallelisms  (8.5-6),  a 
rhetorical  question  (8.7)  and  another  synthetic  parallelism 
(8.8).  8.9  begins  another  reflection,  still  on  the  topic 
of  politics,  but  dealing  specifically  with  injustice  and 
oppression,  with  the  moral  evaluation  of  a  hevel  statement. 
There  are  more  reflections  in  9.1-8,11-12  (possibly  in 
poetic  form)  ,  the  Gattung  of  illustration  (9.13-16) 
followed  by  a  number  of  antithetical  parallelisms  in  9.17- 
10.20. 
B.  The  Immediate  Context  8.10-17 
The  variety  of  Gattungen  and  the  intricate  nature  of  the 
literary  structure  of  the  overall  pericope  of  8.1-10.20 
makes  discerning  the  literary  intent  of  the  joy  statement 
in  8.15  (and  9.7-9  for  that  matter)  an  obscure  and  a 
difficult  task:  8.15  is  flanked  by  two  discourses  taking 
the  Gattungen  of  reflection. 96 
Galling  thought  that  this  pericope  should  end  at  8.15; 
whereas  Hertzberg  thought  it  should  end  at  8.17.  But  it  is 
clear  that  the  subject  matter  of  8.1-10.20,  dealing  with 
politics,  and  8.16-17  are  related  -  with  8.16-17 
functioning  as  a  transition  to  9.  lff.  Ginsburg  says  of 
8.16-10.7,  relating  to  politics  and  beginning  at  8.16,  that 
To  shew  more  strikingly  the  force  of  the 
final  conclusion,  submitted  at  the  end  of 
this  section,  Coheleth  gives  first  a  resume 
of  the  investigations  contained  in  the 
foregoing  three  sections.  He  tells  us, 
that  in  the  course  of  his  enquiry  he 
found  it  utterly  impossible  to  fathom  the 
work  of  God  by  wisdom.  45 
This  analysis,  which  must  be  viewed  as  correct  on  the  basis 
of  the  literary  structure  and  content  of  the  overall 
pericope  (though  not  through  to  12.7  as  Ginsburg  suggests), 
demonstrates  the  continuity  of  8.16ff.  with  8.2-8,9-14, 
15,  but  also  the  literary  function  of  8.16  as  an  evaluation 
of  the  previous  pericopes  including  the  joy  statement  of 
8.15.  Whether  the  joy  statement  is  original  or  an 
editorial  gloss,  the  final  redactor  must  have  had  some 
reason  for  framing  the  joy  statement  between  two  such 
antithetical  ideas  to  it  in  8.14  and  8.16-17. 
But  what  is  the  relationship  of  the  joy  statement  with 
8.14  and  8.16-17?  Why  this  antithetical  statement  in  the 
midst  of  so  much  trouble?  This  may  support  Whybray's  et 
al.  view  that  the  joy  statements  function  as  compensation 
for  the  harsh  realities  of  life;  but  how  can  one  have  joy 
in  the  midst  of  such  injustice,  pain  and  uncertainty? 
Indeed,  even  if  it  were  possible,  one  cannot  be  sure  that 
one  will  find  God's  favour  to  the  end  of  joy  (cf.  2.24-26; 97 
5.17-6.2);  and  8.16-17  only  accentuates  this  problem 
because  of  man's  epistemological  limitations. 
The  immediate  context,  being  flanked  by  two  negative 
evaluations,  makes  understanding  the  literary  intent  of 
8.15  difficult.  Perhaps  8.16-17  function  very  much  in  the 
same  way  as  the  last  clause  of  the  joy  statement  of  3.22, 
which  is  actually  connected  to  the  joy  statement  by  the  'D 
conjunction,  obscuring  the  possession  of,  or  potential  for, 
joy  in  the  light  of  future  uncertainties.  The  literary 
structure  may  also  indicate  that  8.15  is  a  literary 
ellipsis  of  some  sort  because  it  comes  almost  without 
regard  to  its  immediate  context;  or  could  it  be  that  the 
literary  structure,  context  and  content  all  work  against 
(subversively)  the  joy  statement  or  it  against  them?  Dell 
makes  the  observation,  regarding  8.16-17,  that 
...  Qoheleth  reflects  on  man's  inability  to 
know  the  'doing'  of  God.  These  reflections 
provide  examples  of  the  'new'  scepticism 
found  in  Qoheleth's  thought,  but  it  is  the 
content  that  is  new,  not  the  form.  Where 
traditional  forms  are  used  they  are  put  into 
a  context  of  reflective  thinking  which  changes 
their  nature.  The  three  reflections  in  this 
chapter  [8]  are  at  one  in  agreeing  about  the 
absence  of  justice  and  (divine)  judgment  in 
the  affairs  of  the  world  and  man's  impotence 
in  dealing  with  these  things.  46 
This  could  also  apply  to  the  joy  statement  of  8.15,  which 
is  a  part  of  the  overall,  if  not  the  immediate,  context  of 
8.16-17.  Perhaps  this  explains  the  literary  intent  of  the 
joy  statement(s):  a  use  or  reuse  of  forms  in  order  to 
express  scepticism  (so  Dell).  The  literary  structure  and 
content  of  the  pericopes  flanking  the  joy  statement  of  8.15 
certainly  seem  to  indicate  this,  and  thus,  the  indicative 
nature  of  the  joy  statement(s)  comes  into  question:  it  may 98 
be  subversive  to  the  surrounding  pericopes  and  itself  -  and 
indicates  scepticism  not  indicativeness.  But  the  literary 
function  or  intent  remains  ambiguous. 
6.  QOHELETH  9.7-9 
Go,  enjoy  your  food  and  drink  your  wine  with  a  glad  heart  - 
because  God  is  already  pleased  with  your  works.  Let  your 
clothes  be  white  at  all  times  and  let  not  oil  be  lacking  on 
your  head.  Enjoy  1i  fe  with  a  woman  you  love  -  all  the  days 
of  your  hevel  life  which  God  gave  you  under  the  sun  -  all 
your  hevel  days:  because  this  is  your  lot  in  life  and  in 
the  material  benefits  which  you  worked  for  under  the  sun. 
A.  The  Overall  Context  of  the  Pericope  9.1-12 
Much  has  already  been  said  on  the  overall  context  with 
which  the  joy  statements  of  8.15  and  9.7-9  come  (8.1-10.20) 
in  the  previous  section  dealing  with  its  political  context. 
So  this  section  will  only  deal  with  9.7-9  in  the  sub- 
pericope  of  9.1-12. 
9.1  continues,  or  rejoins,  the  theme  of  injustice  in 
the  world  in  the  overall  context  of  politics,  as  indicated 
by  the  'D  conjunction  and  the  content  of  the  pericope  from 
9.1-6  dealing  specifically  with  death,  the  injustice  of 
death,  and  the  leveling  effect  of  death  which  renders  all 
human  qualities  such  as  character  ('righteous'  or  'wicked') 
equal  and  indiscriminate.  The  joy  statement  of  9.7-9 
(which  probably  includes  9.10)  may  be  another  literary 99 
ellipsis  on  the  basis  that  9.11-12  rejoins  the  theme  of 
indiscriminate  determinism  or  fate. 
The  overall  Gattung  of  9.1-6  is  again  that  of 
reflection.  Thus  it  is  probably  in  the  indicative  mood  for 
the  most  part  with  variety  of  sub-Gattungen. 
9.1  opens  with  a  rather  unusual  clause:  11th1 
*I:  ).  First  of  all,  what  is  referred  to  in 
iii-5n-i1bt?  The  conjunction,  followed  by  the  definite  direct 
object  marker,  may  indicate  continuity  with  the  previous 
statement  in  8.17.  The  '.  D  conjunction  in  9.1,  therefore, 
indicates  an  explanatory  clause:  'because  ..  .  ';  though 
Whybray  simply  views  the  'D  as  an  assertative  particle. 
The  LXX  tacks  the  first  clause  onto  the  last  clause  of 
8.17.  If  li-ýI-11k  is  the  direct  object  of  the  subordinate 
subject  and  verb  in  8.17d  (b)1I1  and  )7  K') 
,  then  9.1a 
explains  that  Qoheleth  (the  subject  of  the  clause  in  9.  la 
['TMI) 
'put  all  of  this  (the  wise  man's  inability  to  find 
or  comprehend  the  works  of  God)  into  my  heart';  but  if 
refers  to  the  main  subject  and  verb  of  8.17a 
('fl'K'l),  then  9.1a  explains  'the  whole  mystery  of  God's 
work  on  earth'  [sic]  is  what  'I  [Qoheleth]  put  into  my 
heart'.  The  latter  is  more  likely  since  9.1-6  has  broader 
concerns  than  the  wise  man's  epistemological  limitations; 
and  the  clause  should  be  considered  an  explanatory  clause 
with  a  "D  conjunction  which  functions  as  a  transition  and 
not  the  assertative  particle  (contra  Whybray).  It  should 
be  noted  that  even  though  there  are  a  number  of  manuscripts 
with  7M  being  fK,  47  this  is  highly  unlikely  on  the  basis 
that  a  specifying  preposition  is  more  appropriate  and 100 
necessary  for  the  object  of  the  verb  ('11M)  than  the 
definite  direct  object  marker,  which  is  not  necessary. 
Nevertheless,  9.1a  probably  acts  as  a  transition  from  the 
discourse  on  wisdom  to  the  new  subject  of  retributive 
justice. 
11:  1ý  is  also  problematic,  with  a  number  of  manuscripts 
(Vulgate,  Targum,  Arabic)  emending  '11=ý  to  11i15  from  the 
root  71fl 
,  'spy  out';  and  others  (LXX  [  Et6EV  ],  Coptic, 
Peshi  t  ta)  reading  MO.  Gordis  explains  `11ný  as  'an 
infinitive  construct  consecutive  equivalent  to  a  finite 
verb'  from  the  root  '11n  'test',  'prove'  (cf.  3.18),  which 
he  renders  as  'clearly  understood';  but  this  remains 
dubious  and  requires  due  caution  (cf.  Whitley,  Whybray). 
The  last  phrase  of  9.1  is  also  very  difficult  to 
render  (b1'Mý  ýDi1) 
.  The  LXX,  Symmachus  and  Vulgate  all 
accept  a  textual  emendation  of 
5!  Dii  at  the  beginning  of  9.2 
to 
5ý471 
and  view  it  as  a  part  of  the  end  of  9.  lc  instead  of 
the  beginning  of  9.2.  The  LXX  has  is  Itavtia  ltpo  ltpoacOlrov 
aviwv,  µaiaioTnS  Ev  Tot;  , ram  ('  everything  before  them,  futile  in 
all  things');  but  the  Peshitta  emends  the  plural  suffix  to 
a  singular  and  reads  'everything  before  him 
.  .  '; 
Symmachus  follows  similar  lines  and  the  Vulgate  has  sed 
omnia  in  futurum  servantur  incerta  ('but  all  things  are 
kept  uncertain  for  the  time  to  come').  As  Gordis  points 
out,  nevertheless,  these  latter  ideas  are  irrelevant  here 
and  better  expressed  by  the  Massoretic  Text  as  MIM=5  5D`i 
('everything  is  before  them'),  i.  e.,  'anything  may  happen 
to  them',  which  the  Vulgate  supports  in  principle. 101 
As  the  Gattung  of  reflection,  9.1-2  appear  to  be  in 
the  indicative  mood,  simple  statements  of  fact  as  Qoheleth 
understands  them;  and  their  content  relating  the  wisdom 
subject  of  retributive  justice,  or  lack  thereof,  indicates 
that  8.16-17  (which  rejoined  the  theme  of  oppression, 
injustice  or  lack  of  retributive  justice  in  8.9  related  to 
the  political  realm)  through  to  9.6,  are  along  the  same 
theme  and  should  be  considered  a  single  pericope. 
9.2  uses  the  Gattung  of  merismos  (a  form  of 
parallelism)  to  represent  the  'whole';  but  9.2f  probably 
turns  to  the  Gattung  of  poetry  as  indicated  by  its 
synonymous  parallelism.  The  point  of  the  reflection  is 
clear:  death  is  the  common  destiny  (r1  )  of  the  good  and 
bad,  righteous  (wise)  and  wicked  (fools). 
9.3  returns  to  the  Gattung  of  reflection,  probably  in 
the  indicative  mood,  discoursing  on  the  theme  of  death,  but 
with  an  ellipsis  on  the  evil  and  madness  in  life  before 
death.  9.3a  makes  the  proleptic  moral  evaluation,  Vintl 
Mn  -mM-61944  ý»  V-1  mP  this  is  the  evil  in  everything 
which  is  done  under  the  sun'),  with 
ý»  ßi`1  m  possibly 
being  a  Hebrew  form  of  superlative,  the  greatest  evil 
amongst  all,  (see  Barton;  cf.  Josh.  14.15;  Judg.  6.15);  and 
jl  m=  is  probably  used  as  the  perfect  and  not  the 
participle,  though  the  difference  of  meaning  is  slight  (so 
Gordis).  !  115511 
,  from  the  root 
55M, 
generally  means 
either  to  'shine'  or  'boast',  but  in  this  feminine  plural 
form  means  'folly'  or  'madness'  .  Gordis  adds  that 
55`i  is 
...  a  word  which  Koheleth  uses  to  describe 
unbridled  and  unprincipled  conduct,  which 
results  from  the  conviction  that  life  is 
meaningless  and  that  there  is  no  moral  law 102 
operating  in  the  world.  48 
This,  however,  may  be  reading  too  much  into  the  text. 
1'11111  is  variously  understood  by  the  different 
manuscripts:  the  LXX  has  ical  oirtaw  autiwv,  and  the  Peshi  t  to 
follows  this  plural  reading  of  the  pronomial  suffix  ('after 
them')  ;  but  the  Syriac  and  Symnachus  (i(x  86  IceXcUcEia  avtiwv) 
read  it  as  the  plural  ending  t  Oll  ('their  end'),  as  do 
Galling  and  Barucq;  and  the  Vulgate  reads  post  haec  ('after 
these  things').  Gordis  explains  the  singular  suffix  as  a 
'petrified  ending'  and  the  whole  word  1'11'1M1  means 
'afterward';  though  it  is  possible  to  understand  the 
singular  pronoun  as  the  neuter  'it',  referring  to  what  was 
just  mentioned  ('life,  ),  as  in:  '  after  it  (life)  to  the 
dead'.  Some  ancient  versions  and  commentators  (Midrash 
Rabbah  Ecclesiastes,  Rashi)  understand  n'1In1  as  meaning 
'hell';  thus  the  Vulgate  renders  it  et  post  haec  ad  inferos 
deducentur  ('and  after  these  things  they  shall  be  brought 
down  to  hell');  but  these  are  over-interpretative. 
9.5-6  also  indicate  that  they  take  the  poetic  Gattung, 
with  six  ideas  or  statements  being  represented  in  a  bicolon 
antithetical  parallelism  (9.5ab),  of  which  is  added  two 
further  ideas  in  synthetic  parallelism  (9.5cd),  followed  by 
another  two  ideas  in  synthetic  parallelism  (9.6ab). 
Luther,  interestingly  enough,  coordinates  9.5d  with  9.6a 
and  translates  it:  Daß  man  sie  nicht  mehr  liebet,  noch 
baffet,  noch  neidet  ('for  their  memorial  is  forgotten,  so 
that  they  be  neither  loved,  hated,  nor  envied');  and  Gordis 
comments  that 
Consciousness  on  any  terms  is  preferable  to 
non-existence,  and  knowledge,  however  limited 103 
and  melancholy  in  content,  is  better  than 
ignorance.  49 
But  this  begs  a  number  of  questions:  Is  a  tortured  life  of 
acute  physical  ailment  better  to  unconsciousness  (a  state 
which  is  the  body's  natural  defence  mechanism  against  acute 
trauma  and  pain)?  And  how  can  one  prove  there  is  no 
consciousness  after  death?  Whybray  comments  that  love, 
hate  and  envy  are  the  strong  passions  which  are  the 
mainspring  of  human  activity;  but  he  too  draws  a 
questionable  conclusion  by  saying: 
Better  to  participate  in  the  stimulating  ferment 
of  life  than  to  be  dead,  with  no  passions  and  no 
activities  at  all!  50 
One  could,  or  perhaps  should,  add  that  this  is  the  way 
Qoheleth  seemed  to  see  things;  and  clearly  9.1-6  have  the 
literary  intent  to  demonstrate  the  inevitable  fate  of  all 
living  creatures  to  die,  to  contrast  life  and  death,  and  to 
draw  the  conclusion  that  any  form  of  life  is  better  than  a 
state  of  death;  though  Qoheleth  et  al.  may  be  questioned  on 
this  point  (Why  have  people  committed  suicide  all 
throughout  history?  Why  have  tortured  people  begged  to  be 
killed?  ). 
9.11-12  forms  the  other  side  of  the  frame  to  the  joy 
statement  in  9.7-9(10?  )  and  rejoins  the  original  theme  of 
fate  (9.11)  and  one's  fate  in  death  (9.12).  They  appear  to 
take  the  Gattung  of  poetry  as  indicated  by  synthetic 
parallelism.  The  grammatical  force  of  r'  '  n1575 
M5,  as 
Fox  correctly  points  out,  'does  not  mean  that  the  swift 
never  win,  but  that  they  do  not  possess  the  race, 
thus  do  not  control  it';  51  though 
557  ('runner')  probably 
denotes  a  'courier'  and  not  an  'athlete'  (so  Crenshaw),  and 104 
thus  the  analogy  is  a  military  one  in  keeping  with  the 
second  stich  of  the  synthetic  parallelism  in  9.  llbc  dealing 
with  '  battle'  ('MIZM  ?  1) 
.  Nevertheless,  the  connecting  idea 
is  that  of  'fate'  and  '  death,.  So  too  in  9.12,  where  an 
initial  indicative  statement  is  made,  11'1V-11ly  n1?  1  17T-Mý 
M  'D  ('moreover,  a  man  cannot  know  his  time  [to  die]'), 
followed  by  a  synonymous  parallelism  on  the  deathly  fate  of 
fish  and  birds,  and  concluded  with  a  synthetic  parallelism 
relating  that  same  deathly  fate  with  humans. 
Both  the  grammar  and  Gattungen  of  9.1-6  and  9.11-12 
clearly  emphasise  the  theme  of  death  and  fickle  fate,  and 
act  as  the  frame  to  the  joy  statement  in  9.7-9(10?  ).  There 
must  certainly  be  some  reason  or  meaning  for  framing  the 
joy  statement  in  such  a  fashion. 
B.  The  Immediate  Context  9.7-10 
The  joy  statement  in  9.7-9  again  appears  to  take  the  form 
of  a  reflection,  but  with  a  combination  of  statements  in 
both  the  imperative  and  indicative  moods.  9.7  opens  with  a 
commands  to  'Go  (Jý),  eat  and  drink!  ',  with  the  explanatory 
clause  'because  God  is  already  pleased  with  your  works' 
(ItIDID-rIN  n'th  '  BSI  '1= 
'b) 
.  This  statement  is  followed 
by  another  imperative,  the  jussive  TIM",  to  be  well  clothed 
and  anointed  (9.8)  ;  followed  by  a  third  imperative 
statement  saying  to  'enjoy  life  with  a  woman  you  love', 
with  the  explanatory  clause  'for  this  is  your  lot  in  life' 
(9.9).  Gordis  argues,  by  using  comparative  literature  in 105 
the  ancient  Near  East,  that  9.9  uses  both  the  Gattungen  of 
prose  and  poetry  in  the  same  sentence. 
It  is  very  likely  that  9.10  is  also  a  part  of  the 
immediate  context  of  the  joy  statement  in  9.7-9.  This  is 
because  of  its  thematic  similarities:  fate,  work  and  death; 
and  though  grammatically  it  does  not  take  the  overall 
Gattung  of  an  explanatory  clause,  and  lacks  a  conjunction 
to  this  end,  it  does  function  as  one.  9.10  also  uses  a 
number  of  imperatives  (Y11m31ý  , 
MmD,  M  VI  [this  last 
imperative  is  used  substantively]).  `ItM  ýD 
should  be 
viewed  here  as  the  indefinite  pronoun  'whatever'.  There  is 
widespread  confusion  over  the  accentuation  of  the 
Massoretic  Text,  which  puts  the  infinitive  iili=ý  with  `11= 
instead  of  the  imperative  1m1  ('to  do  in  your  strength'); 
the  Vulgate,  Targum  and  several  Hebrew  manuscripts  put 
It=  with  1ZV  ('in  your  strength  do');  though  Fox  argues 
that,  in  relationship  with  the  LXX'  soS  &uv%tt;  aov, 
Qohelet  does  not  recommend  all-out  expenditure 
of  effort  (as  would  be  implied  by  bekohaka), 
but  only  moderate  exertions  in  accordance  with 
one's  abilities.  52 
But  either  way  makes  little  difference:  the  force  of  the 
sentence  relates  to  'doing'  ,  with  as  much  vigour  as 
possible,  this  side  of  death.  Ginsburg  suggests  that  M112 
with  1l  means  whatever  the  'hand  gains';  and  this  is  a 
reasonable  translation  in  relation  to  work  and  the  material 
benefits  of  work.  The  use  of  the  imperatives  indicate  a 
strengthening  of  9.10's  statement:  'whatever  your  hand 
finds  to  do,  do  it  with  all  your  strength',  with  the 
explanatory  clause,  'because  there  is  no  work,  planning, 106 
knowledge  or  wisdom  in  Sheol  ('grave'?  )  -  where  you  are 
going'. 
Loader  may  be  right  with  regard  to  his  sub-points,  but 
not  with  regard  to  his  overall  conclusion,  when  he  says: 
A  comparison  of  the  two  passages  [8.10-15,16-17 
and  9.1-10]  yields  the  following  similarities 
which  confirm  the  delimitation  given  above:  The 
invalidity  of  the  doctrine  of  retribution, 
the  motif  of  death  and  that  of  abundant  evil 
among  men,  polemic  against  the  general  hokma 
by  the  ironical  use  of  sayings  which  in 
themselves  can  have  a  pure  chokmatic  function, 
and  a  concluding  carpe  diem  section.  53 
Loader  is  probably  right  with  regard  to  irony  being  present 
in  the  above  passages;  but  it  is  doubtful  that  he  has  taken 
the  ambiguities  of  the  text  seriously  enough,  or  got  it 
right  as  to  the  literary  intent  of  the  irony  supporting  a 
straightforward  carpe  diem  interpretation:  the  irony  may  be 
subversive  of  the  straightforward  carpe  diem 
interpretation. 
The  use  of  the  imperative  mood  obviously  intensifies 
the  statements  in  9.7-9;  but  to  what  purpose?  Maybe  the 
statement  on  eating  and  drinking,  in  the  context  of  death, 
is  a  joke  on  the  basis  that  if  one  does  not  eat  or  drink  - 
one  dies.  The  theme  of  fate  and  death  may  also  indicate, 
in  conjunction  with  the  statements  in  9.9bc  which 
qualifying  'enjoying  life  with  a  woman'  in  9.9a  with  'all 
your  hevel  days  which  he  [God]  gave  to  you  under  the  sun  - 
all  your  hevel  days'  ,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  statement 
in  9.9d  which  says  'this  is  your  lot'  (i11),  that  the  joy 
statement  and  the  imperatives  are  a  Gattung  of  taunt  or 
sarcasm.  In  other  words:  It  is  impossible  to  do  these 
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do  fickle  fate  and  death  render  these  activities  hevel  in 
the  long  run,  but  life  itself  is  hevel  on  account  of  them. 
Thus  there  may  be  irony  in  the  joy  statement;  and  this  may 
be  given  support  if  9.10  is  also  a  part  of  the  joy 
statement,  which  it  appears  to  be.  The  interpretation  and 
literary  intent  of  9.7-9,  therefore,  remain  ambiguous. 
7.  QOHELETH  11.8-9 
However  many  years  a  man  may  live,  let  him  enjoy  them  all; 
but  let  him  remember  the  days  of  darkness  -  for  they  will 
be  many.  Everything  to  come  is  hevel.  Be  happy,  young 
man,  while  you  are  young;  and  let  your  heart  be  glad  during 
the  days  of  your  youth.  Follow  the  ways  of  your  heart  and 
whatever  you  eyes  see;  but  know  that  for  all  these  things 
God  will  bring  you  into  judgment. 
A.  The  Overall  Context  of  the  Pericope  11.7-12.7 
Loader  argues  that  the  pericope  is  delimited  from  11.7- 
12.8,  saying  that  11.7  begins  a  new  topos  and  the  end  of 
the  pericope  is  12.8  because  12.9  begins  the  epilogue.  54 
Fredericks,  however,  has  challenged  this  understanding  by 
arguing  for  the  literary  unity  of  11.1-12.8;  55  but  there 
are  probably  three  separate  poems  redacted  together  to  make 
that  literary  unity.  Whybray  views  11.1-6  with  10.1-20  as 
'various  sayings';  Crenshaw  demarcates  the  pericope  from 
11.7-12.7;  Gordis  and  Fox  from  11.7-12.8. ýý  _  -. 
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For  practical  purposes  here,  however,  the  poem  of 
11.1-6  shall  be  excluded  because  of  its  dissimilar  theme  of 
'risk  in  life';  and  the  latter  two  poems  of  11.7-12.7  will 
be  examined  as  a  whole  (though  the  poetic  style  of  12.1-7 
is  very  different  from  the  almost  'prosaical'  style  of  the 
poetic  parallelism  in  11.7-10):  for  Loader  must  be 
considered  correct  when  he  says  that  clearly  a  new  topos 
begins  in  11.7  (light  and  darkness  in  life  and  youth), 
which  12.1-7  also  contains  -  but  with  an  emphasis  on 
approaching  death. 
The  opening  statement  in  11.7  takes  the  Gattung  of 
poetry  as  indicated  by,  what  could  be  interpreted  as, 
either  synonymous  or  synthetic  parallelism,  but  appears  to 
have  the  force  of  the  indicative  mood.  The  Peshi  t  to  reads 
RM2t  "1TT  I'fl'1,  which  Gordis  interprets  as  an 
interpolation  from  7.11  inserted  after  the  original  clause 
fell  out;  but  the  Massoretic  Text  is  sound  here  and  the 
literary  intent  of  the  verse  is  clear:  light  and  seeing  the 
sun  are  metaphors  for  the  goodness  (MM)  of  life  or  living. 
11.10  may  provide  the  reason  for  the  joy  statement  of 
11.8-9.  Barton  argues  that  ODD  is  'here  not  ethical,  but 
physical  evil,  hence  "  misery"  or  "wretchedness"  , 
. 
56 
nr,  MO  i,  from  the  root  II1  meaning  'black'  , 
is  another  term 
which  has  played  havoc  amongst  the  versions:  the  LXX 
renders  it  avola  P  folly'  )  the  Peshi  t  to  reads  Mi1Ii1''  bt 
('ignorance') 
,  the  Vulgate  voluptas  ('desire'  ;  cf.  'Ift, 
'seek'),  Ibn  Ezra  interprets  the  other  meaning  of  1nt  as 
'dawn'  ;  and  the  Targum  1'1=1K1  ''11'  11iß  ('the  days  of  the 
blackness  of  hair')  .  The  last  stich, 
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is  often  regarded  as  a  Chasid  gloss;  but  this  is  wrong  on 
two  counts:  one,  there  is  strong  manuscript  evidence  to 
accept  the  text  as  it  is;  and  two,  the  clause  is  fully 
consistent  with  Qoheleth's  use  of 
ýWjl. 
Jerome  has  surely 
led  a  number  astray  when  he  says  of  11.10:  in  ira  omnes 
perturbationes  animi  comprehendit;  in  carnis  mali  tia 
universas  significat  corporis  voluptotes  ('in  anger 
[Qoheleth]  comprehends  all  the  passions  of  the  mind,  and  by 
wickedness  of  the  flesh  he  indicates  all  the  pleasures  of 
the  body');  and  Luther  rightly  rejects  Jerome  on  this 
point.  11.10  takes  the  Gattung  of  an  explanatory  clause 
which  may  have  the  literary  intent  to  provide  the  rationale 
for  the  carpe  diem  statement  in  11.8-9. 
Only  a  few  cursory  comments  will  be  made  about  the 
poem  in  12.1-7.  That  the  pericope  of  12.1-7  takes  the 
Gattung  of  poetry  is  without  question  on  the  basis  of  the 
extensive  use  of  parallelism;  but  many  commentators 
(Garrett,  Gordis,  Loader,  Whybray)  view  it  as  taking  the 
Gattung  or  using  the  Gattung  of  allegory. 
ýýý1ý  is  universally  attested  to  in  the  versions;  and 
the  plural  has  been  variously  explained  as  'the  plural  of 
majesty'  or  the  mixing  of  lamed  aleph  and  lamed  he  verbs 
(so  Crenshaw,  Gordis).  Crenshaw  thinks  that  j'W  fl  ('your 
Creator')  ill  suits  the  context  and  opts  for  an  emendation 
to  either  '9  ('your  well',  perhaps  a  euphemism  for 
'woman'  or  'wife')  or  111  ('your  pit',  perhaps  a  euphemism 
for  'grave');  though  Ehrlich  also  adopts  ýý  V1  ('your 
well-being').  Crenshaw  further  adds  that 
A  thinker  of  Qohelet's  complexity  might  well 
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pleasure  (the  wife)  and  one's  ultimate  destiny 
(the  grave).  More  probably,  he  urges  young 
people  to  reflect  on  the  joys  of  female 
companionship  before  old  age  and  death  render 
one  incapable  of  sensual  pleasure.  57 
But  the  textual  evidence  and  context  will  not  support  such 
a  notion.  Crenshaw  is,  moreover,  probably  wrong  on  'the 
wife'  being  the  greatest  pleasure  (cf.  7.26:  she  may  be 
your  worst  nightmare),  and  given  Qoheleth's  misogynist 
tendencies,  this  is  an  unlikely  interpretation.  'Your 
Creator'  best  suits  the  context,  which  probably  rejoins  the 
idea  of  God  and  judgment  in  11.9  with  God  and  death  in 
12.7. 
Fox  argues  that  the  text  of  12.1-7  has  three  types  of 
meaning:  the  literal,  symbolic  and  allegorical.  58  He  says 
that 
These  meaning-types  are  not  mutually  exclusive. 
On  the  contrary,  the  figurative  and  symbolic 
require  a  literal  base  line  from  which  both 
types  of  the  extended  meaning  may  proceed.  59 
The  literal  meaning  provides  the  visual  image  (a  funeral 
scene),  which  in  turn  provides  the  symbolic  meaning  (your 
funeral),  which  in  turn  provides  the  allegorical  meaning, 
albeit  in  a  limited  and  disparate  way  (physical  decline  and 
images  of  death).  Perhaps  Fox,  at  least  as  he  describes 
his  approach  to  12.1-7,  should  jettison  the  term  allegory 
and  substitute  it  with  'metaphor',  since  he  seems  to  in 
fact  resistant  to  the  allegorical  interpretation.  Fox 
views  12.1-7  as  a  funeral  scene  in  which  the  meaning  is 
'enjoy  yourself  before  your  funeral'.  60 
The  literary  intent  of  12.1-7,  however,  is  quite  clear 
insofar  as  there  is  a  call  to  remember  one's  Creator 
because  of  one's  inevitable  degeneration  into  the  ultimate ill 
conclusion:  death.  12.8,  whether  original  or  not, 
adequately  frames  the  concluding  theme  both  in  life  and  in 
death  (so  Fox). 
B.  The  Immediate  Context  11.8-9 
MR  "D  is  not  indicative  of  an  explanatory  clause  but  of  the 
indefinite  pronoun  'however'  (see  exegesis).  Nevertheless, 
11.8  probably  takes  the  subjunctive  (implied  in  and  1'r11) 
imperative  (the  implied  jussives  moods;  though 
as  has  already  been  pointed  out:  because  of  the  crudity  of 
the  Hebrew  verbal  inflexion,  it  is  impossible  to  determine 
mood  definitively.  If  the  description  of  the  moods  in  the 
verbs  are  correct,  as  the  context  indicates,  the  first 
clause  could  be  rendered:  'However  many  years  a  man  may 
live,  let  him  enjoy  them  all!  ';  with  the  adversative 
statement  added:  but  let  him  remember  the  days  of  darkness 
-  because  they  will  be  many'.  The  final  sentence  of  11.8 
takes  the  Gattung  of  a  simple  indicative  statement,  which 
is  typical  for  the  hevel  statements:  'everything  to  come  is 
hevelI. 
11.9  also  contains  imperatives,  r'1iý  15  31 
,  and 
thus  take  the  Gattung  of  commands.  The  three  imperatives 
begin  each  of  the  three  sub-statements  of  the  overall  joy 
statement.  The  three  commands  are:  'Enjoy  young  man,  while 
you  are  young';  'follow  the  ways  of  your  heart';  'but  know 
that  God  will  bring  your  actions  into  judgment'. 
There  are  a  number  of  complicating  factors  to 
interpreting  the  joy  statement  of  11.8-9  at  face  value  as 112 
carpe  diem.  While  a  number  of  sub-statements  in  the 
overall  joy  statement  are  commands,  it  does  not  follow  that 
one  will  be  able  to  execute  them  or  achieve  their  ends. 
The  straightforward  interpretation  of  11.8,  moreover,  is 
complicated  by  an  adversative  statement  (11.8c)  and  an 
outright  negative  hevel  statement  at  the  end  (11.8d). 
There  is  a  similar  pattern  in  11.9  where  the  two 
imperatives  are  also  complicated  by  an  adversative 
statement  on  God's  judgment  for  one's  conduct  in  life 
(11.9d)  . 
The  mixture  of  Gattungen  and  the  overall  negative 
context  of  the  joy  statement  in  11.8-9,  indicate  that  there 
might  be  some  subtle  subversion  going  on  in  the  text  - 
because  the  question  remains:  How  can  one  enjoy  life  in 
such  a  context  and  with  such  caveats  on  the  proposed  course 
of  actions? 
8.  CONCLUSIONS  FROM  THE  FORM  CRITICAL  ANALYSIS  OF 
THE  JOY  STATEMENTS 
This  chapter  should  demonstrate  that  form  criticism  is 
inextricably  linked  to  exegesis;  and  literary  function  or 
intent  is  inter-related  to  literary  structure  and  content. 
Source  criticism  is  always  an  ace  up  the  interpreter's 
sleeve:  the  interpreter  can  always  trump  the  game  by 
pulling  this  ace  out  of  his  sleeve;  but  the  questions  must 
then  be  asked:  Is  this  done  for  purely  academic  reasons  or 
is  it  simply  to  undermine  any  interpretations  one  does  not 
like  in  order  to  subvert  them?  Does  the  source  critical 113 
ace  deal  with  the  text  or  is  it  an  abandonment  of  dealing 
with  the  text?  The  sources  of  the  biblical  material, 
nevertheless,  always  remain  elusive  and  problematic  for 
interpretation;  and  the  history  of  redaction  means  that  one 
can  never  'prove'  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  the  state  of  a 
text. 
As  Dell  correctly  points  out:  Qoheleth  operates  on 
several  different  levels  of  genre  at  any  given  time.  The 
joy  statements  consistently  take  the  overall  Gattung  of 
reflection  (observation  +  evaluation).  This  overall 
Gattung  may  aid  in  understanding  the  sub-Gattungen  that 
they  take.  The  joy  statements  take,  by  in  large,  the  sub- 
Gattung  of  statements  in  the  indicative  mood,  which  can 
only  be  determined  contextually  and  because  of  a  lack  of 
parallelism  or  other  indicators.  A  number  of  them  also 
take  the  sub-Gattung  of  statements  in  the  imperative  mood 
(9.7-9;  11.8-9).  These  Gattungen,  taken  on  their  own, 
would  indicate  straightforward  carpe  diem  statements;  but 
the  only  joy  statement  which  stands  as  such,  after  form 
criticism,  is  3.12-13:  this  is  not  a  very  broad  or  strong 
basis  to  make  an  overarching  interpretation  of  the  Book  of 
Qoheleth. 
The  overall  and  immediate  contexts  of  the  joy 
statements,  however,  indicate  that  it  is  dubious  as  to 
whether  or  not  they  should  be  taken  in  a  straightforward 
manner,  and  indicate  (as  a  hermeneutical  clue?  )  that  the 
use  of  the  indicative  and  imperative  moods  may  in  fact  be 
subversive  in  both  form  and  content. 114 
The  rhetorical  questions  in  the  joy  statements  expect 
emphatic  negative  responses  (none!  no  one!  nothing!  ).  The 
question  is  then  raised:  What  literary  effect  can  this 
emphatic  negative  response  have?  There  are  two  possible 
responses  to  this  question:  One,  the  rhetorical  questions 
in  the  joy  statements  support  carpe  diem  because  that  is 
the  best  one  can  do  under  the  circumstances;  or  two,  the 
rhetorical  questions  in  the  joy  statements  are  subversive 
to  carpe  diem  because  the  context  makes  it  difficult,  if 
not,  impossible  to  'seize  the  day'. 
6.1-2  is,  perhaps,  the  most  subversive  passage  in 
Qoheleth  for  the  joy  statements  -  and  one  cannot,  should 
not,  underestimate  the  literary  effect  that  it  has  on  the 
Book  of  Qoheleth  on  the  basis  that  it  is  highly 
deterministic,  portrays  God  as  capricious  and  demonstrates 
how  man  is  a  victim  of  these,  not  the  maker  of  one's  own 
destiny  -  perhaps  with  the  implication  that  freewill  and 
carpe  diem  are  impossible. 
Since  the  exact  literary  nature  of  the  joy  statements 
cannot  be  ascertained  definitive,  as  of  yet  (and  possibly 
not  at  all!  ),  and  the  literary  function  or  intent  of  the 
joy  statements  remain  obscure,  a  look  at  the  philosophy  of 
scepticism  (chapter  four)  and  irony  (chapter  six),  may 
inform  the  discussion  or  interpretation  further. 115 
CHAPTER  FOUR 
WHAT  IS  SCEPTICISM  AND  CAN  IT  BE  FOUND  IN 
THE  HEBREW  BIBLE? 
This  chapter  will  provide  an  overview  of  scepticism  as  a 
philosophy  and  a  working  definition  of  it;  followed  by  a 
critical  assessment.  This  chapter  then  deals  with,  what 
some  scholars  see  as,  a  sceptical  tradition  in  the  Hebrew 
Bible.  It  should  be  noted  here  at  the  very  beginning, 
however,  that  the  purpose  for  looking  at  the  formal 
concepts  of  scepticism  is  not  to  draw  identical 
correlations  with  any  literature  in  the  Hebrew  Bible,  but 
rather  to  make  certain  analogies  in  an  attempt  to  elucidate 
an  understanding  of  some  of  its  content.  O.  M.  E.  D.  defines 
'analogy'  as 
1...  correspondence  or  partial  similarity. 
2  Logic  a  process  of  arguing  from  similarity 
in  known  respects  to  similarity  in  other 
respects.  1 
This  is  the  working  definition  for  'analogy'  in  this 
thesis.  'Scepticism'  comes  from  the  Greek  a  ittxOS  meaning 
to  'inquire'  or  to  'consider';  and  in  the  case  of  the 
philosophy  of  scepticism,  inquiry  and  consideration  are  the 
essential  methodology  for  challenging  epistemological 
assumptions. 
1.  AN  OVERVIEW  OF  SCEPTICISM 
Like  most  philosophical  constructs,  scepticism  long 
antedates  any  formal  description  of  itself.  Defining 
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characteristics  are  discernible  for  the  purposes  of  this 
dissertation.  This  section  will  take  a  brief  historical 
(synoptic)  overview  of  scepticism,  deal  with  the  basic 
tenets  and  working  methodology  of  scepticism,  and  then 
provide  a  working  definition;  followed  by  a  critical 
assessment. 
A.  A  Synoptic  Overview  of  scepticism 
Scepticism  arose  largely,  in  the  context  of  the 
Hellenistic-Roman  period,  in  response  to  certain  'dogmatic' 
philosophies  (those  who  claimed  to  have  discovered  truth), 
or  more  properly,  in  response  to  the  epistemologies  of 
certain  philosophies,  e.  g.,  Aristotelian,  Epicurean  and 
Stoicism.  Scepticism  is  essentially  a  theory  of 
epistemology. 
Epistemology  is  that  branch  of  philosophy  with  deals 
with  the  'limits  and  nature  of  knowledge'  -  and  asks  the 
questions:  How  much  can  one  know?  How  does  one  know 
something?  Of  what  can  one  be  certain?  2  These  rather 
large  questions  can  be  applied  to  everything  in  the 
universe  and  in  consciousness,  and  thus  leads  to  an 
infinity  of  subjects  which  may  be  investigated  sceptically. 
In  essence  scepticism's  epistemology  holds  'the 
possibilities  of  knowledge  to  be  limited'.  3  Of  course 
there  is  a  wide  gamut  of  sceptical  views,  from  the  radical 
scepticism  of  Hume  to  the  more  moderate  or  utilitarian 
scepticism  of  Kant,  who  used  scepticism  as  a  tool  for 
4  affirming  his  'critical  dogmatism'. 117 
Annas  and  Barnes  would  characterise  the  difference 
between  ancient  and  modern  sceptics  by  saying  that  'The 
Greeks  took  their  scepticism  seriously:  the  moderns  do 
not'.  5  That  point  is  probably  debatable,  since  for 
Descartes,  Hume  and  Kant,  the  problems  of  scepticism  proved 
of  utmost  importance  in  the  philosophical  debate  -  which  no 
serious  philosopher  can  avoid;  though  Annas  and  Barnes  may 
be  correct  when  they  say  that 
Scepticism  was  the  philosophical  disease  of  the 
age  [the  Enlightenment],  and  the  disease  had  been 
transmitted  by  Sextus  Empiricus'  Outlines  of 
Pyrrhonism.  6 
j 
The  Outlines  of  Pyrrhonism,  first  translated  and  published 
in  Latin  in  1562  by  the  French  scholar  Henri  Etienne, 
brought  epistemology  into  the  forefront  of  philosophical 
debate  and  led  to  the  rise  of  scepticism  in  Renaissance, 
Enlightenment  and  Postenlightenment  philosophy  -  where  it 
has  maintained  a  prominent  role  into  the  twentieth 
century.?  Sextus  opens  his  book  with  the  statement: 
Those  who  investigate  any  subject  are  likely 
either  to  make  a  discovery  or  to  deny  the 
possibility  of  discovery  and  agree  that  nothing 
can  be  apprehended  or  else  to  persist  in  their 
investigations.  That,  no  doubt,  is  why  of  those 
who  undertake  philosophical  investigations 
some  say  that  they  have  discovered  the  truth, 
others  deny  the  possibility  of  apprehending  it, 
and  others  are  still  pursuing  their 
investigations.  Those  who  are  properly  called 
dogmatists  -  such  as  the  Aristotelians  and  the 
Epicureans  and  the  Stoics  and  others  -  think  they 
have  discovered  the  truth;  Clitomachus  and 
Carneades  and  other  Academic  philosophers  have 
said  that  the  truth  cannot  be  apprehended;  and 
the  sceptics  persist  in  their  investigations.  8 
Annas  and  Barnes  further  comment  that  Sextus  portrays  the 
sceptics  as  'perpetual'  or  'persistent  students',  and 118 
conclude  that  'Sceptics  are  doubters:  they  neither  believe 
nor  disbelieve,  neither  affirm  nor  deny'.  9 
There  were,  of  course,  other  literary  sources  of 
scepticism.  The  work  of  Diogenes  Laertius,  Lives  of  the 
Philosophers,  was  available  from  1430  and  carried  a 
biography  of  Pyrrho  and  a  'brief  survey  of  the  sceptical 
approach  to  philosophy';  10  although  sceptical  ideas  were 
known  to  be  in  Cicero's  Academics.  Montaigne,  however, 
quickly  picked  up  on  Sextus'  work  and  became  the  conduit 
for  scepticism's  quick  rise  to  prominence  in  his  1575  work 
A  Defense  of  Raymond  Sebond.  Less  than  a  century  later,  in 
1642,  Descartes'  famous  work  the  Meditations,  attempted  to 
use  radical  scepticism  in  order  to  overthrow  it,  for  he 
'saw  scepticism  a  disease  of  epidemic  magnitude:  his  whole 
philosophical  activity  was  given  to  the  search  for  a 
cure  ',  11 
There  are  essentially  three  types  of  scepticism, 
spanning  from  Pyrrho  to  the  modern  era,  which  can  be 
... 
defined  by  means  of  the  objects  held  to  be 
unknowable.  Sceptical  arguments  have  been  used 
to  deny  that  we  can  get  knowledge  of  any  matters 
of  empirical  fact,  of  the  external  world  of 
material  objects,  of  the  minds  of  others,  of  the 
past,  of  the  future,  of  nature  as  a  whole,  of 
values  and  of  any  objects  of  religious  or 
metaphysical  speculation  which  lie  beyond  sense 
experience.  12 
Those  sceptics  who  hold  that  the  objects  in  question  do  not 
in  fact  exist  are  also  generally  sceptical  towards  the 
existence  of  God,  ethical  values  or  the  substantive  and 
immortal  soul. 
A  more  moderate  view  of  scepticism  is  Kant's  view, 
which  states  that  while  one  may  admit  that  the  objects  in 119 
question  exist,  one  cannot  know  anything  more  about  them, 
e.  g.,  inductive  scepticism  about  the  laws  of  nature. 
Nevertheless,  as  has  already  been  noted,  Kant  only  used 
scepticism  as  a  tool  to  support  his  critical  dogmatism.  13 
The  most  radical  form  of  scepticism  is  evidenced  in 
those  who  state  that  the  'objects  in  question  could  not 
possibly  exist  and  therefore  that  knowledge  of  the  sort  he 
is  doubting  is  logically  ruled  out';  14  though  one  should 
note  that  this  is  a  contradiction  because  the  radical 
sceptic  should  also  be  sceptical  about  these  propositions 
as  well.  Notwithstanding,  this  would  then  be,  in  effect, 
the  opposite  of  Descartes'  'I  think,  therefore  I  am':  'I  do 
not  exist,  therefore  I  cannot  think'.  This  form  of 
scepticism  can  be  found  in  Berkeley's  view  of  material 
substances  and  Hume's  view  of  real  or  intrinsic  connections 
between  events;  15  but  even  Hume  doubted  the  veracity  of  his 
own  philosophy,  and  was  therefore,  a  true  sceptic.  16 
The  original  purpose  for  the  sceptical  approach,  at 
least  for  Pyrrho,  was  to  attain  detachment  (objectivity), 
and  consequently,  peace  of  mind  (aiapaxt(x)  by  accepting 
that  the  search  for  'truth'  was  inevitably  futile.  It  may 
be  further  argued,  however,  that  a  major  thrust  or  purpose 
of  scepticism,  was  to  undermine  one's  philosophical 
opponents  and  any  certainty  which  they  may  hold;  and  for 
Pyrrho  it  was  the  dogmatism  of  Aristotelian,  Epicurean  and 
Stoic  schools.  This  may,  however,  have  the  effect  of 
rendering  any  peace  unattainable  because  it  raises  the 
question:  How  can  one  have  peace  without  certainty? 120 
B.  The  Working  Presupposition  and 
Methodology  of  Scepticism 
The  working  presupposition  and  methodology  of  scepticism 
need  to  be  articulated  in  order  to  provide  a  basis  for 
comparing  them  with  some  of  the  literature  in  the  Hebrew 
Bible.  This  section  is  not  meant  to  be  exhaustive  but  only 
for  the  purpose  of  acting  as  a  bench  mark  for  comparative 
analysis. 
The  basic  working  presupposition  of  scepticism  is  that 
all  knowledge  is  limited,  if  not,  unattainable.  In  its 
extreme  form,  scepticism  contends  that  nothing  at  all  can 
be  known;  but  more  moderate  forms  'support  a  methodological 
policy  of  reserve  and  circumspection  in  the  formation  of 
beliefs'.  17  The  essence  of  scepticism  is  a  doubting  and 
questioning  spirit  which  suspends  belief.  18  The  term 
'belief'  is  important  to  define  in  contradistinction  to 
'knowledge':  One  may  believe  anything;  but  believing  is  not 
knowing,  belief  is  not  knowledge.  'Belief',  as  Hume 
understood  it,  relative  to  the  philosophy  of  scepticism, 
was  nothing  but  a  feeling  which  causes  one  to  lie  in  the 
imagination.  19  In  other  words:  All  beliefs  are  just 
feelings  which  are  supported  by  a  lying  imagination  and  not 
evidence  or  reason. 
The  ancient  sceptics  did  not  attack  knowledge: 
they  attacked  belief'.  They  argued  that,  under 
sceptical  pressure,  our  beliefs  turn  out  to  be 
groundless  and  that  we  have  no  more  reason  to 
believe  than  disbelieve.  20 
Sextus  outlines  the  basic  working  methodology  of 
scepticism  by  saying: 121 
Scepticism  is  an  ability  which  sets  up  antitheses 
among  appearances  and  judgements  in  any  way 
whatever:  by  scepticism,  on  account  of  the  'equal 
weight'  which  characterizes  opposing  states  of 
affairs  and  arguments,  we  arrive  first  at 
suspension  of  judgement  and  second  at  'freedom 
from  disturbance'.  21 
Sextus  outlined  the  specific  Ten  Modes  in  his  Outlines  of 
Pyrrhonism  which  form  the  basis  of  the  working  methodology 
for  scepticism;  but  other  traditions  use  anywhere  from  four 
to  seven  to  eight.  22  'Modes'  is  a  translation  of  the  Greek 
tipoiro;,  which  sceptics  understood  in  its  most  basic  sense 
of  'way';  though  the  Pyrrhonists  also  used  the  Greek  ko'yog, 
to  mean  'argument'  . 
23  The  modes  were  thus  a  'way  of 
argument'  by  which  the  'suspension  of  judgment  is 
inferred'.  24  The  five  most  basic  modes  are:  the  relative 
or  subjective  nature  of  perception,  infinite  regress  of 
proof,  the  conflict  of  opinions  between  opponents,  the 
inevitably  hypothetical  character  of  all  ultimate  premises, 
and  the  rejection  of  syllogism  or  circular  arguments.  25 
The  relative  or  subjective  nature  of  perception,  is 
again,  related  to  scepticism's  working  presupposition  of 
limited  epistemology.  The  sceptic  doubts  all  sense 
perception  to  the  extent  that  one  cannot  form  solid  beliefs 
about  what  is  seen,  heard,  touched,  tasted  or  smelled.  26 
Or  as  Unger  puts  it,  in  his  book  Ignorance:  A  Case  for 
Scepticism, 
We  don't  come  away  with  the  feeling  that  we 
happen  not  to  know  anything  about  the  external 
world.  Rather,  we  get  the  feeling  that  no 
matter  what  we  do,  no  matter  how  our  beliefs 
may  change,  we  will  never  know  anything  of  the 
sort  in  question.  ... 
So,  you  don't  know  that 
there  are  rocks.  The  same  thing  works  for 
anyone  in  any  situation,  and  in  respect  of  any 
external  matter.  Therefore,  no  one  ever  knows 
anything  about  the  external  world  (nor  ever  can 122 
do  so).  27 
This  lack  of  belief  or  trust  in  sensory  perception 
inevitably  leads  to,  depending  on  the  extent  one  wants  to 
push  the  presupposition,  a  limited  epistemology.  One 
cannot,  therefore,  form  any  solid  beliefs  or  gain  any  true 
knowledge  at  all  about  anything  because  human  beings  are 
prisoners  of  their  physical  and  mental  faculties,  which  may 
be  either  deceptive  or  faulty  in  the  information  they 
perceive,  manufacture  or  filter. 
The  second  aspect  of  the  working  methodology  of 
scepticism  is  the  infinite  regress  of  proof.  Barnes  talks 
of  the  toils  of  scepticism  because  the  nature  of  scepticism 
is  to  question  everything  in  order  to  verify  reality,  and 
this  inevitably  leads  to  'infinite  regression',  i.  e.,  an 
infinite  amount  of  questions,  problems  and  arguments  can  be 
made  against  any  statement  or  belief  about  reality.  28 
If  a  philosopher  offers  a  proof,  he  will  then 
be  required  to  prove  the  premisses  of  his  proof, 
and  the  premisses  of  that  proof,  and  so 
ad  infini  tum.  29 
The  technique  of  the  mode  of  infinite  regression, 
therefore,  leads  (if  not  forces)  one  to  a  suspension  of 
belief  or  dogmatism  concerning  the  veracity  of  any 
proposition  or  knowledge:  it  cannot  be  otherwise,  i.  e.,  if 
one  accepts  the  presupposition  of  infinite  regress. 
The  third  aspect  of  sceptical  working  methodology  is 
the  conflict  of  opinions  between  opponents.  This  is 
related,  in  an  indirect  way,  with  infinite  regress.  The 
basic  premise  is  that  because  there  are  conflicts  of 
opinions  between  opponents  of  any  proposition,  this  in  and 
of  itself  inevitably  leads  to  doubt  over  the  truth  claim.  30 123 
The  fourth  aspect,  or  mode  of  scepticism,  is  the 
inevitably  hypothetical  character  of  all  ultimate  premises. 
This  essentially  means  that  any  proposition  or  hypothesis 
will,  by  its  very  nature,  be  questionable  and  unprovable. 
In  addition  to  this, 
Hypotheses  are  not  in  any  normal  sense  a  class 
of  propositions;  for  we  cannot  intelligibly  ask, 
in  the  abstract,  whether  or  not  a  given 
proposition  is  an  hypothesis.  A  proposition  is 
an  hypothesis  when,  and  in  the  context  in  which, 
it  is  hypothesized;  and  it  is  thus  an  hypothesis 
not  absolutely  and  without  qualification,  but 
relatively  and  within  a  determinate  context  of 
discourse. 
...  you  may  hypothesize  absolutely 
anything  so  far  as  the  form  of  the  hypothesis 
goes,  [but]  the  purpose  and  function  of 
hypothesizing  may  yet  put  constraints  on  the 
content  of  permissible  hypotheses.  31 
The  long  and  short  of  this  statement  is  that  any 
proposition  or  hypothesis,  by  its  very  nature,  means  that 
the  actual  form  or  linguistic  and  grammatical  framing  of 
the  proposition  or  hypothesis,  in  the  specific  context  in 
which  it  is  given,  will  be  in  doubt  and  questionable;  but 
common  sense  will  rule  out  a  lot  of  them  (so  Barnes). 
The  fifth  mode  of  scepticism,  is  the  rejection  of 
syllogism  or  circular  arguments.  This  means  that  the 
sceptic  considers  the  philosophical  mode  of  stating  a 
proposition,  following  it  with  another  proposition  which 
provides  evidence  or  argumentative  support  for  the  initial 
proposition,  which  in  turn  supports  a  conclusion  about  the 
initial  proposition,  invalid.  For  example: 
No  man  is  a  quadruped. 
Socrates  is  a  man. 
Therefore,  Socrates  is  not  a  quadruped. 
Syllogism,  like  the  example  above,  argues  from  a  universal 
to  a  particular;  'and  yet  they  must  also  invoke  an  argument 124 
from  particular  to  a  universal'  . 
32  Syllogism  is  a  more 
compact  version  of  the  'circular  argument'. 
We  might  think  of  three  arguments,  standing 
in  the  following  relation  to  one  another: 
'P3:  so  P2  ';  'P2:  so  P1  ';  'P1:  so  P3' 
.  Here 
there  is  what  we  might  call  circularity  -  you 
start  with  P3  and  end  up  at  P3  again.  And 
the  circles  may  be  as  large  as  you  like.  33 
The  sceptics'  derision  of  arguments  from  reciprocity  or 
circularity  is  used  'for  specifically  sceptical  ends: 
reciprocity  induces  EirO  ,  suspension  of  judgment' 
. 
34  In 
other  words:  Sceptics  do  not  accept  circular  arguments  as 
proof  of  anything;  but  they  can  and  do  use  circular 
arguments  against  dogmatists  in  order  to  support 
scepticism,  i.  e.,  a  suspension  of  judgment. 
C.  A  Working  Definition  of  Scepticism 
The  basic  definition  of  'sceptic',  'sceptical'  in  the 
O.  M.  E.  D.  is 
.a  person  inclined  to  doubt  all  accepted 
opinions;  ... 
inclined  to  question  the  truth 
or  soundness  of  accepted  ideas,  facts,  etc.  35 
The  definition  of  scepticism  for  the  purposes  of  this 
dissertation,  in  conjunction  with  the  previous  discussion 
of  scepticism  as  a  philosophy,  is:  'That  disposition  which 
attacks  dogmatic  assertions  (of  truth  or  absolute 
knowledge)  with  doubt  and  questions'. 
2.  CRITICAL  ASSESSMENT  OF  SCEPTICISM 
Like  any  philosophy,  the  validity  of  scepticism  depends  on 
whether  or  not  one  accepts  its  terms,  and  in  this  case, 125 
limited  epistemology  and  the  working  methodology  of  the 
five  basic  modes.  Even  Carneades  of  Cyrene  (ca.  214-128 
B.  C.  E.  ),  a  true  sceptic  because  he  doubted  his  own 
philosophy,  advocated  a  three  grade  theory  of  probability 
as  a  guide  for  action:  the  probable,  the  probable  and 
undisputed,  and  the  probable,  undisputed  and  tested; 
...  the  latter  being  the  highest  state  of 
belief  that  is  reached  when  a  whole  system  of 
connected  ideas  is  formed  agreeing  logically 
with  each  other.  36 
If  one  accepts,  moreover,  the  basic  presupposition  and 
working  methodology  of  a  philosophy,  and  work  accordingly 
within  that  framework,  the  most  one  can  say  of  their 
conclusions  is  that  they  are  analytic  truths,  i.  e.,  truths 
which  are  true  on  the  basis  of  the  definitions  or  meaning 
of  its  terms  alone  and  not  necessarily  in  fact  or 
reality.  37  There  is,  moreover,  a  distinct  difference 
between  'philosophical  doubt'  and  'practical  doubt'.  The 
first  three  of  Descartes'  Principles  of  Philosophy 
advocated: 
1.  That  in  order  to  investigate  the  truth  of  things  it 
is  necessary  once  in  one's  life  to  put  all  things 
in  doubt  insofar  as  that  is  possible. 
2.  That  it  is  useful  too  to  regard  as  false  those 
things  which  one  can  doubt. 
3.  That  we  should  certainly  not  use  this  doubt  for  the 
conduct  of  our  actions. 
Thus  there  is  a  distinction,  as  Pyhrro  and  Carneades  would 
agree  with  Descartes,  between  'philosophical  doubt'  and 
'practical  doubt':  common  sense,  should  and  will,  usually 
prevail  for  practical  reasons.  As  Annas  and  Barnes  point 
out  regarding  the  above  Cartesian  principles: 126 
Applying  the  first  principle,  the  Cartesian 
sceptic  will  doubt  that  he  is  buying  a  cup  of 
coffee  and  doubts  that  twice  ten  is  twenty; 
applying  the  second  principle,  he  will  actually 
regard  those  things  as  false.  But  the  third 
principle  warns  us  that  his  doubt  is 
philosophical:  he  will  not  conduct  his  actions  by 
it;  that  is  to  say,  even  while  'doubting',  he 
will  persist  in,  and  act  upon,  his  ordinary 
beliefs  that  the  stuff  in  the  cup  is  coffee  and 
that  two  ten-pence  pieces  make  up  twenty  pence.  38 
They  go  on  to  say,  however,  in  contradistinction  to  modern 
sceptics,  that 
...  the  ancient  sceptics  had  no  interest  in 
philosophical  doubt.  The  doubt  they  expected  to 
induce  was  ordinary,  non-philosophical  doubt;  it 
excluded  beliefs,  and  it  was  therefore  a 
practical  doubt.  Indeed,  it  was  precisely  by 
reference  to  the  practical  corollaries  of  their 
doubt  that  they  used  to  recommend  their 
philosophy:  scepticism,  they  claimed,  by 
relieving  us  of  our  ordinary  beliefs,  would 
remove  the  worry  from  our  lives  and  ensure  our 
happiness.  39 
This  was  certainly  Pyrhho's  motivation  for  scepticism;  but 
it  could  be  argued,  however,  that  this  practical  doubt 
might  well  have  the  opposite  effect:  if  knowledge  is 
limited  and  belief  unattainable,  this  lack  of  knowledge  and 
belief  may  render  one  neurotic.  For  as  Annas  and  Barnes 
later  point  out: 
...  why  should  I  philosophise  at  all  if  I 
shall  be  no  happier  for  it?  If  there  is  no  way 
in  which  philosophy  makes  my  life  more 
satisfactory,  then  the  pursuit  of  it  may  seem 
either  perverse  or  trivial.  Pursuing  an 
occupation  which  leads  merely  to  depression  is 
surely  perverse.  40 
On  the  other  hand,  they  further  add  that 
The  sceptic  who  demands  that  his  inquiries 
result  in  happiness  is  surely  making  an 
unrealistic  demand  on  the  world.  41 
Perhaps  it  would  be  best  to  accept  those  good  points  of 
scepticism,  use  them  as  profitably  as  possible  and  suspend 127 
judgment  on  its  psychological  and  emotional  effects  -  which 
are,  conceivably,  irrelevant  -  and  be  sceptical  about 
scepticism. 
Criticism  can  be  leveled  at  infinite  regress, 
depending  on  the  degree  to  which  it  is  pushed,  as 
approaching  a  reductio  adsurdum.  This  is  because,  first  of 
all,  one  cannot  comprehend  the  infinite;  two,  it  is 
impossible  to  survey  an  infinite  amount  of  propositions; 
and  three,  it  is  practically  impossible  to  qualify  every 
proposition  or  sentence  one  utters  ad  infinitum  -  and  to 
require  such  has  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  philosophical 
debate  (see  below).  Or  as  Barnes,  speaking  for  the  common 
man,  puts  it: 
... 
it  is  utterly  plain  both  that  and  why 
infinite  sequences  are  epistemological  absurd  - 
they  are  absurd  because  they  do  not  link  our 
beliefs  to  reali  ty.  42 
Since  syllogism  argues  from  the  universal  to  the 
particular,  but  are  dependent  upon  an  argument  from  the 
particular  to  support  the  universal,  they  are  therefore 
invalid  on  the  basis  that  they  are  truly  reciprocal:  the 
initial  proposition  is  supported  by  a  symbiotic  proposition 
which  is  thus  not  an  independent  means  of  verification;  and 
they  are,  in  some  cases,  analytic  arguments,  i.  e.,  true  on 
the  basis  of  the  definitions  one  gives  to  the  terms. 
Nevertheless,  like  circular  arguments,  they  can  be  used 
legitimately  when  the  evidence  and  arguments  tally  up.  For 
example: 
1.  1  +1  =2 
2.  2  -1  =  1;  therefore, 
3.  1  +1  =2 128 
But  the  bottomline  remains:  if  the  evidence  does  not  tally 
up,  no  matter  what  methodology  of  inquiry  one  uses,  faulty 
results  will  be  produced.  There  is  nothing  inherently 
wrong  with  the  method  of  syllogism,  as  the  above  example 
demonstrates,  because  there  is  a  second,  independent  means 
of  verification  (subtracting  a  total  to  verify  the 
addition)  which  proves  the  initial  proposition. 
Circular  argument  is  only  one  method  of  inquiry.  In 
the  case  of  circular  argument,  all  propositions  are 
verified  by  evidence  or  arguments,  and  all  arguments  by 
necessity,  must  be  circular  if  they  are  to  address  the 
initial  proposition  or  truth  claim  -  and  they  cannot  be 
otherwise:  a  thesis  or  proposition  is  stated,  evidence  and 
or  arguments  are  given  to  support  the  thesis  or 
proposition,  an  evaluation  of  the  evidence  and  or  arguments 
takes  place,  and  a  conclusion  is  given  as  to  whether  or  not 
the  evidence  and  or  arguments  support  the  thesis  or 
proposition.  The  whole  argument  about  circular  reasoning 
or  arguments  hinges  on  the  issue  of  whether  or  not  the 
evidence  and  or  philosophical  arguments  support  the  thesis 
or  proposition,  not  whether  or  not  it  is  a  valid  means  of 
inquiry.  This  is  what  Barr  wants  to  point  out  in  his 
inaugural  lecture  to  the  University  of  Oxford: 
A  viewpoint  expressed  by  a  biblical  scholar 
stands  or  falls,  not  by  the  relation  between  his 
opinion  and  his  presuppositions,  but  by  the 
relation  between  his  opinion  and  the  evidence.  43 
Methodologies  are  tools  of  humanity;  circular  arguments  are 
neither  here  nor  there  insofar  as  being  a  legitimate 
methodology  -  but  whether  or  not,  in  the  final  analysis, 129 
the  evidence  or  arguments  tally  up  -  as  the  example,  again, 
demonstrates. 
1.1  +1=2 
2.2  -1=1;  therefore, 
3.1  +1=2 
Circular  arguments,  as  a  methodology,  can  be  used 
legitimately  when  the  evidence  and  arguments  tally  up. 
Thus  criticism  should  be  leveled  at  scepticism's 
refusal  to  accept  circular  arguments  on  the  basis  that  they 
are  legitimate  and  necessary  methodology  in  order  to  verify 
propositions  or  truth  claims,  as  well  as  common  sense. 
Moreover,  it  needs  to  be  rejected  on  the  grounds  that,  like 
the  employment  of  infinite  regression  by  sceptics,  the 
rejection  is  passive-aggressive  behaviour  and  not 
philosophical  rebuttal. 
To  talk  of  circular  reasoning  as  something  unsound, 
flippant  or  improper  is  a  nonsense:  it  is  actually 
psychological  manipulation  to  undermine  the  arguments 
rather  than  philosophical  rebuttal  and  is  akin  to  a  form  of 
passive-aggressive  behaviour,  i.  e.,  behaviour  which  appears 
innocent  and  to  have  integrity  on  the  surface  but  is  in 
fact  highly  caustic  because  it  undermines  fair  debate  and, 
in  a  subtle  and  deceptive  way,  corrodes  trust  and  honesty 
in  the  philosophical  debate  by  removing  the  focus  from  the 
evidence  and  or  arguments  (the  issues)  and  displaces  debate 
by  psychologically  oppressing  the  opponent  instead  of 
dealing  with  the  arguments.  44  A  similar  tactic,  which  is 
actually  passive-aggressive  behaviour,  is  saying  something 
is  an  assertion  -  when  saying  it  is  an  assertion'  is  in 
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philosophical  arguments:  it  is,  as  Bootzin  et  al.  point 
out,  psychologically  and  sociologically  maladaptive 
behaviour.  45 
This  is  also  applicable  to  the  mode  of  disagreement 
amongst  opponents:  because  an  opponent  states  an  opposing 
argument  to  a  proposition  does  not  make  that  statement  true 
or  valid;  but  neither  does  it  inversely,  necessarily, 
undermine  the  truth  or  validity  of  the  original 
proposition.  Rather,  it  is  the  evidence  or  rational 
arguments  which  will  determine  the  counter-statement's 
veracity  or  validity.  Thus  the  second,  third  and  fifth 
modes  of  scepticism,  depending  on  the  degree  to  which  they 
are  pushed,  can  in  an  overall  sense,  be  criticised  in 
similar  fashion  together  as  being  passive-aggressive 
behaviour  and  not  philosophical  rebuttal. 
The  ultimate  value  of,  the  second,  third  and  fifth 
modes  of  scepticism,  is  that  they  demonstrate  the  value  of 
the  dialectical  method  whereby  a  proposition  can  be  argued, 
pro  and  con,  to  the  extent  that  a  reasonable  conclusion  may 
be  warranted  after  such  investigation  and  in  the  light  of 
common  sense. 
Finally,  in  this  critical  assessment,  while  it  is 
necessary  to  capture  something  of  the  essence  of 
scepticism,  it  is  not  necessary  to  accept  or  employ  all  its 
formal  methods  of  investigation  to  any  proposition,  truth 
claim  or  belief,  at  least  to  the  infinite  degree,  without 
some  critical  scrutiny  and  due  caution.  This  is  precisely 
the  point  that  Williams  makes  when  he  argues  against  the 
sceptic  by  way  of  epistemological  realism: 131 
He  cannot  allow  that  we  create  space  for  a 
distinctive  epistemological  project  by 
imposing  certain  constraints  on  justification, 
for  this  will  suggest  that  his  investigation 
creates  one  more  special  kind  of  enquiry, 
structured  by  its  own  procedural  norms,  but 
on  the  same  level,  so  to  speak,  as  any  other. 
...  But  I  find  it  hard  to  believe  that  in 
bringing  out  the  methodological  constraints 
that  inform  the  traditional  examination  of 
knowledge  of  the  world  [foundationalism/ 
epistemological  realism],  thus  making  sense  of 
the  questions  that  seem  to  lead  to  scepticism,  we 
are  simply  falling  into  line  with  the 
epistemological  facts.  So,  as  I  suggested 
earlier,  when  we  see  how  we  can  make  sense  of  the 
sceptic's  questions,  his  negative  answers  no 
longer  have  the  force  he  means  them  to  have. 
Perhaps  this  is  the  way  of  preventing  the  sceptic 
from  asking  his  questions  in  the  way  he  wants  to 
ask  them.  46 
In  other  words:  One  does  not  need  to  buy  into  the 
psychological  manipulation  of  the  sceptic's  methodological 
questions  he  asks  in  order  to  create  scepticism  regarding 
everything:  the  unreasonableness  of  some  of  scepticism's 
methodology,  or  absurd  ad  infinitums,  can  and  should  be 
restrained  by  common  sense. 
Despite  these  criticisms,  scepticism  is  absolutely 
necessary  for  philosophical  debate.  One  must  logically 
accept  limited  epistemology  (it  is  the  degree  of  limitation 
which  must  be  in  question),  for  this  is  exemplified  in  the 
ancient  sceptics  distinctions  between  'philosophical  doubt' 
and  'practical  doubt'.  Prudence,  or  common  sense,  can  and 
should  be  applied  to  scepticism  like  any  other 
philosophical  construct.  47  The  value  of  scepticism, 
nevertheless,  lies  in  its  doubting  and  questioning  spirit 
which  insists  on  keeping  any  assertion  open  to  review  and 
criticism  via  dialectical  argumentation.  Of  course,  any 132 
true  sceptic,  can  and  will  be  sceptical  of  this  conclusion 
-  and  rightly  so! 
Concerning  the  definition  of  'scepticism'  adopted  by 
this  dissertation,  the  first  criticism  which  might  come  to 
one's  mind,  is  that  it  is  so  broad  that  one  could  not  but 
help  find  scepticism  everywhere  including  the  Hebrew  Bible. 
One  could  counter  this,  however,  by  arguing  that  it  is  not 
that  there  is  anything  wrong  with  the  definition  but  that 
scepticism  is  so  widely  pervasive  that  any  culture  or 
period  cannot  but  help  evidence  scepticism  in  some  of  its 
artefacts.  The  definition,  both  by  the  standards  of  the 
English  dictionary  and  in  conjunction  with  the  synoptic 
overview  of  the  philosophy  of  scepticism,  makes  clear  that 
the  essential  characteristics  of  scepticism  as  being  that 
disposition  which  attacks  dogmatic  assertions  (of  truth  or 
absolute  knowledge)  with  doubt  and  questions',  are  sound. 
3.  A  SCEPTICAL  TRADITION  IN  THE  HEBREW  BIBLE? 
This  section  will  look  at  the  possibility  that  there  is  a 
sceptical  tradition  in  the  Hebrew  Bible.  The  general  view 
that  there  is  a  sceptical  tradition  in  the  Hebrew  Bible 
will  be  examined  first,  followed  by  an  examination  of 
Dell's  book  Job  as  Sceptical  Literature.  A  critical 
assessment  of  these  views  will  then  follow. 
By  way  of  the  synoptic  overview  of  scepticism,  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that,  while  not  in  any  formal  sense, 
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Bible,  or  in  most  literature  of  any  age  or  culture  for  that 
matter.  As  Annas  and  Barnes  point  out: 
Everyone  is  a  sceptic  on  some  issues,  for  there 
are  numerous  questions  on  which,  temporarily  at 
least,  we  cannot  make  up  our  minds  and  over  which 
we  suspend  judgment.  Sceptical  philosophers 
extend,  generalise,  and  systematise  that 
ordinary  attitude.  48 
Scepticism  seems  to  be  quite  universal,  and  therefore,  one 
should  expect  to  find  scepticism  in  the  Hebrew  Bible. 
A.  General  Views  of  a  Sceptical  Tradition  in 
the  Hebrew  Bible 
Crenshaw,  Davidson,  Dell,  Dillon,  Pedersen  and  Priest  have 
all  argued  for  the  existence  of  a  sceptical  tradition  in 
the  Hebrew  Bible. 
In  1895,  Dillon  wrote  a  book  called  The  Sceptics  of 
the  Old  Testament:  Job,  Kohel  e  th,  Agur.  49  He  argues  that 
Job  and  Qoheleth  are  two  Hebrew  books  which  'deal 
exclusively  with  philosophical  problems  ';  50  and  these  books 
only  got  into  the  Jewish  and  Christian  canons 
...  solely  on  the  strength  of  passages  which 
the  authors  of  these  compositions  never  saw,  and 
which  flatly  contradict  the  main  issues  of  their 
works.  51 
These  points  are  probably  debatable  in  the  light  of  modern 
wisdom  scholarship.  Dillon  argues  that  Job,  in  its  poetic 
style,  constitutes  an  adequate  utterance  to  abstract 
thought;  but  Qoheleth  requires  extensive  source  criticism 
to  unclutter  the  author's  philosophy,  which  was  heavily 
influenced  by  Buddha,  and  the  book's  sceptically  ideal 
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Sayings  of  Agur,  on  the  other  hand,  'tell  their  own 
interesting  story,  without  need  of  note  or  commentary'  :  52 
they  are  a  humourous  and  bitter  satire  which  are  sceptical 
of  the  theology  of  his  day. 
Pedersen,  later  in  1930,  argued  for  Scepticisme 
israelite;  and  indeed,  Qoheleth  was  the  first  reference  in 
his  opening  line. 
En  Israel,  le  scepticisme  a  un  representant 
caracteristique:  c'est  l'auteur  de  l'Ecclesiaste. 
...  L'Ecclesiaste  est  un  traite  qui  consiste  en 
reflexions  sur  l'existence.  Aussi  est-il  classe 
parmi  les  livres  sapientiaux.  Bien 
qu'appartenant  ainsi  a  une  categorie  connue  de  la 
litterature  israelite,  il  presente  cependant  un 
caractere  special.  53 
('In  Israel,  scepticism  has  a  representative  character:  it 
is  the  author  of  Ecclesiastes.  ...  Ecclesiastes  is  a 
treatise  that  consists  of  reflections  on  existence.  It  is 
also  classified  among  sapiential  books.  That  it  belongs, 
thus,  to  a  well  known  category  of  Israelite  literature,  it 
presents,  however,  a  special  character  [i.  e., 
scepticism]'). 
Priest  argues  that  Israel  always  had  a  sceptical 
tradition. 
I  suspect  that  there  was  an  informal  kind  of 
skepticism  operative  at  all  stages  of  Israel's 
history  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  formal, 
intellectual  articulation  does  indeed  come  after 
the  Exile.  54 
He  is,  however,  cautious  not  to  define  the  philosophy  found 
in  the  Hebrew  Bible  as  measured  by  the  canons  of  Aristotle. 
Priest  adopts  Berger'S55  definition  of  scepticism  which  is: 
...  an  intellectually  articulated  challenge 
to  the  ultimate  legitimations  of  society;  that 
is,  a  radical  questioning  of  the  religious, 
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which  society  rests.  56 
This  is  certainly  consistent  with  the  previous  discussion 
of  the  basic  ideas  of  sceptical  philosophy.  Priest  further 
adds  that  the  author  of  Ecclesiastes,  unlike  the  Book  of 
Job  which  he  also  views  as  sceptical  literature  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible, 
... 
is  not  just  setting  forth  a  private  view, 
a  personal  memoir,  but  is  projecting  what  he 
intends  to  be  a  public  philosophy,  and  one  which 
deals  both  with  the  lack  of  correspondence 
between  the  principles  of  Israelite  thought  and 
the  phenomena  of  life 
.... 
57 
Job,  according  to  Priest,  is  one  man's  private  struggle 
with  the  inconsistencies  between  his  theology  and  his  life 
experiences  which  contradict  his  view  of  God;  Ecclesiastes 
is  meant  to  represent  a  public  protest,  and  this  may  be 
supported  by  the  epilogue  of  Qoheleth. 
The  idea  of  a  lack  of  correspondence  between 
traditional  thought  and  reality  is  a  theme  which  Crenshaw 
picks  up  on  and  develops  even  further  than  Priest.  58  But 
Crenshaw  goes  on  to  argue  against  three  theses  put  forward 
by  von  Rad  and  Pedersen,  namely: 
1.  Scepticism  signifies  a  burnt-out  culture.  59 
2.  Scepticism  is  an  elitist  phenomenon.  60 
3.  Scepticism  resulted  from  historical  crises.  61 
While  Crenshaw  acknowledges  the  above  as  'half  truths',  he 
puts  the  following  alternatives  forward:  One,  scepticism 
belongs  to  Israel's  thought  from  early  times;  two,  it 
extends  far  beyond  the  intelligensia;  and  three,  it  springs 
from  two  fundamentally  different  sources:  theological  and 
epistemological. 136 
Crenshaw  uses,  to  support  his  thesis  that  scepticism 
belongs  to  Israel's  thought  from  early  times,  a  number  of 
texts  and  characters.  Of  course,  the  dating  of  such 
material  is  always  in  question.  He  nevertheless  cites,  as 
some  examples  of  the  first  thesis,  Is.  5.19;  Zeph.  1.12; 
Judg.  6.11-13;  13.18;  Ex.  3.14  and  Jer.  23.23;  44.15-19. 
All  of  these  texts  express  scepticism  concerning  either 
YHWH's  desire  to  reveal  his  good  pleasure  or  his  ability  to 
make  it  happen.  In  the  case  of  Gideon  (Judg.  6.13),  the 
use  of  the  interrogative  expresses  the  scepticism: 
Pray,  sir,  if  the  LORD  is  with  us,  why  then 
has  all  this  befallen  us?  And  where  are  all 
his  wonderful  deeds  which  our  fathers  recounted 
to  us  ...? 
Crenshaw  states  that  the  interrogative  mood  threatened  to 
swallow  up  the  divine  imperative.  God  is  forever  shrouded 
in  mystery,  as  evidenced  in  his  elusive  response  to  Moses' 
request  for  his  name,  and  as  such  emphasises  his 
transcendent  aloofness.  Creaturely  finitude  and  God's 
infinity  make  for  a  disparate  situation  of  which  Crenshaw 
says: 
Given  these  two  extraordinary  facts,  a  God  who 
hides  and  creatures  who  are  dependent, 
skepticism's  appearance  in  Israel  was  no  great 
surprise.  62 
Crenshaw  then  argues  his  second  thesis,  that 
scepticism  was  not  the  sole  property  of  the  intelligensia 
but  that  it  enjoyed  popular  support.  This  is  based 
primarily  in  the  intrinsic  nature  of  scepticism;  though 
Crenshaw  never  defines  this  'intrinsic  nature'.  What  he 
appears  to  mean,  is  that  scepticism  was  just  too  pervasive 
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he  offers  no  proof  of  this  'wide  spread'  phenomenon,  and 
nor  can  he  do  so  on  the  basis  that  much  of  the  Hebrew  Bible 
contains  the  elitist  ideology  of  the  ruling  classes  and  not 
the  opinions  of  the  common  man;  63  though,  as  McKane  points 
out,  they  occasionally  seep  in.  64  Granted,  it  can  be 
argued,  as  Crenshaw  does,  that  'it  can  hardly  be  denied 
that  many  of  them  [the  prophets]  protested  against  bogus 
promises';  65  but  then  again,  prophetic  literature  may 
represent  the  elitist  views  of  the  biblical  authors  and  not 
necessarily  the  common  man  -  and  it  is  not  at  all  clear  how 
this  argument  supports  his  second  thesis.  Crenshaw  may  be 
on  more  stable  ground  when  he  cites  the  Psalms  as  evidence 
of  popular  scepticism  on  the  basis  that  they  represent  a 
much  larger  worshipping  community  vis-a-vis  the  Torah  or 
Prophets. 
...  the  very  articulation  of  skeptical  views 
satisfies  a  need  for  honesty  on  the  part  of  the 
worshiping  community.  66 
Again,  he  appeals  to  the  use  of  the  interrogative  in  the 
Psalms  that  questions  God's  justice  in  the  light  of 
evidence  to  the  contrary,  which  in  turn,  indicates 
scepticism  on  their  behalf.  Finally,  Crenshaw  argues  that 
Ben  Sirah  is  evidence  of  a  wisdom  tradition  seriously 
challenged  or  threatened  by  scepticism,  and  in  turn,  Ben 
Sirah's  influence  on  the  author  of  the  Wisdom  of  Solomon  is 
evidenced  in  the  book's  statement  that  scepticism  'renders 
one  incapable  of  receiving  divine  revelation  (1:  2)'.  67  In 
essence,  according  to  Crenshaw,  both  books  are  apologies 
for  dogmatic  traditional  theology  vis-a-vis  'pop 
scepticism'. 138 
Crenshaw's  last  thesis,  scepticism  flowed  from  two 
separate  streams  (theological  and  epistemological),  is 
supported  by  the  ideas  that  the  former  indicates  a  lack  of 
faith  in  God  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  latter  a  lack  of 
faith  in  human  beings  on  the  other.  According  to  Crenshaw, 
much  of  Israel's  historical  and  confessional  literature 
(mostly  Yahwistic)  set  up  an  unbearable  tension  between 
God's  supposed  great  deeds  and  the  harsh  reality  of  human 
corruption.  Crenshaw  says  the  Book  of  Deuteronomy  was 
written  in  order  to  reduce  Israelite  grandiose  national 
hopes  to  one  of  individual  responsibility,  and  thus, 
putting  the  blame  for  any  inconsistencies  squarely  on 
humanity.  The  wisdom  literature,  then,  emphasised  God's 
transcendence  and  sovereignty  with  human  epistemological 
limitations  -  which  may  have  had  the  purpose  to  bring 
relief  to  wide  spread  scepticism  by  encouraging  'surrender' 
to  God's  mercy  rather  than  struggling  with  the  issues. 
But,  in  fact,  it  had  the  opposite  effect  as  evidenced  in 
the  apologies  of  Psalm  37  ('who  never  saw  the  righteous 
forsaken  or  his  descendants  begging  bread')  and  the 
rewriting  of  history  in  Chronicles.  In  conclusion, 
Crenshaw  asks: 
What,  then,  did  these  skeptics  accomplish? 
Precisely  this:  they  inscribed  a  huge  question 
mark  over  that  first  great  revolution  in  human 
thinking,  and  they  turned  the  spotlight  upon  the 
cognitive  act.  That  is,  they  refused  to  take 
confessional  statements  concerning  divine 
control  of  human  events  at  face  value,  and  they 
insisted  that  boasts  about  human  ingenuity  also 
be  taken  cum  grano  salis.  68 
This  is  essentially  Crenshaw'  s  view  of  scepticism  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible;  but  many  of  his  arguments  need  to  be 139 
questioned  and  critiqued,  and  this  will  take  place  in  the 
next  section. 
Davidson  too  lends  support  to  the  thesis  that  there  is 
a  sceptical  tradition  in  the  Hebrew  Bible,  albeit  in  not  so 
many  words,  in  his  book  The  Courage  to  Doubt.  69  Davidson 
links  doubt  with  faith  to  form  a  dialectical,  which  he 
perceives  to  found  be  in  many  parts  of  the  Hebrew  Bible. 
Doubt  is  intrinsic  to  scepticism,  and  Davidson  does  support 
the  idea  of  the  cathartic  effect  of  scepticism  to  much  of 
the  traditional  material  of  the  Hebrew  Bible;  a  theme  which 
he  explores  further  in  his  1990  book  Wisdom  and  Worship.  70 
Along  with  doubt,  the  interrogative  is  the  most  commonly 
used  form  for  expressing  doubt  or  scepticism.  It  is 
Davidson's  pervasive  study  of  doubt  and  questioning  that 
runs  throughout  the  two  above  books,  and  his  many  textual 
examples  (too  many  to  be  explored  here),  that  lend  support 
to  the  claim  that  there  is  a  sceptical  tradition  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible:  the  main  examples  come  from  the  Patriarchal 
Narratives,  the  Moses  Traditions  and  the  Prophetic 
Traditions.  Davidson  follows  along  Crenshaw's  lines  above 
when  he  argues  that  the  literary  purpose  of  Deuteronomistic 
tradition  was  to  provide  an  idealistic  background  to 
Israel's  history  which  squarely  put  the  blame  for  all  their 
woes  on  themselves  failing  to  meet  YHWH's  ideals.  Unlike 
Crenshaw,  however,  Davidson  perceives  that  in  this  attempt 
the  Deuteronomistic  tradition  perhaps  raised,  or  left 
unanswered,  many  questions,  e.  g.,  why  was  Manasseh,  the 
arch  evil  king  (II  Kgs.  21.1-18),  allowed  to  die  peacefully 
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the  good  king  Josiah  cut  down  by  the  sword  at  39,  if  the 
concept  of  divine  retribution  is  true?  71  Davidson  further 
argues,  in  Job,  that  the  use  of  rhetorical  questions,  both 
on  behalf  of  Job  and  God,  induce  intrinsic  doubt  from 
whatever  side  of  the  argument  one  finds  oneself,  i.  e.,  even 
the  rhetorical  questions  of  God  do  not  alleviate  the 
problems  of  the  mysteries  of  God  and  life:  they  may  in  fact 
compound  them.  72  Finally,  Davidson  makes  extensive  use  of 
the  Psalms,  again  with  the  evidence  of  much  questioning,  to 
support  the  case  for  a  sceptical  tradition  in  the  Hebrew 
Bible.  73 
If  one  accepts  the  definition  for  scepticism  of  this 
thesis,  'that  disposition  which  attacks  dogmatic  assertions 
(of  truth  or  absolute  knowledge)  with  doubt  and  questions', 
then  quite  clearly  there  are  a  number  of  texts  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible  which  express  scepticism,  including  Qoheleth. 
B.  Dell  on  Job  as  Sceptical  Literature 
The  above  general  views  find  additional,  detailed  support 
for  a  sceptical  tradition  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  in  Dell's 
impressive  work  Job  as  Sceptical  Literature  (originally  her 
Ph.  D.  thesis  at  oxford).  Dell's  book  is  essentially  a  form 
critical  analysis  of  Job.  Dell's  main  thesis  is  that  the 
overall  genre  of  Job  is  sceptical  literature;  which  she 
would  also  ascribe  to  Qoheleth. 
There  are,  however,  a  number  of  subtheses  which  build 
or  lead  up  to  her  main  thesis.  She  argues,  for  example, 
that 141 
...  the  form  of  Job  expresses  the  author's 
scepticism  just  as  much  as  its  overt  content  and 
that  the  relation  of  form  to  content  and  context 
is  a  crucial  key  for  understanding  the  book.  74 
In  addition,  Dell  argues  that  the  literary  structure  and 
essentially  unity  of  the  book  (whether  by  the  author  and  or 
editors)  makes  the  contradictions  in  the  book  a  vital  part 
for  interpreting  the  forms  and  message  of  Job  [i.  e., 
hermeneutical  clues].  75  As  she  wisely  points  out,  however, 
'the  interpretation  of  the  message  of  Job  is  inextricably 
bound  up  with  literary-critical  conclusions':  76  if  one  does 
not  accept  the  contradictions  as  intrinsic  to  the  literary 
structure  of  the  book,  then  one  will  need  to  explain  them 
away  by  declaring  them  editorial  intrusions  -  either  as 
glosses  or  correctives  to  heretical  ideas;  if  one  accepts 
them  as  an  intrinsic  part  of  the  book,  then  one  will  have 
to  deal  with  their  literary  implications  -  and  this  is  what 
Dell  does. 
Dell  goes  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  the  author  of  Job 
was  part  of  a  sceptical  tradition  (or  group)  which  was 
outside  of  traditional  wisdom  circles  in  Israel  -  and  that 
Job  does  not,  therefore,  constitute  wisdom  literature.  77 
Dell's  treatment  of  the  various  main  critical 
interpretations  of  Job  reflects  the  above  mentioned 
literary  critical  conclusions.  The  first  interpretation, 
Job  the  Innocent  Sufferer,  emphasises  the  prologue  and 
epilogue  to  the  story.  The  second  interpretation,  Job  is  a 
book  on  divine  retribution,  emphasises  the  dialogue  section 
of  the  book.  The  third  interpretation,  the  nature  of  God 
and  man's  relationship  with  him,  emphasises  the  God 
speeches  in  the  book.  The  fourth  interpretation,  Job  as 142 
Protest,  emphasises  the  Job  speeches  in  the  book.  Each 
literary  critical  conclusion  (predisposition)  alters  the 
emphasis  and  interpretation  of  the  Book  of  Job.  Thus,  Dell 
concludes  that 
...  the  quest  to  find  a  central,  unifying 
message  in  Job  in  order  to  make  sense  of  its 
various  themes  and  different  parts  both  in 
relation  to  each  other  and  to  the  whole  has 
proved  largely  fruitless.  Perhaps  the  book 
is  just  an  accidental  jumble  of  literary  forms 
and  themes,  of  parts  written  at  different  times 
and  of  misinterpretation  by  subsequent  editors.  78 
After  investigating  the  overall  genre  for  Job,  Dell  further 
concludes  that  in  terms  of  form,  content  and  context, 
interpreters  fall  into  one  or  more  of  two  'pitfalls':  79 
1.  The  assumption  that  the  overall  genre  of  Job  is 
the  most  predominant  'smaller'  genre. 
2.  Deciding  the  overall  genre  before  studying  the 
smaller  genres  which  make  up  the  whole: 
a)  formal  considerations  foremost, 
b)  considerations  of  content  and  meaning 
foremost. 
The  implications  of  these  are  that  while  there  are  many 
identifiable  smaller  forms  or  genres  in  Job,  it  is 
difficult  to  ascertain  an  overall  genre  for  the  book. 
This  may  be  a  deliberate  move  on  the  part  of  the 
author  of  Job.  Perhaps  in  order  to  demonstrate 
the  fully  radical  nature  of  the  book,  it  was 
made  to  defy  traditional  ideas  in  its  content 
and  to  follow  no  one  traditional  genre  in  its 
form.  80 
However  questionable  these  considerations  may  be,  they  will 
not  dissuade  Dell  from  her  own  quest  to  find  unifying 
factor,  genre,  and  interpretation  of  the  Book  of  Job. 143 
Dell  argues  that  the  overall  genre  of  Job  is  parody. 
She  compares  the  subgenres  of  Job  with  the  deliberate 
misuse  of  forms  essential  to  the  genre  of  parody. 
Traditional  forms  from  legal,  cultic  and  wisdom 
spheres  are  deliberately  misused  by  the  author 
to  convey  his  scepticism.  81 
The  setting  or  context  is  what  determines  the 
interpretation  or  meaning  of  a  genre,  and  in  the  case  of 
Job,  the  misuse  of  the  smaller  traditional  forms  and  a 
radical  questioning  of  the  content  of  wisdom  circles  (order 
of  the  world;  ambiguity  of  events  and  the  meaning  of  life; 
punishment  and  reward;  life  is  the  supreme  good;  confidence 
in  wisdom;  personification  of  wisdom82).  Dell  defines 
'misuse  of  forms'  as 
...  referring  to  a  traditional  form  being  used 
with  a  different  content  and  context  and  thus 
having  a  different  function; 
.... 
83 
An  example  of  this  is  where  the  author  of  Job  misuses  the 
form  of  lament  in  order  to  parody  it  (6.8-10;  cf.  Ps.  55.6- 
8),  or  the  misuse  of  wisdom  content  like  the  positive 
affirmation  of  life  (3.11-26;  cf.  Ps.  88.4-5).  84  Dell 
further  argues,  with  specific  reference  to  the  dialogue 
section  of  3-31,  that  there  is  an  overall  pattern  in  the 
misuse  of  forms:  whereas  the  friends  use  traditional  forms, 
Job  misuses  traditional  forms  because  he  is  countering  the 
traditional  propositions.  85 
Dell  argues  that  Qoheleth  is  also  sceptical  literature 
and  then  uses  a  comparison  between  Job  and  Qoheleth  in  the 
misuse,  or  rather  more  properly  'reuse'  (in  Qoheleth),  of 
forms  to  support  her  argument  for  the  misuse  of  forms  in 144 
Job.  86  Dell  defines  'reuse'  of  forms  as  a  form  which 
retains 
... 
its  form  and  content  but  being  placed  in 
a  different  context  and  with  a  different 
function-87 
She  says  that  like  Job,  it  has  been  an  elusive  task  to 
assign  an  overall  genre  to  Qoheleth.  There  are,  however, 
the  same  misuse  of  smaller  forms  (subgenres)  in  the  book 
which  indicate  scepticism  on  the  part  of  the  author. 
Unlike  the  author  of  Job  who  stands  outside  traditional 
wisdom  circles  and  misuses  traditional  forms,  the  author  of 
Qoheleth  tends  to  reuse  traditional  forms  which  indicates 
that  he  operates  from  within  traditional  wisdom  circles. 
Qoheleth,  nevertheless,  expressed  his  scepticism  by,  for 
example,  reusing  traditional  wisdom  sayings  as  in  7.1-7. 
Qoheleth  also  reused  the  traditional  form  of  instruction  by 
providing  additional  comments  which  modify  or  question  the 
premises  of  traditional  wisdom,  e.  g.,  the  use  of  a 
rhetorical  question  in  7.13  which  calls  into  question  the 
premise  of  efficacy  of  wisdom  to  undo  what  God  has  done, 
followed  by  a  commentary  to  accept  one's  lot  and  ignorance 
in  life  in  7.14.  The  third  form  Qoheleth  reused,  which 
Dell  argues  is  largely  confined  to  Qoheleth  alone,  is  that 
of  reflection.  Qoheleth,  however,  used  these  reflections 
(which  contain  numerous  other  subgenres  such  as  sayings, 
rhetorical  questions,  quotations)  in  order  to  contradict 
traditional  wisdom,  e.  g.,  8.12-13  is  negated  in  the  overall 
framework  of  8.11-14.  As  Dell  rightly  points  out: 
Much  of  Qoheleth's  protesting  nature  comes 
therefore  from  the  unusual  features  of  his  own 
style  in  which  forms  are  placed  in  a  new  context, 
a  technique  perhaps  best  described  as  a  reuse  of w 
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forms  since  the  content  of  the  forms  remains  the 
same  (both  content  and  context  have  to  be 
changed  to  constitute  a  misuse  of  forms).  88 
Dell  argues  that  either  Job  is  a  sui  generis  of 
disparate  forms  which  cannot  be  assigned  an  overall  genre 
or  Job  represents  a  parody  of  tradition  wisdom  literature. 
Dell  relates  a  number  of  definitions  of  'parody'  but  more 
closely  aligns  to  Johnson's  definition: 
.a 
kind  of  writing  in  which  the  words  of  an 
author  or  his  thoughts  are  taken  and  by  a  slight 
change  adapted  to  some  new  purpose.  89 
In  the  case  of  Job,  it  is  a  parody  of  the  folk  tale 
...  since  a  new  content  is  given  to  a 
traditional  tale  thereby  spoiling  the  original 
and  'parodying'  the  original  form.  90 
Parody  is  sceptical,  according  to  Dell,  because  of  its 
misuse  of  forms  and  protesting  nature.  91  Job  thus 
represents  sceptical  literature  towards  traditional  wisdom 
in  Israel.  Dell  admits,  however,  that  recognising  parody 
largely  depends  on  proximity  to  the  context  in  which  it  is 
used.  92  This  may  prove  to  be  problematic  for  Dell,  as  the 
next  section  will  show. 
Dell  argues  that  Job  is  the  product  of  a  philosophical 
'group',  perhaps  with  an  affinity  to  the  Greek  sceptics, 
and  this  is  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  kinds  of 
questions  the  author  asks  and  his  familiarity  with 
traditional  wisdom  in  Israel.  93  Yet,  because  this  group 
attacked  the  dogmatism  of  traditional  wisdom  in  Israel, 
Dell  postulates  that  their  origin  may  have  arisen  out  of  a 
crisis  in  wisdom  which  thus  stepped  outside  of  traditional 
wisdom  in  Israel. 146 
Dell  then  uses  the  content  of  the  Book  of  Job  to 
support  her  main  thesis  in  two  parts:  the  overall  genre  of 
Job  is  parody  (a  misuse  of  the  traditional  form  of  the  folk 
tale);  and  as  parody  represents  the  overarching  genre  of 
sceptical  literature  in  ancient  Israel. 
According  to  Dell,  the  character  of  Job  is  indicative 
of  the  sceptical  content  of  the  book:  Job  is  sceptical  of 
many  traditional,  dogmatic  propositions,  e.  g., 
impossibility  of  'innocent  suffering'  (just  deserts), 
divine  retribution,  theodicy,  the  knowability  of  God.  94 
The  scepticism  of  the  author  of  the  book,  however,  is  also 
represented  in  the  literary  structure  of  the  book.  This 
scepticism  is  manifest  in  the  way  in  which  the  author 
raises  issues 
...  to  which  he  deliberately  does  not  supply 
an  answer  and  by  his  juxtaposition  of  different 
sections  of  the  book  and  themes.  ...  which 
appear  to  be  inconsistent  but  in  fact  display 
irony  and  sceptical  intent.  95 
Dell  is  aware  that  the  prologue/epilogue  and  the  dialogues, 
as  well  as  the  Elihu  and  YHWH  speeches,  et  al.,  might  well 
come  from  different  sources,  96  but  argues  that  the  final 
redactor  so  structured  the  book  to  form  a  parody  which 
expressed  scepticism  towards  traditional  wisdom.  The 
book's  prologue  and  epilogue  are  fitted  in  the  literary 
structure  in  order  to  set  up  a  traditional  folk  tale.  The 
traditional  folk  tale,  however,  is  turned  on  its  head  by 
the  many  ironies  conveyed  in  its  juxtaposition  with  the 
dialogues  and  YHWH  speech,  and  the  ironies  conveyed  in  the 
smaller  parts  such  as  Job's  reply  to  the  YHWH  speech.  Dell 
might  have  added  the  ironic  twists  evidenced  in  the r, 
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contrast  of  the  two  characters  of  Job  in  the  folk  tale  (1- 
2)  and  the  dialogue  (3-31). 
Dell's  work  in  Job  as  Sceptical  Literature  is  an 
impressive  treatment  of  the  use  of  forms,  content  and 
literary  structure  to  convey  irony  and  scepticism.  It  is, 
however,  not  without  question  and  above  criticism  at 
certain  points. 
4.  CRITICAL  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  VIEW  THERE  IS  A 
SCEPTICAL  TRADITION  IN  THE  HEBREW  BIBLE 
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  critically  assess  the 
view  that  there  is  a  sceptical  tradition  in  the  Hebrew 
Bible. 
A.  General  Views  of  a  Sceptical  Tradition  in 
the  Hebrew  Bible 
While  there  are  a  number  of  scholars  who  postulate 
scepticism  in  the  Hebrew  Bible,  this  does  not  necessarily 
make  it  so.  Dillon's  work  is  the  product  of  its  age  and 
reflects  a  rather  romantic  view  of  its  biblical  criticism 
and  the  wisdom  literature.  His  assertions  about  Qoheleth 
being  influenced  by  Buddhism  is  an  example  of  uncritical 
scholarship,  which  modern  wisdom  studies  would  dismiss  as 
implausible  given  the  historical  and  geographical  problems 
involved,  and  the  subjective  nature  of  these  types  of 
comparisons.  The  fact  that  Dillon  can  so  easily  identify 
the  Sayings  of  Agur  as  sceptical  is  another  example  of 
uncritical  scholarship. 148 
The  Sayings  of  Agur  in  Proverbs  30  are  the  source  of 
academic  debate  as  to  their  literary  nature:  Are  they  piety 
or  scepticism?  Franklyn  took  up  this  debate  in  1983  and 
argued  for  piety  in  Prov.  30.1-9,  largely  on  the  basis  of 
form  and  content  of  the  material.  The  matter,  however,  is 
not  as  straightforward  as  either  Dillon  or  Franklyn  would 
argue. 
The  main  problem  with  trying  to  interpret  the  Sayings 
of  Agur  as  scepticism  or  piety  is  the  fact  that  there  is  no 
evidence  to  indicate  what  their  context  or  redactional 
history  were.  Were  they  a  debate  between  a  sceptic  (1-4) 
and  a  believer  (5-9);  97  or,  as  McKane  suggests,  not  a 
dialogue  at  all?  98  The  problematics  of  recovering  the 
context  of  the  Sayings  of  Agur  means,  that  on  face  value, 
the  indicative  nature  of  the  sayings  and  the  positive 
response  induced  by  the  rhetorical  questions,  must  be 
viewed  as  piety  not  scepticism  (with  the  exception  of  v.  3 
which  has  the  above  mentioned  characteristics  of 
scepticism99);  though  obviously  one  could  criticise  them  as 
untrue,  naive  or  ridiculous.  Nevertheless,  this  brief 
discussion  on  some  of  the  problematics  of  exegeting  the 
Sayings  of  Agur  demonstrates  the  complexities  of  the  issues 
in  interpreting  scepticism  in  the  Hebrew  Bible. 
Priest's  idea  that  Qoheleth  was  not  setting  forth  a 
private  view  but  a  public  philosophy  can  only  be  based  in 
the  information  found  in  the  epilogue  of  the  book;  and  that 
is  almost  universally  accepted  as  an  editorial  addition 
(with  the  exception  of  Fox).  It  is  questionable,  moreover, 
whether  or  not  Israel  put  forth  any  literature  which  has  a 149 
philosophy  per  se;  and  this  is  a  contradiction  within 
Priest's  own  argument  that  any  philosophy  found  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible  cannot  be  measured  against  the  canons  of 
Aristotle,  i.  e.,  a  proper  philosophical  construct.  Indeed, 
it  must  be  admitted  that  Israel  did  put  forth  philosophical 
ideas,  like  scepticism,  but  certainly  not  in  any  formal 
sense  as  the  Greeks  did  in  their  philosophical  tradition; 
to  say  that  Qoheleth  did  would  then  be  inappropriate. 
Crenshaw  can  be  challenged  on  a  number  of  points  that 
he  wants  to  make  about  scepticism  in  his  article  'The  Birth 
of  Skepticism  in  Ancient  Israel'.  For  example,  he  is 
mistaken  when  he  talks  of  'syntactical'  moods  (p.  3);  for 
these  are  not  'syntactical'  moods  but  'grammatical'  moods: 
syntax  has  to  do  with  the  order  of  words  in  a  sentence, 
e.  g.,  proper  English  syntax  is  subject,  verb,  direct 
object,  indirect  object;  and  mood  has  to  do  with,  as 
O.  M.  E.  D.  correctly  points  out: 
n.  Gram.  1a  form  or  set  of  forms  of  a  verb 
serving  to  indicate  whether  it  is  to  express 
fact,  command,  wish,  etc.  (subjunctive  mood)  . 
100 
Crenshaw  is  following  Priest  here;  but  Priest  rightly  uses 
the  term  'grammatical'  moods  . 
101 
Crenshaw  may  also  be  misleading  when  he  says  that  in 
the  ancient  Near  East,  and  Babylonia  specifically,  a  lack 
of  eschatology  created  the  most  pessimistic  civilization 
in  history'  (p.  8).  As  Carroll  points  out,  in  his  book 
When  Prophecy  Failed:  Reactions  and  Responses  to  Failure  in 
the  Old  Testament  Prophetic  Traditions,  Israel's 
apocalyptic  tradition  may  have  been  a  corporate 
manifestation  of  cognitive  dissonance  whereby  the  failed 150 
prophecies  of  her  prophetic  tradition  were  deferred  to  a 
later  period  in  order  to  cope  with  the  psychological  and 
emotional  trauma  caused  by  the  disparity  between  the  ideal 
and  reality.  102 
Davidson  provides  a  substantial  case  for  scepticism  in 
ancient  Israel.  The  elements  of  doubt  and  questioning  are 
essential  to  scepticism  -  and  Davidson  makes  a  sustained 
case,  throughout  his  two  books  The  Courage  to  Doubt  and 
Wisdom  and  Worship,  for  doubt  and  questioning  being  a 
formidable  part  of  the  Hebrew  Bible  tradition.  Davidson  is 
particularly  brilliant  on  two  points:  one,  that  the 
rewriting  of  history  in  ancient  Israel  raised,  or  left 
unanswered,  many  more  questions  than  it  answered;  and  two, 
that  in  the  Book  of  Job,  the  use  of  rhetorical  questions  of 
YHWH  in  chapters  38-41,  accentuate  the  mystery  of  God 
rather  than  alleviating  it.  In  addition,  the  use  of 
questions  (a  standard  idea  and  form  of  scepticism)  in  the 
Psalms  lends  weight  to  the  argument  that  scepticism  can  be 
found  in  the  Hebrew  Bible. 
B.  Dell  on  Job  as  Sceptical  Literature 
While  in  many  ways  Dell's  work  is  impressive,  there  are  a 
number  of  questionable,  if  not  fundamental,  flaws  in  her 
treatment  of  Job  as  Sceptical  Literature. 
Dell  operates  from  certain  presuppositions,  namely, 
certain  literary  critical  conclusions  and  a  single  author, 
or  perhaps  more  correctly  redactor,  for  the  book  (p.  107). 
If  her  presuppositions  are  correct,  then  it  follows  that 151 
her  subtheses  will  add  up,  e.  g.,  that  the  contradictions  in 
the  book  have  a  vital  part  in  interpreting  the  book.  If 
they  are  not,  then  her  subtheses  will  fall  to  the  wayside, 
e.  g.,  that  the  contradictions  are  actually  intrusions  to 
the  text  and  are  an  obscuring  factor  in  interpreting  the 
book.  She  has  made  a  strong  case  within  the  literary 
critical  conclusions  she  has  made  (which  is  fine  as  long  as 
one  accepts,  or  can  live  with,  her  literary  critical 
conclusions);  but  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  the  book  is 
from  a  single  redactor.  Dell  only  operates  from  this 
presupposition  (though  aware  of  the  problems)  and  therefore 
her  conclusions  must  be  treated  as  tentative. 
The  idea  that  there  was  a  'sceptical  group'  in  ancient 
Israel,  in  any  formal  sense,  seems  questionable.  The  task 
of  reconstructing  the  period  after  the  Return  is 
notoriously  difficult.  103  This  puts  Dell  on  a  slippery 
slope  for  proving  her  subthesis  that  the  author  of  Job 
stood  outside  traditional  wisdom  in  Israel  and  therefore 
Job  is  not  the  overarching  genre  of  'wisdom  literature'; 
and  may,  rather,  represent  a  circular  argument  of  the  worst 
kind.  Dell's  use  of  comparative  literature  in  the  ancient 
Near  East  (p.  168)  only  exacerbates  the  problem,  when  quite 
a  few  of  her  examples  much  antedate  the  formal  sceptical 
tradition  of  the  Greeks  and  represent  the  existence  of 
scepticism  outside  of  the  Greek  culture. 
While  Dell  argues  that  the  misuse  of  forms  (which 
includes  a  change  of  content)  and  a  change  of  context 
indicate  parody,  two  factors  must  be  considered:  one,  Job 
has  the  content  of  wisdom  circles  (order  of  the  world; 152 
ambiguity  of  events  and  the  meaning  of  life;  punishment  and 
reward;  life  is  the  supreme  good;  confidence  in  wisdom; 
personification  of  wisdom104)  ;  and  two,  if  Job  was  not 
written  to  traditional  wisdom  circles,  this  raises  more 
questions  than  it  answers.  In  genre  analysis,  as  Swales 
points  out,  genres  are  used  wi  thin  specific  communi  ties  for 
specific  communicative  purposes,  i.  e.,  people  use 
recognisable  forms  in  order  to  communicate  some  message  to 
a  specific  community.  105  Who  was  Job  written  to  then,  if 
not  to  traditional  wisdom  circles?  If  Job  was  not  written 
to  traditional  circles  (even  as  a  corrective),  whom  was  it 
written  to  (a  sceptical  philosophy  tradition  in  ancient 
Israel)?  Why  deal  with  the  same  content  of  traditional 
wisdom  circles,  if  there  is  no  message  for  them?  Dell's 
conclusion  that  Job  is  not  wisdom  literature,  therefore, 
may  be  in  question.  Of  course,  the  message  may  have  been 
for  an  outside  group  of  antagonists.  For  example,  the 
deceased  lead  singer  of  the  punk-rock  group  the  Sex 
Pistols,  Sid  Vicious,  did  a  cover  version  of  the  1960s  hit 
'My  Way'  (written  by  Paul  Anka  for  Frank  Sinatra).  The 
context  of  the  song  was  changed  to  the  anarchist  subculture 
of  the  late  1970s  and  early  80s  which  is  alien  to  the 
original  version  and  culture  of  the  song  (middle-aged  jazz 
type  fans)  ;  by  changing  the  context  (but  not  the  content!  ) 
Vicious  parodied  the  song  in  order  to  use  it  as  the  ironic 
epitome  of  the  anarchist  punk-rock  culture. 
This  may  be  analogous  with  Job  parodying  traditional 
wisdom  in  an  antagonist  camp  outside  of  wisdom  circles, 
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problem  with  this  interpretation  of  Job,  and  it  is  critical 
for  determining  the  genre  of  parody,  is  access  to  this 
context.  Anyone  old  enough  to  remember  the  original  hit 
song  'My  Way'  in  the  60s,  and  the  historical  trends  and 
phenomenon  of  the  punk-anarchist  movement  of  the  late  70s 
and  early  80s,  had  access  to  both  contexts,  and  therefore 
one  can  determine  that  Sid  Vicious'  version  of  'My  Way'  is 
indeed  a  parody  (though  the  content  remains  the  same). 
Biblical  studies,  however,  do  not  have  this  luxury  of 
immediate  access  to  context  and  therefore  Dell's  thesis 
that  Job  is  parody  and  not  wisdom  literature  can  only  ever 
be  held  tentatively. 
The  question  must  also  be  asked:  Is  the  literary  genre 
of  parody  reflective  of  scepticism  or  rejection,  i.  e., 
cynicism  ('contempt  for  ease  and  pleasure',  'disregarding 
normal  standards'  106)  ?  Parody,  moreover,  is  a  form  of 
mockery  used  to  reject  what  it  mocks  (sometimes 
humourously).  In  Sid  Vicious'  version  of  'My  Way',  Vicious 
uses  the  parody  to  reject  all  the  values  of  the  middle-aged 
jazz  oriented  culture  of  the  60s  (largely  representative  of 
the  establishment  of  that  day):  this  is  more  like  cynicism 
than  scepticism  because  it  is  an  outright  rejection  of  all 
these  values  and  not  a  doubting,  questioning  or  suspension 
of  belief  in  them. 
Dell  is  surely  wrong  when  she  argues  that  the  forms 
used  in  Job  express  the  author's  scepticism  as  much  as  the 
overt  content  and  context;  the  forms  are  simply  the  tool 
for  expressing  the  content  (message)  of  literature,  and  by 
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the  meaning  or  interpretation  of  forms  and  content,  e.  g.,  a 
legal  form  can  be  taken  indicatively,  but  when  placed  in 
the  context  of  an  unjust  situation,  may  indicate  a 
questioning  or  irony  of  the  indicativeness  of  the  legal 
form;  a  rhetorical  question  can  require  either  a  positive 
or  negative  response  depending  on  the  context;  a  joke  could 
have  a  serious  message.  The  form  is  neither  here  nor  there 
in  interpreting  the  meaning  of  its  literary  content  but 
rather  it  is  the  context  which  determines  (if  at  all 
possible)  how  the  form  is  functioning,  how  the  content  of 
the  form  is  to  be  interpreted  and  what  the  literary  intent 
of  the  form  is. 
Many  of  Dell's  examples  (pp.  121-136)  can  be 
questioned  as  to  whether  they  are  to  be  taken  indicatively 
or  as  parody  or  irony  or  just  plain  scepticism,  e.  g.,  Is 
the  hymn  in  9.5-10  really  a  parody  of  creation  hymns  like 
Ps.  104  or  Amos  5.6-9  (p.  127)  or  is  Job  simply  in 
agreement  here  with  traditional  wisdom?  Moreover,  what  if 
the  use  of  the  forms  in  Job  which  were  normative  in  ancient 
Israel  and  their  counterparts  anomalous,  i.  e.  ,  Job 
represented  the  common  man  on  the  street  and  traditional 
wisdom  an  elitist  ideology? 
Despite  a  number  of  flaws  in  Dell's  arguments,  her 
overall  conclusions  are  relatively  sound  with  regard  to  Job 
being  parody;  but  if  this  is  the  case,  Dell  should  be, 
perhaps,  arguing  for  Job  as  Cynical  Literature  not 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS  REGARDING  SCEPTICISM  AND 
A  SCEPTICAL  TRADITION  IN  THE  HEBREW  BIBLE 
The  whole  philosophy  of  scepticism,  obviously  including  its 
epistemology,  has  not  gone  without  criticism  (as  indeed 
every  philosophical  construct  should).  107  Indeed,  both 
Descartes  and  Kant's  purpose  was  in  many  ways  to  discredit 
what  they  saw  was  the  'disease'  of  scepticism;  however, 
whereas  Descartes  tried  to  completely  overthrow  scepticism, 
Kant  saw  the  importance  of  scepticism  to  the  philosophical 
task  and  was  willing  to  employ  it  to  his  own  ends 
('critical  dogmatism').  But  one  needs  to  keep  in  mind  that 
the  purpose  for  this  chapter  on  scepticism  is  not  to 
critique  it,  but  rather  to  describe  its  basic  precepts  in 
order  to  see  if  there  are  analogies  with  texts  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible  and  Qoheleth  specifically  (see  chapter  six). 
A  number  of  the  formal  aspects  of  sceptical 
methodology  are  not  relevant  to  this  study;  but  the  working 
presupposition  of  limited  epistemology  and  the  doubting  and 
questioning  spirit  are.  Indeed,  it  would  almost  seem 
impossible,  given  human  nature,  that  any  culture  could 
escape  leaving  artefacts  which  contain  essential 
scepticism. 
Certainly  no  book  or  text  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  applies, 
with  such  critical  rigour,  the  philosophical  methodology  of 
scepticism;  but  some  texts  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  definitely 
have  the  general  principles  of  scepticism  insofar  as  having 
a  doubting,  questioning  spirit  and  a  rejection  of  dogma, m 
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and  thus  are  not  identical  with,  but  analogous  to, 
scepticism. 
Dell's  point,  on  the  literary  critical  conclusions 
which  one  draws  on  Job,  are  analogous  with  what  one  does 
with  Qoheleth,  i.  e.,  whether  one  interprets  the  book  in  the 
light  of  1.2  and  12.8,  its  use  of  quotations,  poems,  and 
epilogue  or  whether  one  dissects  the  book  and  interprets  in 
pieces.  This  dissertation  has  chosen  to  do  as  Dell  does 
and  interpret  the  joy  statements  in  the  context  of  the  book 
as  one  now  has  it;  but  this  will  always  make  any 
conclusions  tentative  in  the  light  of  the  source  critical 
ace  -  and  one  should  be  sceptical  about  them.  Moreover, 
the  immediate  context  of  Job,  perhaps  as  a  play,  dialogue 
or  parody,  is  just  too  far  removed  in  time  and  space  for 
any  sound  conclusions  to  be  drawn  on  its  form  and  function; 
unlike  modern  parodies  such  as  Sid  Vicious'  version  of  'My 
Way',  where  the  immediate  context  and  inherent  irony  or 
parody  can  be  positively  identified.  Thus,  Job's  genre  and 
interpretation  must  be  viewed  as  indeterminate;  and  these 
conclusions  may  have  implications  for  any  conclusions  which 
one  may  draw  on  Qoheleth  and  the  joy  statements. 157 
CHAPTER  FIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS  OF  THE  JOY  STATEMENTS 
This  chapter  provides  a  review  of  the  three  main 
interpretations  of  the  joy  statements  adopted  by 
commentators  and  attempts  to  point  out  their  strengths  and 
weaknesses.  The  interpretations  of  the  joy  statements  were 
deliberately  deferred  to  near  the  end  of  this  dissertation 
in  order  that  critical  engagement  with  them  could  be  done 
in  the  light  of  the  information  given  in  previous  chapters. 
The  three  main  interpretations  will  be  given  (the  first  two 
being  rather  simple  and  straightforward  and  the  third  very 
complicated);  followed  by  a  critical  assessment  of  the 
arguments  which  support  them.  Finally,  some  conclusions 
will  be  drawn  concerning  the  three  main  interpretations  of 
the  joy  statements. 
The  last  chapter  of  this  dissertation  deals  with  a 
fourth  interpretation,  namely  that  the  joy  statements  are 
ambiguous  in  form,  content  and  context,  thus  either  ironic, 
sceptical,  both  or  neither;  followed  by  a  critical 
assessment  of  it. 
1.  THE  JOY  STATEMENTS  AS  EDITORIAL  GLOSSES 
The  joy  statements  may  appear  to  be  the  most  blatant 
example  of  editorial  interference  in  the  Book  of  Qoheleth; 
though  other  scholars  holding  to  the  prevalent  editorial 
activity  view,  strangely  enough,  do  not  hold  the  joy 
statements  to  be  editorial,  e.  g.,  McNeile,  Barton-1  The 158 
joy  statements  may  appear  to  be  editorial  glosses  for  the 
obvious  reason  that  they  are  so  inconsistent  with  the  dour 
mood  of  the  book  as  a  whole  and  the  specific  negative 
statements  found  therein.  Even  if  they  are  not  editorial 
interference,  a  number  of  scholars  (Barton,  Gemser, 
Humbert,  Loretz,  Plumtre,  Siegfried,  Zimmerli,  et  al.  )  view 
them  as  coming  (i.  e.,  being  influenced)  from  Egyptian, 
Babylonian  or  Greek  sources.  2 
Another,  more  basic,  reason  for  viewing  the  joy 
statements  as  editorial  glosses,  is  the  idea  that  Qoheleth 
is  the  product  (sum  total)  of  many  hands  (Siegfried  =  9: 
QR1,  QR2,  QR3,  etc.  ):  some  chasid  editors  included  the 
'pious'  elements  to  balance  out  the  book's  heterodoxy 
(Barton,  McNeile)  and  other  editors,  the  chakam,  added  the 
traditional  wisdom  material  (Barton,  Podechard).  Following 
Galling's  lead,  a  number  of  scholars  (Eissfeldt, 
Ellermeier,  Fohrer,  Hertzberg)  view  Qoheleth  to  have  a 
basic  number  of  Sentenzen,  anywhere  from  23-37,  to  which 
the  editorial  glosses  were  added;  but  again,  they  tend  not 
to  view  the  joy  statements  as  editorial. 
It  is  the  contradictory  nature  of  the  statements  or 
Sentenzen  which  lead  scholars  to  believe  that  Qoheleth  is 
the  product  of  multiple  sources  or  editorial  glosses,  with 
the  joy  statements  perhaps  representing  the  most  obvious 
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2.  THE  JOY  STATEMENTS  AS  INDICATIVE  CARPE  DIEM 
A  number  of  scholars  (Barton,  Crenshaw,  Eaton,  Ginsburg, 
Gordis)  appear  to  view  the  joy  statements  as  indicative 
carpe  diem  statements,  and  this,  on  the  basis  that  they 
represent  the  only  thing  one  can  do  in  the  light  of 
Qoheleth's  negative  discourses  on  a  variety  of  subjects. 
Barton  says  of  2.24,  that 
Qoheleth  here  states  the  conclusions  to  which 
his  various  investigations  had  led.  The  best 
thing  for  man  is  to  get  the  most  physical 
pleasure  he  can  out  of  life.  3 
Crenshaw  further  adds  on  2.24  that 
Having  concluded  that  both  wisdom  and  an 
inheritance  are  ultimately  disconcerting, 
Qohelet  offers  practical  advice  for  living 
under  the  shadow,  asserting  not  so  much  the 
goodness  of  eating  and  drinking  as  their 
relative  advantage:  not  "This  is  good,  "  but 
"There  is  nothing  better.  "4 
Despite  Crenshaw's  added  caution,  namely  that  of  the 
relative  advantage  of  enjoying  life,  the  essential  view  is 
that  the  joy  statements  are  to  be  taken,  on  face  value,  as 
indicative  carpe  diem  statements  to  enjoy  life.  This 
position  is  that  simple;  the  third  and  final  interpretation 
of  the  joy  statements  is  not. 
3.  THE  JOY  STATEMENTS  AS  PROVIDING  AN  ESSENTIAL 
MESSAGE  OF  JOY  IN  THE  BOOK  OF  QOHELETH 
There  are  a  number  of  coalescing  arguments,  or  dimensions 
of  the  basic  argument,  for  the  view  that  the  joy  statements 
provide  an  essential  message  of  joy  for  the  Book  of 
Qoheleth.  This  view  is  by  far  the  most  complicated  because 160 
it  is  based  in  more  subtle  arguments  and  a  heuristic 
process  whereby  a  number  of  scholars  have  added  to  the 
case. 
A.  General  Views  of  the  Joy  message 
Whybray,  in  his  famous  1982  article  'Qoheleth,  Preacher  of 
Joy',  seems  to  have  established  this  most  recent  trend  of 
interpreting  the  Book  of  Qoheleth  as  having  an  essential 
message  of  joy.  He  has  been  influential  in  Qoheleth 
studies  and  a  number  of  scholars  have  followed  his  lead, 
e.  g.,  Brown,  Chia,  Ogden.  One  should  note,  however,  that 
Whybray  views  the  joy  statements  as  just  one  leitmotif  of 
Qoheleth  (the  one  which  he  most  wanted  to  emphasise),  but 
not  the  only  one  or  central  thesis  to  the  book:  the 
essential  message  of  joy  interpretation  for  Qoheleth  comes 
from  followers  of  Whybray,  e.  g.,  Chia  and  Ogden. 
Of  course,  Whybray  was  not  the  first  or  only  scholar 
to  see  the  positive  value  of  the  joy  statements  in 
Qoheleth.  Indeed,  Whybray  in  many  ways  has  picked  up  on 
the  indicative  carpe  diem  interpretation,  held  by  so  many 
scholars,  and  built  upon  that.  As  early  as  1930,  Knoph 
emphasised  'The  Optimism  of  Koheleth'.  5  In  this  article, 
Knoph  argues  that  within  the  multiple  strands  running 
throughout  the  book,  a  practical  philosophy  has  been  missed 
by  interpreters  of  Qoheleth 
The  point  is,  that  too  often  the  whole  cast  of 
the  book  has  been  determined  by  certain  possible 
pessimistic  elements,  ignoring  just  as  patent 
constructive  elements.  If  it  is  to  be  a  matter 
of  choice,  at  least  it  is  permissible  to  choose 
some  strand  that  yields  the  greatest  spiritual 161 
value  and  that  better  meets  the  eternal  quest  of 
the  race  for  light.  Scientific  exegesis  does  not 
demand  validity  of  the  negative  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  positive.  6 
A  number  of  presuppositions  of  Knoph  are  in  question, 
especially  a  Greek  philosophical  background  to  Qoheleth, 
and  will  be  criticised  later;  but  the  point  is  well  taken 
that  because  a  book  may  contain  large  amounts  of  negative 
material  in  it,  it  does  not  follow  (non  sequitur)  that  this 
is  all  there  is  to  a  book.  Indeed,  this  is  the  basic 
strength  of  the  joy  interpretation:  the  joy  statements 
represent  Qoheleth's  best  advice,  even  commands  (cf.  9.7-9; 
11.8-10),  under  such  deterministically  negative 
circumstances  as  humanity  find  themselves  'under  the  sun'. 
Knoph  argues  that  Qoheleth  is  a  brilliant  rebuttal  to 
Hellenistic  assumptions,  specifically  Heraclitus,  namely 
7ýii  is  something  fixed  P  deeded')  and  in  the  context  of 
chapter  three,  the  deterministic  context  supports  optimism 
and  not  pessimism  because  of  the  steadying  influence  of 
nature  (God's  providence?  ).  'This  75M  is  what  is  left, 
out  of  all  the  vicissitudes,  of  life'  .7 
In  1982,  Whybray  took  a  specific  look  at  the  seven  joy 
statements  in  'Qoheleth,  Preacher  of  Joy': 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  re-examine 
these  seven  texts  and  their  contexts  in  an 
attempt  to  understand  their  place  in  his 
thought.  8 
Whybray  argues  that  these  seven  joy  statements  are  not 
merely  marginal  comments  or  asides,  but  that  they  punctuate 
the  whole  book  with  ever  increasing  emphasis.  He  further 
argues  that  the  contexts  of  the  joy  statements  indicate  the 
reasons  for  the  advice  to  enjoy  life.  Whybray  also  argues 162 
that  the  words  'give'  or  'gift',  with  God  as  the  giver 
(i.  e.,  the  subject  of  the  verb),  occur  with  great  frequency 
in  these  passages.  In  addition, 
Three  other  reasons  are  also  adduced:  the 
necessity  of  accepting  one's  lot,  which  is 
unchangeable  (2:  26;  3:  14;  3:  22b;  5:  18;  9:  9); 
the  brevity  of  life  (5:  17b;  9:  9b;  11:  9;  12:  1b); 
and  man's  ignorance  of  the  future  (3:  11;  3:  22b; 
8:  14).  These  apparently  depressing 
considerations  are  turned  by  Qoheleth  into 
positive  incentives  to  enjoy  all  the  more  what 
God  gives  in  the  present.  9 
Whybray  further  stresses,  in  addition  to  the  enjoyment  of 
life  being  a  gift  from  God,  that  man  must  accept  what  God 
gives.  So  the  seven  problems  to  which  the  joy  statements 
are  the  answer,  according  to  Whybray,  are:  10 
1.  The  vanity  of  toil  and  human  effort  (1:  12-2:  26). 
2.  The  vanity  of  man's  ignorance  of  the  future 
(3:  1-15). 
3.  The  vanity  of  the  presence  of  injustice  in  the 
world  (3:  16-22). 
4.  The  vanity  of  the  pursuit  of  wealth  (5:  9-19). 
5.  The  vanity  of  unpunished  wickedness  (8:  10-15). 
6.  The  vanity  of  the  fact  that  all  men  share  a  common 
fate  (9:  1-10). 
7.  The  vanity  of  the  brevity  of  human  life 
(11:  7-12:  7). 
Whybray  thus  summarises,  what  he  views  as  Qoheleth's 
conclusions,  as:  11 
1.  What  good  things  God  has  given  us  are  intended 
for  our  enjoyment,  and  in  the  giving  of  them 
he  has  shown  his  approval  of  our  actions. 
To  enjoy  them  is  actually  to  do  his  will. 
2.  We  must  accept  our  ignorance  of  God's  purposes  and 
of  the  reasons  why  he  has  permitted  evil  to  exist 
in  the  world;  and  we  must  take  life  as  we  find  it 
and  enjoy  what  we  can,  because 
a.  we  cannot  change  the  fate  which  God  has 
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b.  we  cannot  know  what  God 
c.  life  is  short  and  death 
3.  The  recognition  that  toil  is 
allotted  to  us  in  this  life, 
our  own  efforts  is  vain,  enal 
enjoyment  even  in  our  toil. 
has  in  store  for  us; 
inevitable. 
a  part  of  what  God  has 
and  that  reliance  on 
Dies  us  to  find 
Whybray  further  supports  his  conclusions,  on  the  basis  that 
in  the  overall  context  of  the  Book  of  Qoheleth,  the  many 
negative  ideas  and  statements  are  not  'a  contradiction  of 
his  positive  teaching  but  as  actually  providing  support  for 
it'.  12  While  Whybray  will  be  criticised  on  a  number  of 
points  in  the  next  section,  he  has  made  a  strong  case  which 
his  followers  have  picked  up  on  and  strengthened  his 
deficiencies. 
Chia  built  his  thesis  for  his  Ph.  D.  dissertation,  that 
Qoheleth  has  essentially  a  message  of  joy,  on  the  basis  of 
the  structure  of  Qoheleth's  'thought'  pattern  and  not  on 
the  basis  of  the  literary  structure  of  the  book.  13  Chia 
argues  that  the  fatal  flaw  of  Ogden's  thesis  is  that  he 
operates  from  a  single  thesis:  joy.  Qoheleth's  thought 
pattern  holds  hevel  and  joy  in  tension  throughout  the  book. 
Chia  attempts  to  argue  from  a  greater  degree  of  coherence 
between  the  primary  (hevel)  and  secondary  themes  (joy,  et 
al.  ) 
.  The  joy  imperatives  thus  provide  'compensation'  for 
the  hebel  statements.  14 
Lohf  ink15  adds  another  perspective  to  the  argument 
when  he  argues  that  5.17-19  actually  provides  a  two-stage 
reason  to  prove  that  joy  is  the  'gift  of  God'  quoting  5.19: 
i"ri  'r'  nm  nDr  in'ir  N5  ':  ) 
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Essentially  Lohfink  thinks  that  5.19  is  the  revelation  of 
God  to  humanity,  i.  e.,  when  human  beings  have  joy  in  their 
hearts.  In  other  words:  Just  as  God  is  revealed  in  the 
creation  and  the  word,  so  too  is  God  revealed  when  humans 
experience  joy.  The  whole  argument,  however,  is  based  on 
the  translation  of  11=M,  which  Lohfink  views  as  coming  from 
the  root  71)1i  meaning  to  'answer',  'speak  in  public', 
'reveal'  (e.  g.,  by  an  oracle).  Lohfink  implies  that  the 
LXX'  s  interpretation  o  OEog  ?  LEptaira  au-cov  £V  E'U4pomovii  KOxp8m 
avtioo  led  commentators  astray  because  the  translators 
interpreted  fM3?  Z  as  being  from  the  root  fM3II  :  'occupied', 
'busied'  (with  something).  Lohfink  then  argues  there  is  a 
strong  connection  (play  on  words)  between  1.13;  3.10  rT  II 
('toil')  and  5.19b  'MV  I  expressing  'ease  and  happiness'. 
Ultimately  Lohfink  views  5.19  as  the  revelation 
...  that  human  joy  is  a  divine  gift  just 
because  it  means  one  does  not  have  to  meditate  on 
death,  that  is,  one  does  not  have  to  exercise  the 
"fear  of  God". 
...  The  joy  of  the  heart  must  be 
something  like  divine  revelation.  16 
While  this  is  a  fascinating  interpretation,  it 
nevertheless,  is  very  problematic  for  a  number  of  reasons, 
which  will  be  given  in  the  critical  assessment. 
Brown  has  been  the  most  recent  scholar  to  endorse  the 
essential  message  of  joy  in  Qoheleth  position,  i.  e., 
'Ecclesiastes  is  a  treatise  on  joyful 
perseverance'.  17  He  argues,  following  and  adding  to 
Crenshaw,  18  that  Qoheleth's  scepticism  stems  from  a 
'heightened  degree  of  self-consciousness'  whereby  Qoheleth 
'stepped  out'  of  the  character  of  traditional  wisdom  and 
found  a  new  form  of  wisdom  which  accepts  the  absurdities  of 165 
life  and  enjoys  the  few  fleeting  moments  of  joy  it  has. 
Qoheleth's  'reconstructed  character'  lies  in  his  acceptance 
of  life's  absurdities  which  provide  an  'inner  freedom  that 
is  unassailable'  based  in  an  'interior  act  of  self- 
consciousness'.  19  This  makes  all  ambition  vain  and  joy  is 
found  in  persevering  (continuing  to  toil),  even  though  the 
joy  statements  are  '  anticlimactic'  . 
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B.  Ogden  on  Qoheleth's  Essential  Message  of  Joy 
Ogden  has  written  a  number  of  articles  and  a  commentary 
which  share  the  positive  assessment  of  the  joy  message  of 
Qoheleth.  Ogden  makes  a  specific  case  for  a  carpe  diem 
interpretation  of  the  joy  statement  in  11.7-12.8.21  The 
reality  of  death,  argues  Ogden,  is  the  basic  impetus  for 
one  to  reflect  on  life  and  thus  Qoheleth's  summons  to  the 
reader  to  enjoy  life  now  while  one  may.  The  advice  to 
'remember  the  Creator'  in  12.1,  Ogden  argues  (on  the  basis 
of  the  waw  reversive  `iDi1?  )  ,  makes 
...  clear  that  it  cannot  denote  the 
recollection  of  some  past  event  or  situation; 
on  the  contrary,  a  present  state  of  mind  with 
regard  to  the  future  is  advocated.  22 
That  point  is  debatable;  but  Ogden  nevertheless  concludes, 
on  the  basis  of  the  rhetorical  device  of  the  last  three 
pericopes  of  Qoheleth  (9.17-10.20;  11.1-6;  11.7-12.8),  23 
namely  the  twin  themes  of  reflection  and  enjoyment,  that 
...  this  rhetorical  device  enables  us  to 
grasp  the  fact  that  the  call  to  enjoyment  and 
concurrent  reflection  on  the  inevitable  future 
of  humanity  in  death,  is  indeed  the  central 
theme  of  the  book.  Qoheleth,  on  this  estimate, 
is  not  a  simple  hedonist,  but  one,  who  from  a 
standpoint  of  faith  wishes  to  confront  directly 166 
the  reality  of  human  existence  and  to  offer  the 
most  consistent  and  sagacious  advice  on  how  to 
cope  with  the  problems  of  life.  24 
Ogden  finds  support  for  this  essential  thesis  for  11.7-12.8 
in  Fredericks,  who  binds  11.1-6  with  11.7-12.8,  to  conclude 
that  Qoheleth  essentially  says  in  11.1-12.8:  'enjoy  life 
now  while  you  can,  and  such  enjoyment  should  not  avoid  wise 
labor'.  25 
Ogden  further  argues  the  essential  message  of  joy  in 
Qoheleth  in  his  1987  J.  S.  O.  T.  commentary.  Here  Ogden  fills 
in  some  of  the  gaps  of  his  previous  argument,  e.  g.,  how 
death  does  not  obliterate  any  meaning  to  life  or  enjoyment. 
Ogden  makes  a  two-pronged  attack  on  this  issue.  One,  he 
argues  that  the  term  hevel  does  not  carry  the  heavy 
negative  connotations  which  many  scholars  ascribe  to  it: 
... 
it  identifies  the  enigmatic,  the  ironic 
dimension  of  human  experience;  it  suggests  that 
life  is  not  fully  comprehensible.  It  in  no  sense 
carries  the  meaning  'vanity'  or  'meaningless'.  26 
The  former  meaning  may  be  debatable;  but  by  denying  the 
latter,  Ogden  may  be  on  a  dangerous  footing.  Ogden, 
nevertheless,  further  argues  that  the  hevel  statements  may 
represent  Qoheleth's  concluding  statements  on  life's 
experiences  but  they  are  not  his  advice;  the  joy  statements 
are  his  advice  in  the  light  of  the  hevel  conclusions.  The 
thesis  of  Qoheleth,  argues  Ogden,  is:  'life  under  God  must 
be  taken  and  enjoyed  in  all  its  mystery'.  27 
Secondly,  Ogden  argues  that  the  programmatic  question 
of  Qoheleth  is  1.3  (also  3.9;  5.15):  'What  is  man's 
advantage?  '  (f1`1ii'  iii) 
,  and  this  was  the  question  Qoheleth 
was  seeking  to  answer;  which  Ogden  concedes  the  required 
response  is:  'there  is  no  yitron-and  leading  into  the 167 
advice  that  life  as  a  gift  from  God  must  be  enjoyed'.  28 
Ogden  argues  that  there  are  only  seven  occurrences  of  1141n*f 
which  provide  a  sensible  context  from  which  to  determine 
its  meaning  (2.11,13;  3.9,19;  5.15;  6.8,11).  As  Ogden 
correctly  points  out,  j1ft)tt#  is  not  always  related  to 
'material  success',  or  what  one  gains  from  work,  and 
according  to  him,  the  first  formal  response  to  the 
programmatic  question  comes  in  2.11:  'yitron  is  not 
dependent  upon  material  success'  .  He  further  adds  that 
Even  if  one  were  to  opine  that  yitron  refers  to 
some  deep  inner  satisfaction,  which  the  wise 
might  expect,  one  would  have  to  take  into 
account  the  additional  fact  that  the  yitron 
Qoheleth  longs  to  know  is  not  to  be  found 
'under  the  sun'.  If  it  is  not  equated  with 
some  worldly,  measurable  benefit,  then  it 
probably  belongs  to  a  somewhat  different  order. 
While  undoubtedly  not  'other  worldly'  in  the  full 
sense,  Qoheleth  is  at  least  pointing  in  the 
direction  of  a  yitron  which  transcends  this 
present  earthly  experience.  ...  He  has  assigned 
it  a  metaphorical  sense  to  speak  of  that  which  is 
non-material.  29 
So  Ogden  postulates,  rather  uniquely,  that  11111'  belongs  to 
the  other  world  (afterlife).  Ogden  attempts  to  support  his 
definition  of  IV1!  1"  with  Qoheleth's  use  of  b5D,  usually 
rendered  'eternity'  (3.11:  'He  [God]  put 
&'  in  the  hearts 
of  men');  but  he  could  have  also  cited  Rabbah  Midrash 
Ecclesiastes  where  b  by  is  rendered  as  'world'  with  the 
implication  of  'love  of  this  world'  (so  too  Gordis);  but 
the  use  of  = 
,V  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  and  Qohel  e  th  are 
fraught  with  difficulties  and  this  is  not  a  sound  basis  to 
build  speculation  upon  speculation  (see  chapter  2  for 
detailed  exegesis  of  nh.  V).  Ogden  further  argues  that 
By  opting  for  the  question-form  (1.3  etc.  ), 
Qoheleth  is  indicating  that  he  cannot  prove  that 
yitron  will  be  granted  beyond  the  grave,  but  he 168 
insists  that  it  is  at  least  a  possibility,  .  The  function  of  the  word  yitron  which  Qoheleth 
coined  was  to  gather  up  all  his  hopes  that  there 
might  be  some  just  resolution  of  these  many  human 
enigmas.  30 
Ogden  argues,  on  the  basis  of  Deuteronomic  belief  in  divine 
retribution  and  the  lack  of  evidence  for  it  in  this  world, 
that  this  discrepancy  inevitably  led  to  the  question: 
Where?  Ogden  also  attempts  to  support  his  particular  view 
of  11711"  in  Qoheleth  by  arguing,  that  because  the  author 
was  limited  to  the  empirical  epistemology  of  traditional 
wisdom,  he  could  only  'intimate  his  belief'.  In  other 
words:  Qoheleth  could  not  prove  this  idea  so  he  framed  it 
in  such  a  way  as  to  indicate  his  tentativeness  by  using 
oblique  terms  or  nuances  of  connotations.  Ogden  further 
claims  that  if  his  view  of  Qoheleth's  use  of  11111"  is 
correct,  then  it  may  represent  one  of  the  earliest  stages 
of  the  theory  of  afterlife  which  was  later  accepted  in  the 
New  Testament.  This  may  be  a  circular  argument  of  the 
worst  kind  (cf.  chapter  four  for  a  positive  endorsement  of 
circular  arguments  when  properly  used). 
The  problematics  of  Ogden's  view  of  11111'  in  Qoheleth 
should  now  be  apparent  to  the  reader.  A  critical 
assessment  of  Ogden's  view  can  be  found  in  the  next 
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4.  CRITICAL  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  INTERPRETATIONS  OF 
THE  JOY  STATEMENTS 
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  critically  assess  the 
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  three  main  interpretations 
of  the  joy  statements. 
A.  The  Editorial  Gloss  Interpretation 
The  main  strength  of  the  editorial  gloss  argument  is  the 
blatant  internal  contradictions  which  the  Book  of  Qoheleth 
presents  in  the  overall  dour  mood  of  the  book.  How  can  the 
same  author  say,  on  the  one  hand,  'So  I  hated  life,  because 
the  evil  toil  under  the  sun  was  upon  me'  (2 
. 
17  a)  ,  and  on 
the  other  hand,  'There  is  nothing  better  for  a  man  than  to 
eat  and  drink,  and  show  himself  his  work  is  beneficial' 
(2.24)?  Or  what  about  the  internal  contradictions  of  some 
of  the  joy  statements  themselves:  'Enjoy  life  with  a  woman 
you  love  -  all  the  days  of  your  hevel  life  which  God  gave 
you  under  the  sun  -  all  your  hevel  days'  (9.9)?  Or 
statements  which  follow  the  joy  statements  (5.17-19):  'God 
gives  a  man  wealth,  possessions  and  honour,  so  he  lacks 
nothing  his  soul  desires;  but  God  does  not  enable  him  to 
enjoy  them,  because  a  stranger  enjoys  them  instead.  This 
too  is  hevel,  a  sick  evil'  (6.2)?  These  obvious 
contradictions  are  strong  support  for  the  editorial  gloss 
view  of  the  joy  statements. 
Added  to  this  strength  is  the  commonly  accepted  view 
that  the  Book  of  Qoheleth  is  the  product  of  many,  or  at 170 
least  some,  hands.  There  is  a  strong  case  to  be  made  for 
the  view  that  chasid  and  or  chakam  editors  attempted  to 
cover  over  or  embellish  the  heterodox  statements  in 
Qoheleth.  The  view  of  Galling  and  his  follows  also  add 
weight  to  this  sort  of  idea,  that  of  a  progressive 
redactional  development  of  the  book:  the  apparent  unity  of 
some  of  the  material  (usually  considered  negative  or 
pessimistic)  was  'corrected'  by  pious  glossators,  and  this 
therefore  explains  the  book's  contradictions  (usually 
considered  'traditional'). 
Despite  the  strengths  of  the  editorial  gloss  view, 
there  are  a  number  of  weaknesses  in  it.  First  of  all, 
there  is  no  textual  critical  evidence  which  exposes 
tampering  with  the  text  (with  the  exception  of  individual 
words);  though  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  textual 
critical  apparatus  of  B.  H.  S.  can  only  evidence,  and  even 
then  in  a  very  qualified  way,  the  transmission  of  the  text 
and  not  the  redaction  of  the  text.  The  fact  that  there  is 
very  little  evidence  of  the  history  of  redaction  of  the 
Bible  and  Qoheleth  means  that  no  one  can  really  know  for 
sure  who  is  responsible  for  what  with  regard  to  the 
individual  parts  or  statements  in  Qoheleth.  Added  to  this, 
the  growing  consensus  of  the  book's  literary  unity  based  in 
vocabulary,  syntax,  catch  phrases,  themes,  etc.,  which 
would  then  argue  against  excessive  editorial  activity; 
though  those  holding  the  essential  unity  of  the  book  do  not 
necessarily  deny  editorial  activity  (with  the  exception  of 
Fox). 171 
Secondly,  as  some  scholars  point  out  (Eaton,  Gordis): 
If  these  chasid  and  chakam  editors  attempted  to  cover  over 
or  embellish  the  heterodox  statements  in  Qoheleth,  then 
their  attempt  must  be  considered  a  failure,  for  all  they 
succeeded  in  doing  was  to  set  up,  in  acute  relief,  the 
contradictions  of  the  book  side  by  side,  which  in  turn  led 
to  the  many  opinions  regarding  Qoh  eleth's  sources, 
compositions  and  or  unity. 
it  is  very  odd  to  imagine  an  'editor'  issuing 
a  work  with  which  he  disagrees  but  adding 
extensive  notes  and  an  epilogue  to  compensate. 
Why  should  an  orthodox  writer  reproduce  a 
sceptical  book  at  all,  let  alone  add  orthodox 
glosses  to  produce  a  noticeably  mixed  bag? 
It  is  quite  conceivable  that  an  editor  sent 
out  Ecclesiastes  with  a  commendatory  note,  but 
it  is  scarcely  likely  that  anyone  would  do  this 
if  he  were  unhappy  with  the  content  of  the  work. 
...  It  is  possible  to  imagine  an  orthodox 
writer  re-writing  a  dangerous  work  in  order  to 
counteract  it;  but  if  this  were  the  case,  he  was 
singularly  unsuccessful,  for,  ex  hypothesi,  he 
left  the  'dangerous'  views  side  by  side  with  the 
orthodox  ones.  If  we  are  capable  of  noticing 
this,  surely  he  was.  31 
In  the  case  of  Ben  Sira  and  the  Wisdom  of  Solomon,  they 
represent  an  overt  attack,  if  not  on  Qoheleth  specifically, 
at  least  on  some  of  the  unorthodox  ideas  found  in  Qoheleth: 
there  is  no  need  to  rewrite  any  heterodox  work  when  one 
could  criticise  the  ideas  from  scratch  in  a  new  book. 
Thus,  these  orthodox  writers  would  not  have  to  leave  the 
'dangerous'  views  alongside  the  orthodox,  and  would  be  less 
ambiguous  and  clearer  to  readers. 
Gordis  further  adds  weight  to  these  ideas  expressed  by 
Eaton  when  he  says  that  the  so-called  Chasid  interpolations 
need  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  Qoheleth's  literary 
style,  the  spiritual  background  of  his  writing  (which  is 172 
probably  impossible  to  recover)  and  his  use  of  quotations, 
i.  e.,  Qoheleth  quotes  traditional  wisdom  in  order  to 
discuss,  reject  or  refute  it.  32  Also  in  support  of  Eaton 
(though  it  is  likely  that  Eaton  drew  from  Gordis'  work 
which  proceeded  his  own),  Gordis  argues  that  there  is  no 
reason  for  the  canonisers  to  accept  Qoheleth  into  the  canon 
when,  like  so  many  other  Apocryphal  and  Pseudepigraphal 
writings,  with  high  claims  to  Patriarchal  authorship  and 
with  much  more  orthodox  views,  were  suppressed  and  kept  out 
of  the  canon;  and  were  only  discovered  by  accident  in  the 
genizah.  33 
Perhaps  Whybray  sums  up  the  unity  or  integrity  of 
Qoheleth  view  best,  vis-a-vis  the  editorial  gloss  view, 
when  he  says  that  the  most  probable  explanation  of  the 
tensions  within  the  book  is  that  these  tensions  existed 
within  Qoheleth's  own  mind'  . 
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While  these  arguments  on  the  integrity  or  literary 
unity  of  the  Book  of  Qoheleth  do  not  bear  directly  on  the 
editorial  gloss  view  of  the  joy  statements,  they  do  argue 
against,  or  offer  a  possible  explanation  for,  the  joy 
statements  not  being  editorial  glosses  but  integral  to  the 
book  as  a  whole.  Of  course,  interpreting  the  meaning  of 
those  statements  in  the  overall  context  of  Qoheleth  still 
remains  problematic. 
B.  The  Indicative  Carpe  Diem  Interpretation 
The  simple  but  powerful  case  for  the  interpretation  of  the 
joy  statements  as  indicative  carpe  diem  must  be  taken 173 
seriously.  This  view  represents  the  attempt  to  interpret 
the  joy  statements'  meaning  in  the  overall  context  of 
Qoheleth.  The  main  strength  of  the  argument  is  that  the 
joy  statements,  in  the  context  of  negative  discourses  on 
life's  circumstances,  provide  an  answer,  or  at  least  some 
advice,  on  what  one  should  do  in  the  light  of  the  harsh 
realities  of  life. 
What  creates  scepticism  concerning  the  carpe  diem 
interpretation  of  the  joy  statements  is  the  he  vel 
statements,  the  literary  structure  of  Qoheleth,  the  joy 
statements'  immediate  and  overall  contexts  and  such 
contradictory  statements  as  6.2  and  9.7-10. 
The  strongest  arguments  against  the  indicative  carpe 
diem  interpretation  come  in  the  next  subsection  dealing 
with  the  interpretation  of  an  essential  message  of  joy  in 
Qoheleth  (which  in  some  respects  is  a  more  extended  carpe 
diem  argument)  and  in  chapter  six  which  deals  with  ironic 
and  sceptical  correlations. 
C.  The  Essential  Message  of  Joy  Interpretation 
There  are  a  number  of  strengths  of  the  essential  message  of 
joy  interpretation.  The  first  lies  in  the  fact  that  it 
takes  seriously  the  joy  statements  in  Qoheleth  and  attempts 
to  make  sense  of  them  and  the  book  as  a  whole,  i.  e.,  their 
literary  function  in  the  book.  Secondly,  the  fact  that  the 
joy  statements  follow  such  negative  discourses  on  life, 
makes  for  a  strong  case  that  this  was  indeed  Qoheleth's 
advice  in  the  light  of  them.  The  fact  that  the  last  joy 174 
statement  comes  in  the  final  context  of  aging  and  death, 
couched  in  imperative  forms,  indicates  that  this  context 
provides  the  impetus  for  carpe  diem  as  the  book  'wraps  up', 
and  thus  represents  the  final  and  ultimate  advice  and 
interpretation  for  Qoheleth. 
a)  General  Views  of  the  Joy  Message 
Despite  the  strengths  of  the  essential  joy  interpretation, 
Knoph,  along  with  the  other  joy  interpreters,  demonstrates 
subjective  and  arbitrary  choices  which  raise  many  more 
questions  than  they  answer:  Why  should  the  often  ignored  or 
neglected  leitmotif  of  carpe  diem  joy  (part  of  the 
'optimism'  of  Qoheleth  according  to  Knoph)  be  arbitrarily 
chosen  and  emphasised  to  the  exclusion  of  others?  How  does 
this  wrong  right  the  other  wrong?  Why  an  essential  or 
central  thesis/message  of  joy  over  one  of  the  other 
negative  messages?  Though  it  must  be  admitted  that  this 
choice  of  the  essential  message  of  joy  does  not  necessarily 
negate  these  other  negative  leitmotifs  in  Qoheleth  (as  many 
scholars  readily  admit);  and  it  is  acknowledged  that  these 
negative  leitmotifs  are  considered  the  basis  for  the 
essential  message  of  joy  interpretation  of  Qoheleth  via  the 
joy  statements. 
But  Knoph  alerts  readers  to  the  first,  and  potentially 
most  fatal  flaw,  in  the  methodology  of  those  who  hold  to 
the  interpretation  that  the  joy  statements  provide  an 
essential  message  of  joy  to  the  Book  of  Qoheleth,  namely 
that  of  the  alignment  of  all  the  positive  things  which 175 
Qoheleth  had  to  say  and  then  building  one's  case  around 
that  alignment.  This  is,  in  fact,  what  Whybray  does  in  his 
trend  setting  article  'Qoheleth,  Preacher  of  Joy'.  For 
example,  when  Whybray  deals  with  the  joy  statement  of  5.17- 
19  (his  5.9-19),  he  aligns  it  with  his  previous  treatment 
of  the  joy  statement  in  2.24-26  and  effectively  sidesteps 
the  immediate  context  of  the  joy  statement  in  5.9-19  and 
the  following  contradictory  statement  of  6.1-2.  The 
immediate  context  of  the  joy  statement  in  5.17-19  may,  in 
fact,  indicate  scepticism,  perhaps  in  the  form  of  irony  or 
a  joke:  for  how  can  one  enjoy  food  and  drink  in  such  an 
unpredictable  and,  in  any  case,  unsatisfactory  context? 
Added  to  this,  is  the  fact  that  the  ability  to  enjoy  what 
one  has,  albeit  as  the  gift  of  God  (as  Whybray 
acknowledges),  comes  from  an  arbitrary  and  capricious  God 
who  may  also  deny  such  enjoyment  even  when  one  has  all  the 
'trimmings'  of  the  enjoyable  life  (6.1-2).  The  argument 
that,  the  ability  to  enjoy  one's  lot  demonstrates  God's 
already  approval  of  one  and  one's  life,  is  refuted  in  a 
number  of  different  ways  by  the  Book  of  Qoheleth  itself: 
one,  by  the  above  demonstrated  capriciousness  of  God  (6.2); 
two,  general  injustice  in  the  world;  three,  Qoheleth's 
refutation  of  retributive  justice;  and  four,  the  hevel  of 
material  things  and  pleasure  in  the  world.  The  evidence  of 
internal  contradictions  within  the  joy  statements 
themselves,  e.  g.,  9.7-10,  also  argue  against  a 
straightforward  adoption  of  the  indicative  carpe  diem 
nature  of  the  joy  statements  on  the  basis  that  the 
immediate  context  of  the  joy  statement,  in  9.9 176 
specifically,  may  indicate  sceptical  irony  or  even  the  joke 
of  enjoying  life  in  such  hevel  circumstances  rather  than 
carpe  diem.  Simply  sidestepping  the  internal 
contradictions  and  problems,  made  all  the  more  acute  if  one 
accepts,  as  Whybray  does,  the  essential  literary  integrity 
and  unity  of  the  Book  of  Qoheleth,  will  not  resolve  the 
interpretive  problems  that  the  immediate  and  overall 
contexts  of  the  book  present  to  the  joy  statements  taken  in 
isolation  or  together  as  an  aligned  position  of  Qoheleth. 
A  number  of  other  propositions  of  Whybray  must  be 
questioned  and  challenged.  The  idea  espoused  by  Whybray 
with  regard  to  3.13,35  that  somehow  in  the  light  of 
ignorance  (if  one  can  call  that  'light'),  one  should  enjoy 
oneself,  may  on  the  contrary,  represent  an  ironic  rejection 
of  such  an  idea  on  the  basis  of  the  internal  contradiction 
of  enjoying  life  under  such  circumstances.  The  idea  that 
it  is  the  man  who,  in  Whybray's  words,  accepts  what  God 
gives,  is  also  questionable.  On  the  one  hand,  Whybray 
would  want  to  espouse  the  determinism  of  Qoheleth,  and  on 
the  other  the  freewill  of  humanity  to  make  such  choices.  36 
It  is  precisely  because  of  the  determinism  of  God  that,  in 
ignorance,  one  should  accept  and  enjoy  what  one  has;  but 
this  falls  down  on  two  counts:  one,  it  disregards  the  fact 
that  God  determines  who  gets  what  and  under  what 
circumstances  (freewill  has  nothing  to  do  with  one's  lot); 
and  two,  that  choice  and  acceptance  also  remain  within  the 
capricious  determinism  of  God  who  may  not  allow  one  to 
enjoy  what  one  has,  even  when  it  is  the  best  life  has  to 
offer  (cf.  6.2).  De  Jong  has  recently  reinforced  these 177 
ideas  in  his  article  dealing  with  'God  in  the  Book  of 
Qohelet'. 
It  can  be  concluded  that  Qohelet's  main  theme 
"human  limitation  in  relation  to  God"  is  an  important  Old  Testament  theme. 
...  In  this 
way  he  [Qoheleth]  defends  a  well-known  biblical 
theme  and  a  genuine  characteristic  of  the  God  of 
the  Old  Testament:  the  Creator,  in  relation  to 
whom  human  hybris  is  not  appropriate,  is 
substantially  different  from  man  and  acts 
according  to  his  own  free  sovereignty.  37 
And  with  regard  to  God's  determinism  and  the  joy 
statements,  de  Jong  says  that 
There  are  some  other  texts  which  do  not 
explicitly  argue  that  God  acts  in  a  deterministic 
way,  but  which  leave  the  impression  that  he  does 
so.  Most  of  these  texts  are  closely  related  to 
ii  26,  and  their  central  theme  is  enjoyment. 
According  to  vi  2,  God  endows  wealth  but  not  the 
ability  to  enjoy.  The  texts  of  ii  24-5, 
iii  12-13,  v  18-19  stress  that  enjoyment  is  God's 
sovereign  gift,  as  well  as  the  days  in  which  to 
enjoy  (v  17,  viii  15,  ix  9).  The  contents  and 
context  of  vii  14  also  leaves  the  impression  that 
God  as  the  Giver  of  the  good  and  the  bad  days 
acts  without  respect  of  persons.  38 
This  leads  to  another  criticism,  against  Ogden,  which  lends 
strength  to  this  last  point:  Ogden  argues  that  in  the  light 
of  the  programmatic  question  of  1.3,  that  Qoheleth's 
success  at  enjoying  life,  vindicates  the  joy 
interpretation;  39  but  this  is  untrue  as  evidenced  in 
Qoheleth's  evaluation  of  his  life's  pursuits  (1.18;  2.11, 
15,17-23).  Qoheleth  admitted  that  he  had  intellectual, 
material  and  hedonistic  success  (1.12-2.23),  but  his 
evaluations  of  them  were  hevel:  Qoheleth  had  all  the  best 
God  had  to  offer  him  but  he  found  them  wanting  (cf.  2.1-11; 
especially  2.3,11). 
Another  idea  of  Whybray  which  needs  to  be  critically 
assessed  is  the  idea  that  the  joy  interpretation  is 178 
warranted  in  the  overall  context  of  the  book.  40  For 
example,  Whybray  says  2.17  ('So  I  hated  life')  represents 
an  expression  of  Solomon  (in  the  context  of  the  royal 
fiction  of  1.12-2.26)  and  not  Qoheleth  himself.  This  may 
be  true;  but  Whybray  cannot  know  that  this  was  in  the  mind 
of  Solomon,  Qoheleth,  or  that  it  was  original  to  the  text. 
This  view,  moreover,  disregards  the  inclusio  of  1.2-12.8, 
which  may  or  may  not  be  editorial,  but  requires  that  it  be 
dealt  with:  Whybray  simply  ignores  it  in  his  article  and  in 
his  book  simply  dismisses  1.2  and  12.8  as  editorial 
glosses.  41  This  is  interesting  since,  for  Whybray's  joy 
interpretation  to  stand  up,  this  is  what  he  must  do  with 
1.2  and  12.8. 
Chia's  thesis,  that  Qoheleth  has  a  dual  thesis  of 
hevel/joy,  provides  an  opportunity  to  demonstrate  how  the 
literary  structure  of  Qoheleth  raises  scepticism  against 
such  a  view.  The  macro  literary  structure  of  Qoheleth  will 
not  support  such  a  thesis.  The  main  literary  structure 
which  undermines  such  a  thesis  is  the  superlative  hevel 
inclusio  of  1.2-12.8.  Moreover,  1.2  and  12.8  state  that 
X711  Vii 
. 
5V  I  qualifies 
5:  1i1  and  thus  means  '  absolutely 
everything  is  hevel  '.  'Everything'  is  without 
qualification.  The  other  micro  literary  structures  of  the 
book  also  undermine  any  value  to  the  joy  statements  and  may 
indicate  scepticism  in  the  joy  statements.  In  addition, 
the  book's  leitmotifs,  at  least  as  it  now  stands,  are 
governed  by  the  thesis  of  1.2  which  is  validated  in  12.8. 
The  joy  statement  of  2.24  comes  immediately  following 
Qoheleth's  ultimate  pleasure  campaign  in  2.1-10,  which  he 179 
criticises  in  2.11  and  in  2.17-23.  The  final  conclusion, 
moreover,  is  a  hevel  statement  in  2.26.  The  joy  statements 
of  3.12-13  come  in  a  highly  deterministic  context  which 
juxtaposes  God  and  his  eternal  work  with  the  transitory 
nature  of  human  life  in  the  world  in  3.14.  The  joy 
statement  of  3.22a  is  brought  into  question  by  a  statement 
of  the  transitory  nature  of  human  life  in  the  world  and 
man's  ignorance  of  the  future  in  3.22b. 
The  joy  statement  of  5.17-19  is  preceded  by  a  very 
pessimistic  statement  regarding  the  'grievous  evil'  in  life 
in  5.12-15;  and  is  followed  by  a  statement  of  God's 
capricious  determinism  of  joy  in  6.1-2.  The  fact  that  the 
joy  statement  is  enveloped  by  statements  of  the  evil  in  the 
world  (5.12-15)  and  God's  capricious  determinism  of  joy 
(6.1-2)  suggests  that  a  straightforward  indicative 
interpretation  of  5.17-19  is  dubious. 
The  joy  statement  of  8.15  is  immediately  followed  by 
an  ignorance  statement  in  8.16-17  and  a  death  statement  of 
God's  capricious  determinism  in  9.1-6.  The  joy  statement 
of  9.7-9a  is  embellished  by  a  double  hevel  statement  in 
9.9b  and  a  death  statement  in  9.10.  The  joy  statement  of 
11.8-9  comes  in  the  context  of  a  statement  foreshadowing 
death,  and  is  ultimately  made  redundant  by  the  superlative 
hevel  statement  in  12.8. 
The  joy  statements  are  never  given  in  an  open-ended 
context  whereby  they  stand  alone  and  without  qualification 
or  negation  by  the  following  statements  or  pericopes; 
though  it  may  be  argued  that  these  following  statements  or 
pericopes  could  be  reinforcing  the  idea  of  carpe  diem.  The 180 
book,  however,  has  an  overall  dour  ethos  despite  these  joy 
statements.  The  joy  statements,  moreover,  are  ultimately 
invalidated  by  the  superlative  hevel  statement  of  12.8;  and 
this  represents  a  contradiction  in  Ogden's  position  which 
on  the  one  hand  wants  to  hold  to  the  literary  integrity  and 
unity  of  Qoheleth  but  on  the  other  disregards  or  sidesteps 
the  implications  of  such  a  position.  What  12.8  validates 
is  Qoheleth's  thesis  that  Perhaps  the  literary 
structure,  as  Dell  suggest  for  the  Book  of  Job,  indicates 
scepticism  in  Qoheleth  (inclusive  of  the  joy  statements); 
but  even  if  there  is  no  contrived  sceptical  effect  intended 
by  the  author  and  or  editors,  the  literary  structure  of 
Qoheleth  raises  doubts  and  a  number  of  questions. 
Lohf  ink's  interpretation  of  5.17-19  is  fascinating; 
but  seriously  flawed.  It  is  probably  safe  to  say  that 
r  3IV,  '  sing',  is  not  a  possibility  for  Qoheleth.  M  DI, 
II,  III  are  all  possible  but  only  II  and  III  really  seem 
viable  in  the  context  in  which  the  root  is  used  in 
Qoheleth.  How  is  1i  'answer',  'respond'  appropriate  for 
5.19:  for  he  does  not  remember  much  the  days  of  life 
because  God  answers  with  joy  in  his  heart'  (1=h  nrJMtV=  -, JýSin 
':  )  1"1I  'n'-r1N  "1:  )T'4  M  ':  ))  ?.  First  of  all, 
root  `DI  does  not  provide  a  natural  linguistic  and 
grammatical  sense  in  the  context  of  5.19:  'Answers', 
'reveals'  what?  The  lot  of  enjoyment  already  given  in 
5.17-18?  Secondly,  arriving  at  the  English  sense  of 
'revelation'  from  rT3i  is  a  long  and  difficult  task  which 
Lohfink  never  makes;  probably  because  if  he  looked  at 
IUVI's  occurrences  in  the  Hebrew  Bible  and  B.  D.  B.  the 181 
problematics  are  obvious.  Thirdly,  even  if  Lohfink  is 
right  and  there  is  a  play  on  words  going  on  between  1.13, 
3.10  and  5.19,  it  is  more  likely  to  be  between  'M  DII 
('occupied',  'busy  with')  in  5.19  and  MIDIII  ('afflicted') 
in  1.13  and  3.10  than  '713I  and  II  because  the  play  on  words 
is  more  natural  and  makes  more  sense  in  those  contexts. 
Fourthly,  the  difficulties  of  articulating  a  doctrine  of 
revelation  are  well  known  to  be  legion  in  Bible  and 
theology  studies  and  cannot  just  be  assumed  but  require 
extensive  and  rigourous  arguments  for  which  Lohfink  is  not 
prepared  to  make  for  his  case.  And  finally,  the  sense  of 
'busy'  or  'occupy'  convey  the  same  overall  literary  intent 
or  message  of  5.19:  joy  is  a  distraction  from  God  for  the 
bad  in  life.  For  these  and  many  other  reasons,  Lohfink's 
position  on  5.17-19  must  be  rejected. 
Brown  admits,  that  after  Qoheleth  has  deconstructed 
traditional  wisdom  in  ancient  Israel  from  within,  he  only 
provides  a  'faint  sketch'  of  the  new  character'  he  wants 
to  build.  Brown's  interpretation,  however,  seems  largely 
driven  by  modern,  if  not  postmodern,  concerns  and  not 
necessarily  the  concerns  of  Qoheleth;  and  this  for  the 
purpose  of  making  practical  applications  to  the  postmodern 
predicament  (cf.  the  Preface  for  ecclesiastical  concerns; 
pp.  148-50).  While  this  is  admirable,  one  may  question,  in 
the  light  of  Brown's  own  emphasis  on  the  negative  in 
Qoheleth,  that  this  'deconstruction'  and  'reconstruction' 
might  not  be  the  product  of  twentieth  century  hermeneutics 
and  an  attempt  to  squeeze  out  an  interpretation  of  the  book 
which  lends  itself  to  this  purpose.  Also,  Brown'  s 182 
methodology  may  be  in  question  in  the  light  of  the  source 
critical  complexities  of  the  book:  Is  one  able  to  discern 
what  is  Qoheleth's  or  not?  One  may  also  ask  whether  or  not 
an  ancient  Israelite  would  be  willing  and  able  to  do  such 
an  exercise  of  deconstruction  or  is  this  an  anachronism? 
One  might  also  question  if  enjoying  'the  few  fleeting 
moments  of  joy  one  receives  from  the  hand  of  God'  (which 
Brown  admits  is  'anticlimactic')  is  a  solid  enough  basis 
for  interpreting  Qohel  e  th  as  a  book  on  'joyful 
perseverance'?  If  just  a  few  fleeting  moments  of  joy  are 
allotted  a  man  in  life,  how  does  this  provide  a  basis  to 
enjoy  everyday  work  and  life  as  Brown  suggests?  It  sounds 
more  like  the  'Calvinstic  work  ethic'  and  a  modern 
interpretation  than  an  ancient  book;  and  again  one  is  left 
wondering  if  the  interpretation  raises  more  questions  than 
it  answers? 
b)  Ogden  on  Qoheleth's  Essential  Message  of  Joy 
First  of  all,  Ogden  provides  quite  an  arbitrary,  though 
necessary  for  his  essential  joy  interpretation,  definition 
of  hevel  in  Qoheleth.  He  acknowledges  the  correctness  and 
importance  of  the  hevel  inclusio  of  1.2-12.8.  He  argues 
that  for  the  Book  of  Qoheleth  to  be  interpreted  negatively 
as  a  whole  would  require  a  translation  of 
5=1 
as  'vanity'  , 
'meaningless';  but  argues  against  the  commonly  held  views 
of  hevel  ('vanity',  'nothingness',  'vapour')  on  the  basis 
of  how  Qoheleth  specifically  used  hevel  and  arrives  at  the 
definition  '  enigmatic',  '  ironic',  (without  negative 183 
connotations)  .  While  it  is  true  that  defining  ýWjl  is  a 
difficult  task,  and  Ogden  accepts  Barr's  advice  that  a 
context  specific  approach  is  necessary  for  defining  how 
individual  books/authors  used  terms,  it  is  doubtful  that 
ýWl 
means  'enigmatic',  'mysterious'  (cf.  chapter  one); 
though  it  may  have  some  of  those  connotations.  The  point 
with  regard  to  Ogden's  definition  of 
ý=I  is:  He  must 
circumvent  any  outright  negative  definition  of  hevel  if  he 
is  to  sustain  his  essential  joy  interpretation.  One  may 
also  wonder  why,  when  Ogden  defines  ýWsl 
as  'enigmatic'. 
'ironic',  that  he  does  not  conclude  that  the  joy  statements 
are  'enigmatic'  or  ironic  -  especially  in  the  'light'  of 
12.8?  Ogden'  s  views  12.8  as  a  concluding  device  of  the 
book  and  uses  it  to  support  his  positive  interpretation  of 
11.7-12.8;  but  the  final  evaluation  of  the  book  in  12.8  is 
hevel:  the  last  word  on  Qoheleth  is  hevel  not  joy!  42 
Again,  one  is  left  with  more  questions  than  answers. 
Ogden  also  redefines  I1i11'  in  Qoheleth.  11111',  Ogden 
argues,  is  not  to  be  understood  in  any  material  sense 
(which  is  indicated  by  the  Qoheleth's  use  of  the  term  75r) 
but  as  a  neologism  which  Qoheleth  coined  to  indicate 
something  beyond  the  material,  beyond  this  world,  namely 
life  after  death.  Ogden  locates  the  semantic  field  of 
'fill'  outside  of  this  world  precisely  because,  as  Qoheleth 
points  out,  none  can  be  found  here.  This  redefinition 
programme  of  Ogden  is  how  he  circumvents  a  number  of 
problems:  death,  theodicy,  hedonism  and  jurisprudence. 
Thus  Qoheleth's  purpose  is  to  point  to  something  beyond  the 
grave  and  the  call  to  enjoy  life  is  therefore  not  thwarted 184 
by  any  hevel,  lack  of  11%jr'  in  this  world  or  death.  This 
seems  a  rather  convenient  arrangement  which  needs  to  be 
rigourously  and  critically  assessed. 
For  Ogden  to  redefine  7V'  and  call  it  a  neologism 
which  Qoheleth  coined  is  a  circular  argument  of  the  worst 
kind,  because  "III"  is  used  some  266  times  in  the  Hebrew 
Bible  and  its  semantic  field  is  well  known  and  does  not 
include  'otherworldly';  though  Ogden  could  have  used 
Bauernfeind  and  Balz'  s  understanding  of  hevel  (µaiatog 
'retains  its  comprehensive  metaphysical  undertone'43)  as 
'otherworldly'  in  a  Greek  context  to  support  his  case,  as 
well  as  the  midrashic  interpretation  of  nýy  as  the  'next 
world';  but  these  views  must  also  be  rejected  on 
linguistic/grammatical  and  contextual  grounds  (cf.  chapters 
one  and  two).  Moreover,  Ogden  could  have  dealt  with  hevel 
having  the  accounting  connotation  of  'zero',  'nothing', 
which  would  be  appropriate  for  both  the  book  and  in 
relationship  with  the  negative  connotations  of  11'  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible  (95  occurrences);  but  Ogden  does  not  deal  with 
that  either,  probably  because  it  would  argue  against  his 
position.  When  Ogden  argues  that  Qoheleth  used  ITT"  in  an 
obscure  way  (so  Ogden  can  support  his  '  obscure' 
interpretation),  he  defies  the  266  occurrences  in  the 
Hebrew  Bible  in  which  the  term's  semantic  field  is  well 
known;  and  this,  again,  may  represent  a  circular  argument 
of  the  worst  kind. 
With  regard  to  Ogden's  position  that  the  programmatic 
question  of  Qoheleth  (1.3),  'what  is  man's  1jß  n'v 
('advantage')?  ',  and  its  relationship  to  the  inclusio  and 185 
essential  joy  interpretation:  the  answer  which  is  demanded 
from  that  rhetorical  question  is  an  unqualified  'no  one!  ' 
or  'nothing!  '  (cf.  chapter  two).  It  may  even,  in 
relationship  with  an  accounting  connotation  of  hevel  as 
'zero'  ,  'nil',  mean  a  'negative  surplus',  i.  e.,  a  'loss' 
(cf.  chapter  one).  For  Ogden  to  use  1r4  and  the 
programmatic  question  to  build  his  joy  case  is  ironic 
because  the  programmatic  question  actually  works  against 
his  case.  One  would  expect,  then,  that  such  an  unqualified 
negative  response  to  that  question  would  bring  into 
question  the  interpretation  of  the  joy  statements:  this  is 
consistent  with  scepticism  and  not  a  positive  endorsement 
of  an  indicative  interpretation  of  the  joy  statements 
(another  irony?  ). 
In  addition  to  this,  Ogden's  attempt  to  argue  that  the 
semantic  field  of  111i1*1  has  moved  outside  of  this  world  and 
into  the  next,  must  be  called  into  question  both  on 
grammatical/linguistic  and  contextual  grounds;  the  above 
point  taken  that  the  rhetorical  question  demands  a  negative 
response.  To  shift  the  context  from  this  world  to  the  next 
is  an  example  of  a  scholar  attempting  to  sidestep  the 
problematics  that  the  programmatic  question  appears  to  be 
designed  to  evoke:  there  is  no  advantage  to  living  in  this 
world  and  thus  Qoheleth  evaluated  it  as  hevel,  and  he  did 
not  speculate  or  suggest  that  one  should  look  elsewhere, 
even  if  that  were  possible.  Moreover,  the  semantic  field 
Of  i11',  in  266  occurrences  in  the  Hebrew  Bible,  are  in  this 
world.  In  addition  to  this,  Ogden  is  simply  wrong  when  he 
suggests  in  his  commentary  (p.  23)  that  7  ýý 
refers  to 186 
material  success  in  this  world  in  general  and  that  in  2.11 
11711"  to  some  unspecified  thing  else:  for  in  2.11  the  term 
is  '111  and  it  does  refer  to  a  failure  of  material  success 
to  satisfy  and  follows  a  hevel  and  'vexation  of  spirit' 
evaluation  (1  rnn?  1  11111+  1+111  n17  n1r11 
Ogden's  attempt  to  sidestep  the  problematics  of  the 
programmatic  question,  its  emphatic  negative  response  and 
death,  must  be  rejected. 
Finally,  with  regard  to  Ogden's  idea  that  Qoheleth  was 
a  man  of  faith,  there  are  a  number  of  arguments  which  go 
against  this.  Ogden  says  in  conclusion,  to  his  argument 
that  reflection  and  enjoyment  in  the  light  of  inevitable 
death,  is  that  Qoheleth, 
...  who  from  a  standpoint  of  faith  wishes  to 
confront  directly  the  reality  of  human  existence 
and  to  offer  the  most  consistent  and  sagacious 
advice  on  how  to  cope  with  the  problems  of 
life.  44 
First  of  all,  Qoheleth  nowhere  used  any  Hebrew  term  for 
'faith'  in  his  book,  e.  g.,  I  MM,  fl  M,  1itD=.  45  Secondly,  if 
Ogden  is  correct  and  the  book  is  framed  by  ahe  vel 
inclusio,  then  this  would  seem  to  indicate  a  lack  of  faith 
on  the  part  of  either  the  author  or  at  least  the  final 
redactor.  And  finally,  it  would  seem  difficult  to  employ 
carpe  diem  under  such  negative  circumstances  outlined  in 
the  book  as  humanity  finds  themselves;  and  one  could  just 
as  easily  have  argued  Qoheleth  was  a  man  downtrodden  and 
defeated  by  life  in  every  way:  he  had  no  faith. 
Despite  the  interesting  and  valuable  contributions 
which  the  joy  interpreters  have  provided,  the  larger 
philosophical  questions  remain:  Is  there  any  'fl  l'  if  all 187 
is  consumed  by  death  and  eternity?  Or  does  this  just  make 
life  hevel?  Perhaps  this  is  the  editor's  point  (if  there 
was  one)  in  12.8. 
S.  CONCLUSIONS  REGARDING  THE  INTERPRETATIONS  OF 
THE  JOY  STATEMENTS 
After  a  critical  assessment  of  the  three  main 
interpretations  of  the  joy  statements  in  Qoheleth,  the 
following  conclusions,  however  tentative,  can  be  drawn. 
The  real  strength  of  the  editorial  gloss  or  intrusion 
interpretation  of  the  joy  statements  is  the  fact  that  they 
seem  so  alien  to  the  rest  of  the  mood  and  content  (ethos) 
of  the  Book  of  Qoheleth.  Since  there  is  no  evidence 
whatsoever  of  how  the  Book  of  Qoheleth  was  written  or 
redacted,  it  is  impossible  to  draw  any  firm  conclusions  on 
what  is  original  to  Qoheleth  or  not.  Therefore,  one  must 
be  sceptical  of  any  view,  one  way  or  another,  of  any 
particular  text  in  the  book.  In  other  words:  The  joy 
statements  may  be  editorial  intrusions  to  the  text,  as 
indicated  by  their  alien  nature  to  the  rest  of  the  book; 
but  then  again,  they  may  not.  The  point  cannot  be  proven 
one  way  or  another.  So  the  editorial  gloss  position  cannot 
be  lightly  dismissed;  though  the  textual  evidence  seems  to 
indicate  that  the  text  of  Qoheleth,  as  found  in  the 
Massoretic  Text,  is  reasonably  sound.  But  then  again, 
textual  criticism  does  not  necessarily  provide  a  history  of 
a  text's  redaction:  it  only  indicates  the  reliability  of  a 
text's  transmission,  and  even  then  this  may  be  ambiguous.  46 188 
The  essential  message  of  joy  interpretation  seems  to 
represent  a  counter  reading  of  the  Book  of  Qoheleth  from 
the  historically  sceptical  or  pessimistic  reading;  a 
counter  reading  which  nevertheless  needs  to  be  taken 
seriously  but  not  without  critical  assessment  and  due 
caution  in  adopting  it.  Methodologically,  both  Whybray  and 
Ogden  aligned  the  bits  and  pieces  of  the  book  to  make  their 
case  and  effectively  either  sidestep  the  problems  of  such 
an  interpretation  or  ignore  them.  The  ploy  of  redefinition 
or  emptying  words  of  their  inherent  negativity,  cannot,  and 
should  not  be  allowed. 
It  seems  ironic,  when  scholars  are  so  prone  to  hold 
that  there  is  scepticism  throughout  the  Book  of  Qoheleth, 
that  they  are  not  sceptical  of  the  joy  statements 
themselves.  This  seems  to  represent  a  contradiction, 
perhaps  even  an  irony  within  that  view,  i.  e.,  why  does 
scepticism  in  the  book  lead  to  a  carpe  diem  interpretation 
of  the  joy  statements  instead  of  an  ironic  or  sceptical 
interpretation  of  them? 
Nevertheless,  the  carpe  diem  interpretation  is  by  far 
the  strongest  interpretation  of  the  joy  statements.  This 
is  based  in  the  power  of  its  simplicity,  its  one  message 
amongst  many  in  Qoheleth  (mostly  negative),  the  negative 
context  in  which  the  joy  statements  come  and  the  positive 
advice  to  make  the  most  of  life  in  such  a  negative  context. 
If,  however,  the  joy  statements  are  ironic,  then  of  course 
this  would  invalidate  the  carpe  diem  interpretation.  The 
main  problem  with  the  wholesale  essential  message  of  joy 
interpretation  is  that  it  is  committed  to  the  joy  message 189 
(one  amongst  many)  being  the  central,  if  not  the  only, 
thesis  or  message  of  Qoheleth;  and  this  is  where  Whybray, 
Ogden  and  Chia  fall  down  because  they  must  manipulate  the 
data  to  fit  the  theory  :  they  are  over  committed,  or  over 
emphasise  (Whybray),  one  interpretation  or  message  of  the 
book  to  the  exclusion  of  others;  whereas  the  interpreters 
who  endorse  the  simple  carpe  diem  interpretation  do  not. 
Notwithstanding,  chapter  six  may  provide  more  information 
which  challenges  even  the  carpe  diem  interpretation. 190 
CHAPTER  SIX 
IRONIC  CORRELATIONS  AND  SCEPTICISM  IN 
THE  JOY  STATEMENTS? 
This  chapter  begins  where  scepticism  and  the  main 
interpretations  left  off.  It  looks  at  irony  as  a  literary 
form  and  examines  whether  or  not  irony  is  analogous  with, 
or  compatible  to,  scepticism,  i.  e.,  is  irony  a  Gattung  or 
literary  device  of  scepticism  and,  if  so,  what  literary 
effect  does  it  have?  The  joy  statements  of  Qoheleth  are 
then  examined  in  the  light  of  this  study  to  see  whether  or 
not  they  are  ironic,  sceptical,  both  or  neither. 
1.  IRONIC  CORRELATIONS  TO  GATTUNGEN  AND  SCEPTICISM 
This  section  attempts  to  answer  the  questions:  What  is 
irony?  How  can  one  determine  irony  in  a  given  text  and 
what  is  its  literary  effect?  It  also  explores  the 
correlations  between  irony,  the  various  literary  devices  or 
Gattungen  which  exhibit  irony  and  their  literary  effects, 
e.  g.,  sarcasm,  joke,  litotes,  double  meaning  (complex 
irony),  satire  and  parody.  This  section  then  attempts  to 
answer  the  questions:  Is  irony  a  Gattung  or  literary  device 
of  scepticism?  Are  irony  and  scepticism  compatible?  The 
O.  M.  E.  D.  defines  'correlation'  as: 
1a  mutual  relation  between  two  or  more  things. 
2a  interdependence  of  variable  quantities. 
ba  quantity  measuring  the  extent  of  this. 
3  the  act  of  correlating.  1 
For  the  most  part  this  definition  suffices  for  the  purposes 
of  this  thesis;  but  one  needs  to  add,  surely,  in 191 
conjunction  with  quantity,  'quality'  ('a  distinctive 
attribute  or  faculty;  a  characteristic  trait')2  as  a  part 
of  correlation:  for  quantity  on  its  own  is  not  adequate  for 
the  purposes  of  correlations  because  quantity  only  relates 
to  the  size  of  something  and  not  its  characteristics  or 
nature,  which  are  also  necessary  for  making  correlations, 
i.  e.,  one  cannot  talk  about  size  without  characteristics. 
'Literary  device'  is  defined  as  'a  conceptual  and 
grammatical  mechanism  whereby  a  certain  literary  effect  is 
achieved'.  3  The  definition  of  'literary  effect',  as  noted 
in  the  introduction,  is  'the  result  or  consequence  of  the 
use  of  conceptual,  grammatical  and  literary  devices  to 
produce  a  desired  effect  on  the  reader,  understanding  or 
meaning  a  particular  text'. 
A.  Irony  in  Historical  and  Philosophical  Context 
The  subsection  examines  irony  in  its  historical  and 
philosophical  context. 
Vlastos,  in  his  article,  'Socratic  Irony',  discusses 
the  etymological,  historical  and  philosophical  development 
of  irony  in  its  ancient  Greek  setting,  through  the  Roman 
period,  and  lasting  effects  into  the  twentieth  century 
West.  4  He  points  out  the  lasting  influence  of  Quintilian's 
definition  of  irony,  as  that  'figure  of  speech  or  trope  11  in 
which  something  contrary  to  what  is  said  is  to  be 
understood"  (contrarium  ei  good  dicitur  intelligendum 
est)';  adding  Johnson's  definition  as  'mode  of  speech  in 
which  the  meaning  is  contrary  to  the  words',  and  Webster's: 192 
'Irony  is  the  use  of  words  to  express  something  other  than, 
and  especially  the  opposite  of,  [their]  literal  meaning'.  5 
Vlastos  considers  a  straightforward  example  of  this 
opposite  meaning:  the  British  visitor  who  arrives  in  Los 
Angeles  in  a  downpour  and  says  'what  fine  weather';  the 
meaning  of  'fine'  of  course  being  the  opposite  of  what  is 
meant.  The  irony  of  this  so-called  straightforward  example 
is  that  a  British  visitor,  who  is  so  used  to  rainy  weather, 
might  indeed  think  the  weather  'fine'  relative  to  what  he 
is  used  to;  but  this  added  twist  to  Vlastos'  example  only 
represents  the  complexity  and  interplay  of  irony  between 
the  author,  characters,  situations,  dialogue  and  readers 
(more  will  be  said  on  this  interplay  in  a  moment). 
In  discussing  the  purpose  for  irony,  Vlastos  suggests 
that  humour  is  one  purpose;  but  it  can  also  have  the 
purpose  to  mock,  or  both  to  mock  and  be  humourous.  Vlastos 
gives  an  example  of  both  when  he  quotes  Mae  West's  reply  to 
Gerald  Ford's  invitation  to  a  state  dinner  at  the  White 
House:  'It's  an  awful  long  way  to  go  for  just  one  meal'. 
Vlastos  further  adds  that  the  'joke  is  on  someone,  a  put- 
down  made  socially  acceptable  by  being  wreathed  in  a 
cerebral  smile'.  6  Vlastos  argues  that  there  is  one  other 
possible  purpose  of  irony:  to  riddle;  but  this  may  be  part 
and  parcel  of  the  above  mentioned  complex  interplay.  The 
Mae  West  quotation  is  an  example  of  this  complex  interplay, 
whereby  she  is  implying  that:  'If  you  are  not  an  utter  fool 
you'll  know  this  isn't  my  real  reason.  Try  guessing  what 
it  might  be?  '7  Vlastos  insists  that  this  form  of  riddling 
irony  is  more  common  than  one  normally  expects  and  adds 193 
that  'When  irony  riddles  it  risks  being  misunderstood';  8 
though  he  also  argues  that  irony,  by  the  modern  definition, 
cannot  deceive  for  it  to  be  irony.  But  why  would  anyone 
want  to  be  misunderstood  or  leave  the  potential  to  be 
misunderstood?  A  rather  extended  example  may  elucidate  the 
purpose,  according  to  Vlastos,  for  riddling  irony. 
A  crook  comes  by  a  ring  whose  stone  he  knows 
to  be  a  fake,  and  he  goes  round  saying  to  people 
he  trying  to  dupe,  'Can  I  interest  you  in  a 
diamond  ring?  '  To  call  this  'irony'  would  be 
to  show  one  is  all  at  sea  about  the  meaning  of 
the  word.  Our  definition  tells  us  why:  to  serve 
his  fraud  the  literal  sense  of  'diamond'  has 
to  be  the  one  he  intends  to  convey.  To  see  him 
using  the  word  ironically  we  would  have  to 
conjure  up  circumstances  in  which  he  would  have 
no  such  intention  -  say,  telling  his  ten-year-old 
daughter  with  a  tell-tale  glint  in  his  eye,  'Luv, 
can  I  interest  you  in  a  diamond  ring?  '  Now 
suppose  he  had  said  this  to  her  without  that 
signal.  Might  we  still  call  it  'irony'?  We 
might,  provided  we  were  convinced  he  was  not 
trying  to  fool  her:  she  is  ten,  not  five,  old 
enough  to  know  that  if  that  trinket  were  a 
diamond  ring  it  would  be  worth  thousands  and  her 
father  would  not  let  it  out  of  his  sight.  If  we 
thought  this  is  what  he  was  about  -  testing  her 
intelligence  and  good  sense  -  we  could  still 
count  it  irony:  a  pure  specimen  of  the  riddling 
variety.  It  would  not  be  disqualified  as  such  if 
the  little  girl  were  to  fail  the  test,  for  the 
remark  had  not  been  made  with  the  intention  to 
deceive.  9 
Vlastos  argues  that  this  riddling  irony  had  its  roots  in 
classical  Greek  philosophy  and  cites  a  rather  long  and 
complicated  set  of  examples,  often  with  reference  to,  or 
correlation  with,  Socrates,  from  the  Attic  Texts  to  Plato's 
Laws,  Republic,  Sophist  and  Dialogues;  and  it  was  only  with 
the  appearance  of  Cicero's  first  century  C.  E.  de  Oratore  in 
Latin  that  'irony'  again  loses  this  deceptive  sense  of 
riddling  and  becomes  entrenched  as  the  predecessor  of  the 194 
classic  sense  of  irony  which  has  followed  into  the 
twentieth  century  West.  10 
In  the  Attic  Texts,  particularly  Clouds  415,  the  Greek 
term  £tp(ov  is  'sandwiched  in  between  two  words  for 
"slippery",  9aa8Axr  ,  'y?  otoc,  figures  "in  a  catalogue  of 
abusive  terms  against  a  man  who  is  a  tricky  opponent  in  a 
lawsuit"'.  11  In  the  Sophist,  Plato  portrays  ordinary 
sophist  as  'impostors'  (Etp(ovES)  vis-a-vis  the  arch- 
dialecticist  Socrates.  Vlastos  is  careful  to  point  out, 
that  because  Ftp(OvEta  is  often  used  with  negative 
connotations  in  classical  Greek  literature,  does  not  mean 
that  it  is  always  used  in  that  period  as  such.  Rather, 
each  context  must  be  examined;  and  indeed,  many  uses  of 
F,  tpwvF-ta  in  the  sense  of  '  mockery'  without  deceit  can  also 
be  found  in  the  mouths  of  Aristophanes,  Plato  and  Socrates. 
With  regard  to  the  complex  interplay  of  irony  between 
the  author,  characters,  situations,  dialogue  and  reader, 
Vlastos  uses  two  examples,  one  from  the  speaker's  point  of 
view  and  one  from  the  hearer's  point  of  view.  From  the 
speaker's  point  of  view,  irony,  in  the  sense  of  'mockery', 
can  be  found  in  a  text  of  uncertain  authorship,  Rhetorica 
ad  Alexandrum  [b]: 
Etpwvcta  is  [a]  saying  something  while  pretending 
(irpoa1rotoo  1Evov)  not  to  say  it  or  [b]  calling 
things  by  contrary  names  (21).  12 
The  hearer's  point  of  view  can  be  found  in  Quintilian's 
definition  or  irony  as  that  figure  of  speech  or  trope:  'in 
which  something  contrary  to  what  is  said  is  to  be 
understood  (contrarium  ei  quod  dicitur  intelligendum  est)'. 
In  the  first  example,  [a]  in  Rhetorica  ad  Alexandrum, 195 
'pretending'  need  not  be  'deceiving',  according  to  Vlastos, 
as  pointed  out  by  the  crook  with  his  daughter  example  (it 
is  only  deception  if  trying  to  pass  the  diamond  off  to  a 
prospective  purchaser). 
That  the  latter  [b]  should  be  the  most  common 
and,  in  point  of  logic,  the  primary  use  of 
'pretending'  does  nothing  to  block  a  secondary 
use  of  the  word,  tangential  to  the  first  -a 
subsidiary  use  of  'pretending'  which  is 
altogether  innocent  of  intentional  deceit, 
predicated  on  that  'willing  suspension  of 
belief'  by  which  we  enter  the  world  of 
imaginative  fiction  in  art  or  play.  This  is 
the  sense  of  'pretending'  we  could  invoke  to 
elucidate  ironical  diction,  as  in  Mae  West's 
remark:  we  could  say  she  is  'pretending'  that 
the  length  of  the  journey  is  her  reason  for 
declining,  which  would  be  patently  absurd  if 
'pretending'  were  being  used  in  its  primary 
sense;  there  is  no  false  allegation  because 
there  is  no  allegation:  she  is  pulling  our  leg.  13 
This  understanding  of  irony  may  have  bearing  on  the 
interpretation  of  the  joy  statements  of  Qoheleth. 
It  might  be  beneficial,  at  this  time,  to  deal  with  the 
complex  interplay  between  the  author,  characters, 
situations,  dialogue  and  readers  in  irony,  i.  e.,  the 
context  in  which  this  interplay  occurs  and  provides  the 
hermeneutical  guidelines  and  clues  for  interpreting  irony. 
B.  The  Role  of  Context  in  Interpreting  Irony 
Context  provides  the  hermeneutical  guidelines  in  which  the 
clues  for  interpreting  irony  come.  In  some  senses,  irony 
requires  a  type  of  stage  or  theatre  (as  the  context  in 
which  irony  occurs),  so  to  speak,  in  order  to  understand 
the  above  mentioned  complex  interplay.  Good,  in  his  famous 196 
book,  irony  in  the  Old  Testament,  provides  added  insight 
from  Greek  comedy  for  understanding  the  mechanics  of  irony. 
The  comedy  presented  the  conflict  (agon)  between 
two  characters,  the  one  called  the  alazon,  the 
other,  the  eiron.  The  alazon,  we  are  told,  may 
be  called  the  "impostor",  the  eiron,  the 
"ironical  man.  "  The  alazon  is  the  pompous  fool, 
the  pretender  who  affects  to  be  more  than  he 
actually  is.  The  eiron,  his  antagonist,  is  the 
sly,  shrewd  dissimulator,  who  poses  as  less  than 
he  is.  The  conflict  ends,  of  course,  in  the 
pricking  of  the  alazon's  bubble,  the  triumph  of 
eiron.  Therein  lies  its  comedy,  for  the 
spectator  knows  without  doubt  which  character 
is  the  impostor,  which  the  ironical  man,  and  he 
knows  what  the  end  will  be. 
...  Irony,  then, 
begins  in  conflict,  a  conflict  marked  by  the 
perception  of  the  distance  between  pretense  and 
reality.  14 
Rudman,  in  his  article,  'A  Contextual  Reading  of 
Ecclesiastes  4.13-16',  views  4.13-16  as  ironic;  15  and 
perhaps  it  correlates  with  the  above  in  the  sense  of  tragic 
irony  (see  also  below). 
Weisgerber  also  portrays  irony  and  satire,  in  his 
article  'Satire  and  Irony  as  Means  of  Communication',  as 
part  of  a  theatrical  production.  16  He  says  the  satirist  is 
like 
.a  remote  enemy,  a  sphinxlike  counselor, 
a  spectator  both  involved  in  and  detached  from 
the  human  comedy.  ... 
He  ultimately  relies 
upon  the  reader's  wisdom  and  judgement,  upon  his 
ability  to  discover  hidden  meanings,  accept 
criticism,  and  reform  accordingly,  ...  The 
satirist  is  a  kind  of  playwright  hiding  behind 
his  mouthpiece-the  persona-and  looking  at  the 
show  while  staging  it;  the  persona  addresses  the 
victim  and  directs  the  attention  of  the  audience 
to  the  norms  the  satirist  thus  alludes  to.  The 
persona  and  the  victim  are  the  actors  of  the 
play.  The  author  and  the  reader  are  watching 
from  outside,  although  deeply  involved  in  the 
process.  ... 
Instead  of  exercising  a  direct 
influence,  the  satirist  uses  an  intermediary; 
he  produces  a  play  in  which  his  representative 
attacks  a  "social"  evil  impersonated  by  the 
victim  (e.  g.,  Pope's  squire)  and  from  which  the 
reader  is  supposed  to  deduce  the  opposite  good.  17 197 
Both  irony  and  satire,  while  distinct,  have  much  in  common; 
and  in  many  ways  are,  in  their  interpretation,  analogous 
with  reader-response  theory  insofar  as  'The  reader,  like  a 
child  listening  to  a  story  or  a  person  captivated  by  a 
novel,  is  the  servant  of  the  text'  . 
18 
Reader  response  criticism  moves  beyond  these 
observations  to  more  sophisticated  methodology. 
For  instance,  it  draws  a  distinction  between  the 
real  reader  and  the  implied  reader.  The  real 
reader  is  the  flesh-and-blood  person  who  actually 
reads  a  text;  the  implied  reader  is  the  reader 
the  author  images  when  writing  the  text. 
Similarly,  there  is  a  real  author  (the  actual 
writer)  and  the  implied  author  (the  writer  the 
reader  images  when  reading  the  text.  In  the 
process  of  reading,  the  real  reader  is 
manipulated  by  the  implied  author  to  react  as, 
and  become,  the  implied  (or  ideal)  reader. 
Other  participants  are  envisaged,  such  as  the 
omniscient  narrator,  that  is,  the  teller  of  the 
story  who,  in  the  imagination  of  the  reader, 
knows  everything.  19 
In  other  words:  Reading  a  text  becomes  a  complex 
interactive  exercise  and  not  a  static  recital  of  words  and 
grammar  imposing  a  determinate  meaning  upon  the  reader  by 
the  author  or  text.  More  succinctly  put:  'Irony  is  in  the 
eye  of  the  beholder'.  2O  Irony,  however,  is 
.., 
liable  to  be  missed  by  an  unsophisticated 
audience.  Indeed,  it  requires  readers  whose 
sense  of  irony  is  at  least  equal  to  the 
ironist's;  that  is,  people  who  are  able  to  grasp 
at  the  same  time  the  pretended  and  the  intended 
meaning.  21 
Sometimes  irony  is  intentionally  elusive  (deceptive?  )  in 
order  to  test  the  audience.  This  may  be  analogous  to  the 
dialectical  or  dialogical  method  of  philosophy  (perhaps 
even  playing  'devil's  advocate'),  whereby  dialogue  is  used 
to  'bounce'  ideas  of  one  another.  The  function  of  irony  is 
to  attack,  22  and  according  to  Good,  is  to  act  as  a 
criticism  which  exposes  falsehood,  stupidity  and  pretense: 198 
'It  mocks  those  who  think  they  are  something  when  they  are 
actually  nothing';  23  though  one  should  note  that  this  is 
only  one  aspect  of  irony. 
Irony,  as  Good  also  points  out,  can  act  as  a  bridge 
between  the  tragic  and  the  comic;  perhaps  this  is  what  is 
happening  with  the  joy  statements  in  Qoheleth  (square 
brackets  []  indicate  possible  analogous  questions  not  found 
in  the  original  quotation): 
The  tragedian  assumed  that  his  audiences 
possessed  a  framework  of  knowledge  and 
understanding,  knowledge  of  the  story  [Solomon 
and  his  lifestyle?  ]  and  understanding  of  the  way 
the  world  spins  [traditional  wisdom?  ].  All  had 
that  in  common-the  author,  the  characters 
[Qoheleth?  ],  and  the  audience  [traditional  wisdom 
circles?  ].  The  audience  was  required  to  listen, 
to  fit  each  piece  of  insight  into  the  existent 
structure  [wisdom  literature?  ]  as  the  play  went 
along.  The  play  finished,  the  structure  was 
complete  [1.2-12.8?  ],  and  the  audience 
understood  [hevel?  ] 
. 
24 
Perhaps  this  is  what  the  literary  effect  of  the  hevel 
inclusio  of  Qoheleth  is  about  -  with  the  literary  intent: 
'Here  is  my  [Solomon's]  story  and  any  insights  given 
therein  are  bevel  [including  the  joy  statements]'.  This 
idea  may  be  supported  by  both  Dell's  important  insight  into 
the  function  of  the  literary  structure  of  Job  and 
Hoffmann's  article  'Irony  in  the  Book  of  Job':  Just  as  the 
Book  of  Job  is  framed  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  the  smaller 
forms  or  parts  work  against  one  another  in  an  ironic  way, 
so  too  Qoheleth  buttresses  his  topoi  in  such  a  way  as  to 
bring,  into  acute  ironic  relief,  his  advice  to  enjoy  life. 
Thus,  the  mocking  and  joke  are  on  all  parties:  the  author, 
Qoheleth,  traditional  wisdom  and  the  audience  (traditional 
wisdom  circles);  and  this  is  Hoffmann's  view  of  what  is 199 
happening  in  Job,  albeit  not  in  the  sense  of  joking,  i.  e., 
author,  players  and  readers  are  all  being  ironically 
mocked.  25 
There  are  a  number  of  other  factors  which  aid  in 
interpreting  irony,  but  lie  outwith  literature  and  belong 
to  the  stage.  They,  nevertheless,  stress  the  importance  of 
context,  subtlety  and  the  difficulty  in  interpreting  irony: 
these  are  namely  tonal  inflexion,  facial  expressions  and 
body  language.  A  modern  example  of  these  hermeneutical 
guides  or  clues  to  interpreting  irony  may  be  the  stand-up 
comedian,  who  can  communicate  irony  in  the  statement,  'I 
love  you',  by  screaming  it  at  the  top  of  her  lungs, 
squinting  her  eyes,  clenching  her  fists  and  jumping  up  and 
down;  but  one  would  have  to  have  direct  access  to  the 
context  in  which  the  comedian  expresses  this  irony  not  to 
interpret  the  statement  'I  love  you'  indicatively;  either 
that  or  explicit  instructions,  say  in  a  programme  or 
script,  which  explain  that  the  indicative  Gattung  'I  love 
you,  is  ironic.  Nevertheless,  the  context  (a  stand-up 
comedy  gig)  is  a  part  of  the  hermeneutical  guidelines  where 
the  clues  come  (tonal  inflexion,  facial  expression  and  body 
language),  and  where  these  are  to  be  interpreted  as  clues, 
with  the  ultimate  function  of  conveying  irony.  Without  an 
adequate  understanding  of  the  context  and  the  hermeneutical 
guidelines  it  provides  for  interpreting  the  clues  to  irony, 
one  could  think,  on  the  straightforward  indicative 
statement  (form),  that  the  woman  was  simply  saying:  'I  love 
you'.  Form  or  Gattung  tells  one  nothing  about  the  content 
or  intent  of  the  message  the  woman  was  truly  trying  to 200 
convey.  As  Hoffmann  points  out:  'Irony  is  determined  more 
by  context  than  phrasing  [or  Gattungen];  therefore,  the 
same  statement  could  be  ironic  in  one  context  and  totally 
unironic  in  another'.  26 
Another  example  may  be  Neil  Young's  song  'Ohio',  which 
is  about  the  Kent  State  University  massacre  under  Richard 
Nixon.  Even  many  moderns,  unless  privy  to  the  late  1960s 
and  this  event,  could  not  detect  the  irony,  i.  e.,  sarcasm, 
in  the  line  from  the  song  which  says:  'soldiers  are  cutting 
us  down,  should  have  been  done  long  ago'.  Neil  Young 
further  added  that:  'It's  ironic  that  I  capitalized  on  the 
death  of  these  American  students.  Probably  the  biggest 
lesson  ever  learned  at  an  American  place  of  learning'.  27 
Perhaps  this  last  example  demonstrates  just  how  common 
irony  is  as  a  form  of  communication:  for  Young  is  not 
referring  at  all  specifically  to  that  ironic  line  but  to 
the  song  as  a  whole,  which  he  characterises  as  'ironic'; 
moreover,  the  Kent  State  University  demonstration  was  a 
peace  demonstration  against  the  incursion  into  Cambodia 
during  the  Vietnam  War  (more  irony  to  the  story  and 
statements).  Nevertheless,  the  distance  between  the 
historical  contexts  and  cultural  influences  of  the  1960s 
and  the  1990s  only  illustrates  the  acute  disparity  of 
detecting  irony  in  the  Book  of  Qoheleth  which  is  far 
removed  in  antiquity. 
There  can,  nevertheless,  be  a  tone  or  ethos  to  a 
literary  work;  and  tone  can  and  does  have  a  significant 
role  to  play  in  interpreting  irony.  As  Hoffmann  wisely 
points  out,  concerning  the  context  of  the  Lover's  metaphors 201 
for  his  mate  in  Song  of  Songs  1.9;  7.31  5;  etc.:  'Only  the 
anti-ironical  tone  of  the  work  as  a  whole  make  such  an 
interpretation  unreasonable';  28  whereas  Swift's  Modest 
Proposal  and  its  'tone  of  utter  rationality',  represents 
the  opposite  tone  of  the  Song:  it  is  clearly  ironic.  29  One 
should  note  the  need  to  interpret  the  subtle  use  of  tone  in 
the  overall  context  of  a  work:  while  it  can  be  done,  tone 
is  of  such  a  subtle  quality  that  it  is  dubious  one  can  ever 
be  sure  of  its  exact  nature;  and  this  is  consistent  with 
scepticism. 
C.  Correlations  Between  Irony  and  Gattungen 
If  defining  irony  proves  difficult,  any  attempt  to 
correlate  it  to  a  specific  Gattungen  also  proves  elusive: 
Can  one  honestly  say  that  irony  is  a  Gattung,  or  should  one 
say  that  the  concept  of  irony  uses  Gattungen  (which  require 
hermeneutical  clues  for  detection)  to  express  itself?  A 
'concept'  is  an  abstract  idea',  and  an  'abstract  idea'  has 
'to  do  with  or  existing  in  thought  rather  than  matter';  30 
or  in  this  case,  in  grammar  and  literature  vis-a-vis 
matter.  A  similar  conflict  arises  when  one  considers  the 
natures  of,  say  for  example,  indicative  or  subjunctive 
forms:  are  they  truly  Gattungen  or  simply  grammatical 
concepts?  Indicative  forms,  in  English,  make 
straightforward  use  of  dictionary  words  in  the  basic 
grammatical  structure:  subject,  verb,  direct  object, 
indirect  object;  subjunctive  forms  are  identified  by  their 
use  of  auxiliary  verbs  such  as  'should',  'may'  in 202 
grammatical  relationship  with  ordinary  verbs  such  as  'do', 
'go'  ('should'  +  'go'  =  subjunctive  mood  -f  'should  go')" 
though  in  other  languages,  like  Greek,  the  inflexion  of  the 
verbal  stem  indicates  their  indicative  or  subjunctive 
forms.  Indeed,  even  the  Gattungen  used  by  irony  may  be 
questionable  as  to  whether  or  not  they  are  in  fact 
Gattungen  or  concepts;  but  suffice  it,  for  discussion's 
sake,  that  the  concept  of  irony  is  expressed  in  Gattungen. 
Irony,  can  and  does,  take  many  different  sub-Gattungen. 
Irony  can  be  expressed  in  the  Gattung  of  a  joke.  A 
'joke'  is  'a  thing  said  or  done  to  excite  laughter'  or  'a 
ridiculous  thing,  person,  or  circumstance'  . 
31  The  previous 
discussion,  on  the  development  of  the  concept  of  irony  in 
classical  Greece  up  into  the  twentieth  century,  made  it 
clear  that  while  irony  can  be  found  in  a  joke,  or  expressed 
in  a  joke,  it  does  not  follow  that  irony  is  always 
humourous.  Moreover,  a  joke  may  take  many  other  different 
forms  from  irony:  irony  and  joke  are  not  equivalent  terms 
(synonyms).  The  Gattung  of  joke  is  only  one  of  many  in 
which  irony  can  and  is  expressed;  yet  Good  warns  that  for 
irony  'to  be  comic  it  cannot  hurt  too  much':  32 
But  if  it  does  not  sting,  it  is  not  ironic  but 
merely  funny.  Jack  Benny  is  funny,  but  seldom 
ironic;  Mort  Sahl  is  ironic,  but  seldom  merely 
funny.  33 
So  while  irony  can  be  found  to  be  painful  and  unhumourous, 
it  is  clear  that  it  is  often  both  painful  and  humourous  at 
the  same  time;  whereas  irony  expressed  in  a  joke  must  be 
painful  and  humourous  at  the  same  time. 
Irony's  use  of  sarcasm  is  a  Gattung  which  expresses 
both  a  painful  jibe  and  humour.  'Sarcasm'  is  'a  bitter  or 203 
wounding  remark;  a  taunt,  especially  ironically  worded'.  34 
Jonah  is  probably  being  sarcastic  to  YHWH  in  4.2  when  he 
says: 
I  knew  that  you  are  a  gracious  and  compassionate 
God,  slow  to  anger  and  abounding  in  love,  a  God 
who  relents  from  sending  calamity'. 
One  can  detect  irony  and  sarcasm  in  the  statement  because 
of  the  overall  tone  of  the  book,  Jonah's  xenophobic 
attitude,  and  because  the  Ninevites  are  the  arch-enemies  of 
Israel  which  Jonah  tries  to  run  away  from.  35  Likewise, 
satire  and  parody  can  be  hilarious  and  yet  contain  a  vital 
sting  and  serious  message  -  the  opposite  to  what  is  being 
said. 
Irony's  use  of  mockery  is  an  example  of  a  Gattung  in 
which  there  may  be  no  humour  involved;  but,  then  again, 
mockery  can  be  funny,  at  least  to  the  inflicting  party  but 
not  often  for  the  victim;  though,  depending  on  the 
personality  (another  important  aspect  of  detecting  irony) 
of  the  victim,  they  too  might  find  the  mocking  funny.  The 
O.  M.  E.  D.  defines  'mock'  and  'mockery',  respectively,  as: 
1a  ridicule;  scoff  at.  b...  act  with  scorn 
or  contempt  for.  2  mimic  contemptuously. 
3  jeer,  defy,  or  delude  contemptuously.  ... 
1a  derision,  ridicule.  ... 
3a  ludicrously 
or  insultingly  futile  action  etc.  36 
Hoffmann  argues  that  a  number  of  ironic  statements  in  Job 
actually  mock  either  the  author,  the  characters,  situations 
and  the  audience,  or  all  of  the  above;  though  he  does  not 
use  the  specific  term  'mock'  but  conveys  that  idea  of 
irony,  37  e.  g.,  the  author  mocks  himself  and  the  audience  by 
pretending  he  has  all  the  answers  in  the  God  speech  and 
epilogue  when  clearly,  what  is  on  the  page,  does  not  add 204 
up.  Mockery,  nevertheless,  conveys  irony  by  saying,  in 
words,  actions,  tonal  inflexion  or  body  language,  the 
opposite  of  what  is  meant:  it  is  simple  irony;  it  may  or 
may  not  be  humourous,  but  it  usually  contains  a  sting.  The 
child  mimicking  the  adult  singer  at  the  bottom  of  the  stage 
facing  the  audience  by  clenching  his  breast,  opening  wide 
his  mouth  and  rolling  his  head,  is  mocking  the  singer  and 
their  pretense  to  be  better  than  they  are.  The  audience 
may  or  may  not  find  this  funny:  some  may  interpret  this 
mocking  as  the  behaviour  of  an  obnoxious  child,  however, 
some  may  find  it  funny;  the  singer  may  or  may  not 
appreciate  the  mockery:  if  they  accept  that  this  is  the 
normal  behaviour  of  children,  they  might  find  it  funny;  if 
they  do  not,  they  might  be  highly  stung  (offended). 
Litotes  is  the  use  of  understatement  in  order  to 
convey  irony.  Aristotle  defines  etpoveta  in  the 
Nichomachean  Ethics  as  a  'pretense  tending  toward  the 
underside  [of  truth]'.  38  Litotes  'uses  the  suspicion  that 
a  thing  means  more  that  it  says'.  39  On  the  one  hand,  Ezra 
Pound's  statement,  'Mutton  cooked  the  week  before  last  is, 
for  the  most  part,  unpalatable',  is  an  understatement 
insofar  as  mutton  cooked  the  week  before  last  would  be 
disgustingly  rancid  and  uneatable;  but  on  the  other  hand  he 
leaves  one  with  the  impression  that  he  wants  to  say  so  much 
more  than  that  -  and  the  'what?  '  is  left  up  to  the  reader. 
With  litotes  there  is  always  a  victim,  the  fool  who  is  both 
ignorant  and  self-confident:  they  do  not  'get'  the  irony  or 
even  that  they  are  the  victim  of  the  jibe  and  a  fool. 
Irony,  however,  is  not  always  or  necessarily,  humourous; 205 
though  it  is  difficult  to  get  away  from  the  concept  of 
humour  in  irony. 
In  'simple  irony',  where  what  is  said  is  the  opposite 
of  what  is  meant,  40  no  humour  may  be  conveyed  at  all  for  it 
to  be  irony.  There  is  nothing  funny  about  the  indicative 
statement:  'He  died  trying  to  save  her';  though  someone 
with  a  perverse  sense  of  humour,  might  interpret  it  as 
such,  i.  e.,  someone  with  a  sardonic  sense  of  humour;  or  in 
a  particular  context,  say,  the  context  of  a  black  comedy, 
it  might  be  viewed  as  humourous.  These  examples,  however, 
only  highlight  the  difficulty  in  interpreting  the  nuances 
of  irony,  and  of  the  interplay  between  the  author, 
audience,  personalities  and  irony. 
'Complex  irony',  is  where  'what  is  said  is  and  is  not 
meant'.  41  A  classic  example  of  complex  irony  is  Socrates' 
statements  that  he  has  no  knowledge  and  ability  as  a 
teacher. 
Each  of  these  is  intelligible  only  as  a  complex 
irony.  When  he  professes  to  have  no  knowledge 
he  both  does  and  does  not  mean  what  he  says. 
In  one  sense  of  'knowledge',  the  traditional 
one,  in  which  it  implies  certainty,  Socrates 
means  just  what  he  says:  he  wants  it  to  be 
understood  that  in  the  moral  domain  there  is  not 
a  single  proposition  he  claims  to  know  with 
certainty.  But  in  another  sense  of  'knowledge', 
where  the  word  refers  to  justified  true  belief, 
justified  through  the  peculiarly  Socratic  method 
of  elenctic  argument,  there  are  many  propositions 
he  does  claim  to  know.  ... 
In  the  conventional 
sense,  where  to  'teach'  is  simply  to  transfer 
knowledge  from  the  teacher's  to  the  learner's 
mind,  Socrates  means  what  he  says:  that  sort  of 
'teaching'  he  does  not  want  to  do  and  cannot  do. 
But  in  the  sense  which  he  would  give  to 
'teaching'  -  engaging  would-be  learners  in 
elenctic  argument  to  make  them  aware  of  their  own 
ignorance  and  give  them  opportunity  to 
discover  for  themselves  the  truth  the  teacher 
had  held  back  -  in  that  sense  of  'teaching' 
42 
Socrates  would  want  to  say  he  is  a  teacher,  .. 206 
The  identification  and  interpreting  of  complex  irony  seems 
to  be  an  analytic  one,  i.  e.,  one  where  the  intended  meaning 
is  dependent  upon  the  definition  one  gives  to  the  key 
concepts  to  be  interpreted  ironically,  as  in  the  above 
example  of  Socrates  having  'knowledge'  or  being  a 
'teacher'. 
The  above  discussion  on  the  Gattung  of  irony,  makes 
clear  that  irony  has  correlations  with  a  number  of  sub- 
Gattungen  which  are  used  to  express  irony,  or  are  the 
'vehicle'  of  irony;  but  are  irony  and  scepticism 
compatible? 
D.  Are  Irony  and  Scepticism  Compatible? 
Hoffmann  and  Weisgerber  explicitly  link  irony  with 
scepticism;  whereas  Good  and  Vlastos  talk  of  the  suspicion 
irony  raises;  all  discuss  the  doubts  and  questions  irony 
raises,  sometimes  intrinsic  to  its  nature  and  sometimes 
because  of  the  nature  of  interpreting  irony.  43 
In  theory,  irony  seems  to  be  able  to  appeal  to 
more  people  [vis-a-vis  satire]  precisely  because 
it  is  content  with  asking  questions  and  does  not 
give  ready-made  solutions.  But  it  could  be 
argued  that  question  marks  are  still  more 
baffling  and  disquieting  than  incitements  to 
hate:  questions  leave  people  free  to  make  their 
own  choices-an  unbearable  burden  to  most  of  us. 
... 
the  ironist  poses  as  a  sceptic  rather  than 
a  judge  [satirist]  . 
44 
Perhaps  this  is  what  is  going  on  with  the  joy  statements  of 
Qohel  e  th  . 
One  of  the  reasons  irony  induces  scepticism  is  because 
of  its  moral  dimension  or  concerns:  morality  is  the  motive 
for  expressing  irony  and  the  reason  why  authors  use  it  as  a 207 
Gattung;  but  because  morality  is  complicated,  and  the  right 
course  not  always  obvious,  irony  inevitably  leads  to  a 
search  for  truth  and  not  a  prescribed  action.  Along  with 
the  moral  motive  for  irony,  Weisgerber  discusses  the  three 
other  motives  for  writers  using  satire  and  irony:  the 
psychological  motive,  the  aesthetic  motive  and  the  social 
motive.  The  psychological  motive  for  irony  is 
aggressiveness:  irony  is  used  to  attack  some  moral  deficit. 
Aggression  is  sublimated  by  the  aesthetic 
motive  or,  to  put  it  otherwise,  literature 
transforms  a  socially  unacceptable  impulse  into 
socially  acceptable  and  even  delightful  forms.  45 
This  rhetorical  feature  is  used  to  convey  the  satirist  or 
ironist's  social  motive  which  is  to  call  attention  to  some 
truth  or  ideal  and  to  correct  abuses. 
Satire  censures  what  is  wrong;  irony  only 
intimates  that  it  may  be  wrong  and,  as  we  already 
know,  discloses  vices  as  well  as  virtues  in  an 
oblique  way. 
The  consequence  is  that  the  ironist  poses  as  a 
sceptic  rather  than  a  judge.  That  is  the  reason 
the  two  so  often  work  together:  the  judicial 
function  of  satire  rests  upon  ironic  doubt,  for 
you  cannot  condemn  abuses  unless  you  first 
question  the  validity  of  the  established  order.  46 
The  moral  dimension  is  obviously  why  irony  leads  to 
questioning  and  doubts:  because  moral  issues  are  not  always 
straightforward;  and  whereas  the  satirist  views  the  issues 
in  black  and  white,  the  ironist  is  sceptical  of  the  'quick- 
fix'  solutions  that  satire  suggests.  47 
Irony  communicates  something  positive  insofar  as 
it  prompts  the  reader  to  search  after  wisdom  and 
especially  to  adopt  a  mental  attitude  conducive 
to  that  kind  of  investigation.  The  unknown  truth 
which  the  reader  is  expected  to  look  for  is 
different  from  a  real  but  allegedly 
unsatisfactory  state  of  affairs.  ...  Irony  is 
a  way  of  writing  that  bridges  the  gap  between  a 
positive  but  still  elusive  ideal  and  a 208 
questionable  reality.  48 
This  sounds  surprisingly  close  to  Qoheleth  and  his  struggle 
to  find  I1AIfl'  in  life,  and  is  perhaps  related  to  the  joy 
statements  and  their  function  in  the  book.  Hoffmann  says 
of  wisdom  literature,  and  its  moral  concern,  that 
A  writer  of  this  type  of  literature  -  who  is 
intelligent  enough  to  see  the  difficulty  - 
will  have  no  choice  but  to  adopt  a  skeptical 
attitude  toward  the  various  phenomena  ...  When  this  attempt  to  push  worldly  phenomena 
into  the  straitjacket  of  fixed  order  ... 
by 
advice  to  man  on  what  mode  of  behavior  he  ought 
to  choose  for  his  own  benefit  -  contradictions 
begin  to  spring  up  between  what  is  worthwhile  and 
compatible  with  that  order,  and  what  is  proper.  49 
Again,  this  sounds  surprisingly  like  the  joy  statements  in 
Qoheleth.  With  reference  to  Prov.  6.30-31,  'Men  do  not 
despise  a  thief  if  he  steals  to  satisfy  his  hunger  when  he 
is  starving;  yet  if  he  is  caught,  he  must  pay  sevenfold', 
Hoffmann  says  that 
The  author  is  clearly  being  ironic  about  just 
and  moral  laws  which  under  certain  circumstances 
become  an  instrument  of  injustice,  yet  are  still 
necessary  (and  thus  just?  ).  50 
Prov.  6.30-31  is  probably  an  example  of  complex  irony, 
whereby  'what  is  said  is  and  is  not  meant'.  Irony, 
therefore,  does  not  presume  to  have  all  the  answers  but  has 
the  literary  function  to  induce  doubt  and  raise  questions: 
this  is  perfectly  analogous  with,  and  compatible  to, 
scepticism.  So  there  is,  without  doubt,  a  correlation 
between  scepticism  and  irony. 209 
E.  The  Essential  Elements  and  Definition  of  Irony 
It  might  be  helpful,  at  this  juncture,  to  outline  what 
scholars  of  irony  consider  to  be  essential  to  irony. 
The  first  element  required  for  irony  is  a  stage,  so  to 
speak,  a  context  in  which  complex  interplay  can  occur 
between  author,  characters,  situations,  dialogue  and 
audience. 
The  second  element  required  for  irony  are  the 
hermeneutical  cues  or  clues  that  irony  is  taking  place 
within  this  context,  e.  g.,  tonal  inflexion,  or  a  statement 
completely  out  of  sync  with  the  context  in  which  it  is 
given. 
Since  these  complex  hermeneutical  clues  are  often 
subtle,  the  third  element  required  for  irony  is  that  the 
audience  have  a  sense  of  irony  equal  to  the  ironist;  for  as 
Weisgerber  says  of  irony: 
The  communication  is  indirect  because  it  takes 
the  shape  of  a  veiled  attack.  The  ironist 
pretends  to  subscribe  to  an  opinion  other  than 
the  one  he  actually  holds.  51 
Therefore,  the  audience  must  be  equal  to  the  task  of 
discerning  that,  in  the  context  in  which  it  is  given,  the 
communication  is  irony;  but  to  use  the  ironic  method  is  to 
risk  the  failure  of  this  recognition'.  52  It  does  not 
follow,  therefore,  that  the  reader  will  necessarily  'get' 
the  irony;  and  indeed,  moreover,  it  may  be  that  irony  can 
be  found  where  none  was  originally  intended  by  the  author. 
The  fourth  element  of  irony  is  that  it  is  a  criticism 
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what  is  meant  to  demonstrate  what  should  be  (though  what 
should  be  may  be  elusive  or  unattainable). 
The  fifth  element  of  irony  is  scepticism:  a  doubting 
and  questioning  spirit  which  admits  epistemological 
limitations  and  proceeds  with  due  caution  in  searching  for 
the  truth  and  right  courses  of  action. 
A  reasonable  definition  of  'irony',  on  the  basis  of 
the  above  discussion,  would  then  be:  'Irony  is  that  Gattung 
which  uses  the  literary  device  of  stating  the  opposite  of 
what  is  meant  in  order  to  have  the  literary  effect  of 
criticising  the  incongruity  between  the  two:  irony  can  only 
be  determined  by  the  context  in  which  it  is  given'. 
2.  CRITICAL  ASSESSMENT  OF  IRONIC  CORRELATIONS  AND 
SCEPTICISM 
As  Good  points  out:  'Irony,  like  love,  is  more  readily 
recognized  than  defined'  . 
53  He  provides  added  caution  to 
the  above  views  on  irony  and  for  interpreting  the  Hebrew 
Bible. 
It  is  to  ask,  How  do  Old  Testament  writers  say 
what  they  say?  ... 
Irony  is  a  hallmark  of 
sophisticated  subtlety.  If,  in  fact,  Old 
Testament  writers  sometimes  expressed  their  ideas 
by  irony,  the  possibility  opens  that  they  have 
said  something  different  from,  or  more  complex 
than,  what  we  had  supposed.  54 
In  the  light  of  the  previous  discussion,  and  in  an  attempt 
to  define  'irony', 
difficulties  of 
the  sophistication,  complexities  and 
recognising  and  interpreting  irony, 
especially  contextually,  must  be  admitted;  and  in  fact  only 
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conceptually,  grammatically,  formally,  in  function  and 
intent.  While  there  is  a  consensus  on  an  essential 
definition  of  irony  as  being  'a  Gattung  which  expresses  the 
opposite  of  what  is  meant',  there  is  no  consensus  on  what 
the  exact  nature  and  hermeneutical  guidelines  are  for 
interpreting  irony.  Thus,  the  very  nature  of  irony  and 
interpreting  it  will  probably  always  remain  elusive 
because,  to  a  certain  extent,  finding  it  is  dependent  upon 
intuition;  but  perhaps  to  capture  it,  would  be  to  spoil  the 
fun  of  it  all. 
Vlastos  may  have  a  contradiction  in  his  overall 
argument  that  for  irony  to  be  irony,  it  cannot  deceive;  for 
though  he  accepts  Quintilian's  classic  definition  based  in 
Cicero,  as  'simply  expressing  what  we  mean  by  saying 
something  contrary  to  it',  55  he  insists  that  irony  cannot 
deceive.  Vlastos,  however,  may  redeem  himself  and  his 
argument:  for  he  wants  to  argue,  on  the  basis  of  complex 
interplay,  that  deception  was  a  part  of  the  original 
etymology  of  irony  as  it  developed  in  classical  Greek 
philosophy  and  with  specific  reference  to  Socrates,  but 
.., 
in  the  course  of  this  inquiry  I  stumbled 
upon  something  I  had  not  reckoned  on  at  the 
start:  that  in  the  persona  of  Socrates  depicted 
by  Plato  there  is  something  which  helps  explain 
what  Kierkegaard's  genius  and  Friedlander's 
learning  have  read  into  Socrates.  In  that  small 
segment  of  the  evidence  I  have  scrutinized  one 
can  see  how  Socrates  could  have  deceived  without 
intending  to  deceive.  ... 
If  you  go  wrong  and 
he  sees  you  have  gone  wrong,  he  may  not  lift  a 
finger  to  dispel  your  error,  ..  ￿56 
When  Vlastos  questions  the  implications  of  Socrates 
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matters  of  life,  he  argues  that  one  should  not  assume  that 
Socrates 
... 
does  not  care  that  you  should  know  the 
truth,  but  that  he  cares  more  for  something  else: 
that  if  you  come  to  it  at  all,  it  must  be  by 
yourself  for  yourself.  57 
While  this  developmental  aspect  of  Vlastos'  argument 
(Socrates  care  for  developing  character  in  the  pursuit  of 
truth)  demonstrates  his  openness  to  new  ideas  and  objective 
learning  (admirable  in  and  of  itself),  he  still  has  a 
contradiction  in  his  argument.  To  fix  that  contradiction 
he  needed  to  add,  as  Weisgerber  does,  the  concept  of 
possible  deception  with  a  purpose  in  irony  as  a  part  of  the 
subtle  and  complex  interplay  between  the  author,  players, 
situations  and  audience  (despite  the  fact  that  Vlastos 
evidences  this  in  his  thief  example).  Maybe  this  is  what 
is  going  on  in  the  joy  statements  of  Qoheleth:  there  is  the 
intent  to  make  the  audience  search  for  'what  is  good  under 
the  sun',  of  which,  the  joy  statements  may  or  may  not  be 
true,  may  or  may  not  be  a  good  course  of  action  (that  is 
left  up  to  the  audience  to  decide  for  themselves). 
With  regard  to  the  stage  in  which  irony  is  played  out, 
Good  may  be  criticised,  when  he  contends  that  Charlie 
Chaplin  represents  a  modern  eiron,  for  the  shrewdness  of 
Charlie  Chaplin's  character  in  his  movies  comes  only  as  an 
accident  and  not  because  of  serious  intelligence.  There 
may  be  an  analogy,  however,  with  the  complex  interplay  of 
irony  and  the  Charlie  Chaplin  example:  here  the  complex 
interaction  can  be  seen  between  author,  characters, 
situations  and  audience;  but  a  distinction  would  need  to  be 
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actor,  and  Charlie  Chaplin  the  character  who  truly  is  a 
bumbling  fool  who  only  wins  out  of  pure  accident  and  not 
because  of  superior  intelligence  or  wit  (though  he  often 
displays  a  type  of  'street-sense'). 
There  is  clearly  a  contradiction,  or  scholars  are  at 
odds  concerning  the  perspicuity  of  irony  or  not  (cf. 
Vlastos  and  Weisgerber).  Even  within  Weisgerber's  article, 
there  are  number  of  contradictions  as  to  whether  or  not 
irony  is  to  be  understood. 
The  main  thing  from  a  social  point  of  view, 
however,  is  that  irony  wants  to  make  itself 
understood:  it  is  a  means  of  communication.  58 
But  he  also  says  that  irony  is  oblique  in  both  form  and 
message.  59  Of  course,  one  could  argue  that  it  is  irony  as 
Gattung  that  wants  to  be  recognised  and  understood  as  such 
and  not  the  content  thereof;  but  why  all  this  effort  if  the 
message  can  be  lost?  Since  much  of  irony  is  missed,  one 
must  admit  that  with  irony  there  is  the  potential  to  miss 
it  and  misunderstand  it;  but  Weisgerber  needs  to  be 
supported  on  the  point  that  not  all  victims  'get  it',  and 
this  is  not  necessary  for  irony  to  be  present,  e.  g.,  Job's 
friends  do  not  get  the  irony  of  the  situation  because  they 
are  not  privy  to  the  'omniscient'  narrator's  point  of  view; 
but  the  reader/audience  can. 
The  hermeneutical  guidelines  and  clues  for 
interpreting  irony,  such  as  tonal  inflexion,  facial 
expression  and  body  language,  will  always  remain  elusive 
and  with  the  potential  to  be  missed  or  misunderstood.  This 
may  be  found  in  people  who  have  Aspergers,  a  condition  akin 
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often  take  things  said  very  literally  and  can  only  operate 
in  black  and  white.  60  Though  this  is  an  extreme  example, 
it  does  underline  the  factor  of  personality  and  the  complex 
interplay  in  interpreting  irony.  It  is  precisely  the 
subtlety  and  complexity  of  contextual  interplay  that  will 
always  make  interpreting  irony  elusive;  and  as  was  just 
mentioned:  perhaps  to  capture  it  would  spoil  the  fun  of  it 
all.  The  essential  elements  of  a  stage  and  hermeneutical 
clues,  nevertheless,  are  valid  and  necessary  for  irony  to 
take  place  in  a  context. 
Along  the  lines  of  irony  and  humour,  it  is  difficult 
to  find  any  form  of  irony  as  not  having  a  humourous 
dimension  to;  for  even  in  the  most  biting  satire  there  is 
still  something  funny  about  it,  e.  g.,  Swift's  Modest 
Proposal:  there  is  something  funny  about  eating  babies  to 
avoid  starving  precisely  because  the  situation  is  so 
ridiculous  and  incongruent  with  reality  that  no  one  could 
possibly  take  it  seriously. 
Along  the  lines  of  morality,  the  idea  that  irony 
always  has  a  moral  concern  for  truth  cannot  be  sustained: 
sometimes  sarcasm,  a  form  of  irony,  has  no  moral  concerns 
(though  it  is  clear  that  it  points  out  incongruity  between 
what  is  said  and  what  is  meant).  So  irony  definitely 
points  out  incongruity,  and  this  on  the  basis  of  the  effect 
of  using  the  opposite  of  what  is  meant  to  demonstrate  the 
incongruity  of  what  should  be.  It  could  be  argued, 
however,  that  irony  can  be  used  to  moral  ends,  and  very 
often  is,  but  moral  concerns  are  not  intrinsic  to  irony. 215 
Irony  is  a  Gattung  only  in  an  informal  sense,  i.  e.,  a 
conceptual  sense;  but  is  akin  to  scepticism  in  its  doubting 
and  questioning  spirit,  which  uses  numerous  Gattungen  to 
express  itself.  So  while  it  may  be  said  that  scepticism 
occasionally  uses  the  form  of  irony,  it  is  not  true  to  say 
that  irony  is  a  Gattung  of  scepticism  or  intrinsic  to 
scepticism.  Rather,  irony  is  a  tool  or  weapon  employed  by 
scepticism  at  certain  times  and  under  certain 
circumstances.  Nevertheless,  as  Hoffmann  points  out: 
Irony  is  determined  more  by  context  than  phrasing 
[or  Gattungen];  therefore,  the  same  statement 
could  be  ironic  in  one  context  and  totally 
unironic  in  another.  61 
Irony  uses  many  different  Gattungen  to  express  itself 
including,  jokes,  sarcasm,  mockery,  litotes,  etc.  While 
some  forms  of  irony  have  closer  affinities  to  scepticism, 
e.  g.,  simple  and  complex  irony,  others  like  satire  and 
parody  may  be  more  akin  to  pessimism  and  cynicism,  i.  e., 
they  represent  a  rejection  of  the  values  and  not  only  a 
doubt  or  questioning  of  them;  though  it  is  clear  that  there 
are  inter-connected  relations  between  these  various 
concepts,  e.  g.,  before  one  can  be  a  pessimist  or  cynic,  one 
must  be  a  sceptic;  before  irony  becomes  satire,  one  must 
take  a  dogmatic  stance  on  the  values  rejected  and  the 
opposite  values  endorsed. 
Irony  is  consistent  with,  but  not  identical  to, 
scepticism.  Irony  must  be  considered  a  Gattung  of 
scepticism  as  a  stock-in-trade  tool  of  scepticism;  even 
though  Johl  argues  that  irony  is  sceptical  in  its  own 
right.  62  Irony  may  or  may  not  have  the  opposite  meaning 
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not  have  the  intention  to  deceive  (for  didactic  purposes), 
but  must  always  have  the  interplay  or  literary  function  to 
raise  doubts  to  the  veracity  of  what  is  being  said  and  to 
question  its  (moral?  )  value  -  and  this  function  is 
definitely  compatible  with  essential  scepticism. 
3.  POSSIBLE  IRONIC  INTERPRETATIONS  OF 
THE  JOY  STATEMENTS 
This  section  will  attempt  to  make  correlations  between  the 
common  elements  in  the  joy  statements  of  Qoheleth  and 
irony.  It  then  asks  a  number  of  questions  with  regard  to 
irony,  Qoheleth  and  the  joy  statements:  What  is  going  on 
with  the  joy  statements  of  Qoheleth?  Do  they,  in  context, 
correlate  to  irony  and  scepticism?  A  specific  examination 
of  Good  and  Spangenberg's  ironic  commentaries  on  Qoheleth 
will  also  be  brought  in  to  aid  answering  such  questions; 
followed  by  a  critical  assessment  of  their  arguments. 
Finally,  the  essential  joy  statements  will  be  run  through  a 
number  of  ironic  Gattungen  which  may  provide  correlations 
between  them  and  irony,  and  thus  provide  a  possible 
interpretation  of  them.  A  critical  assessment  of  this 
section  will  then  follow. 
A.  Common  Elements  of  the  Joy  Statements 
What  do  all,  or  most,  of  the  joy  statements  have  in  common? 
All  come  in  a  highly  negative  context:  the  overall  negative 
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deterministic  contexts  of  the  preceding  and  following 
pericopes  enveloping  the  joy  statements;  conflating  joy  and 
negative  statements  in  the  same  statement  (e.  g.,  9.9);  the 
negative  context  of  death  as  the  great  leveler  of  all 
humanity;  the  negative  context  of  aging  and  dying  (e.  g., 
11.8-9);  and  possibly  the  hevel  conclusion  of  the  book 
(12.8).  The  most  problematic  verse  in  Qoheleth  for  all  the 
joy  statements,  6.2,  which  articulates  God  as  a  mean  and 
capricious  determinist  who  can  make  the  man  with  everything 
necessary  for  joy  not  to  enjoy  them  (contra  the  other  joy 
statements  which  say  God  determines  others'  lot  to  enjoy), 
also  raises  questions  as  to  the  literary  intent  of  the  joy 
statements.  Perhaps  6.2  is  an  example  of  a  profound  irony 
in  which  there  is  no  humour  whatsoever  in  the  irony.  6.2 
might  be  the  arch-ironical  statement  in  Qoheleth.  None  of 
the  joy  statements  comes  in  a  purely  positive  context 
unencumbered  with  enveloping  negative  statements  on  either 
side  of  them. 
B.  Questions  on  Some  Possible  Correlations  Between 
Irony,  Qoheleth  and  the  Joy  Statements 
There  is  additional  commentary  by  scholars  of  irony  which 
has  not  be  brought  to  light  as  of  yet,  but  may  prove 
helpful  in  illuminating  possible  correlations  between 
irony,  Qoheleth  and  the  joy  statements.  Before  one  moves 
onto  that,  there  are  a  number  of  questions  that  one  should 
ask  in  the  light  of  the  previous  discussions  of  this 
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The  highly  negative  context,  in  which  the  positive  joy 
statements  come,  should  raise  questions  as  to  their 
literary  nature,  effect  and  intent:  Are  they  to  be  taken  as 
simple  indicative  carpe  diem  statements  or  is  there 
something  more  complicated  going  on  here?  Is  not  the 
setting  up  of  opposites  in  a  context  a  hermeneutical  clue 
to  irony?  Are  not  the  moral  concerns  of  irony  consistent 
with  Qoheleth?  Given  the  highly  negative  context  in  which 
the  joy  statements  are  given,  could  it  not  be  that  they  are 
analogous  to  the  ironist  who  'pretends  to  subscribe  to  an 
opinion  [or  advice  in  this  case]  other  than  the  one  he 
actually  holds'?  Or  could  it  be  that  the  joy  statements 
'point  out  the  incongruity  between  what  is  and  what  should 
be'?  Nevertheless,  this  incongruity  can  lead  to  doubts  and 
questioning  (a  suspension  of  judgment)  as  to  the 
possibility  of  attaining  the  should  be  (joy  in  life),  and 
this  is  consistent  with  essential  scepticism. 
Perhaps  the  author  of  Qoheleth  risked  being 
misunderstood  in  the  joy  statements.  As  Vlastos  points 
out,  concerning  Plato's  Socratic  dialogues: 
What  he  is  building  on  is  the  fact  that  in  almost 
everything  we  say  we  put  a  burden  of 
interpretation  on  the  hearer.  When  we  speak  a 
sentence  we  do  not  add  a  gloss  on  how  it  should 
be  read.  We  could  not  thus  relieve  the  hearer  of 
that  burden,  for  that  would  be  an  endless 
business:  each  gloss  would  raise  the  same  problem 
and  there  would  have  to  be  gloss  upon  gloss  ad 
infinitum.  63 
In  other  words:  One  would  need  to  explain  each  sentence  one 
utters  or  writes  ad  infinitum,  which  is  totally  impractical 
and  an  absurd  exercise.  Vlastos  further  adds: 
Socratic  irony  is  not  unique  in  acknowledging  the 
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significant  communication. 
...  He  just  says  he 
has  no  knowledge,  though  without  it  he  is  damned, 
and  lets  us  puzzle  out  for  ourselves  what  that 
could  mean.  64 
Or  as  Weisgerber  says: 
The  ironist  is  a  moralist  only  insofar  as  he 
draws  attention  to  something  wrong,  or  to  a  half 
truth;  unlike  the  satirist,  he  does  not  suggest 
any  definite  line  of  action;  he  rather  recommends 
a  way  of  thinking,  a  more  complex  attitude  to 
life,  and  a  more  comprehensive  view  of  things  by 
making  fun  of  a  lack  of  worldly  wisdom,  the  so 
called  single  vision;  his  is  "a  view  of  life 
which  recognizes  that  experience  is  open  to 
multiple  interpretations,  of  which  no  one  is 
simply  right,  and  that  the  co-existence  of 
incongruities  is  a  part  of  the  structure  of 
existence.  °65 
Weisgerber's  comments  are  completely  unrelated  to  Qoheleth, 
and  yet  the  parallels  are  remarkable  with  relation  to  irony 
and  Qoheleth.  Could  this  not  be  what  the  author  of 
Qoheleth  intended  to  do  with  his  book,  and  the  with  the  joy 
statements  specifically,  and  in  their  interpretation? 
Hoffmann  points  out: 
As 
The  power  of  irony  lies  in  its  subtlety.  The 
more  hidden  it  is,  the  greater  the  intellectual 
satisfaction  of  both  discerner  and  ironist. 
The  subtlety  of  irony  is  also  a  function  of  its 
object.  66 
Kierkegaard  adds  that 
Irony  is  in  the  process  of  isolating  itself,  for 
it  does  not  generally  wish  to  be  understood  ... 
the  more  the  ironist  succeeds  in  deceiving  and 
the  better  his  falsification  progresses,  so  much 
the  greater  is  his  satisfaction.  67 
While  some  of  the  points,  e.  g.,  that  irony  tries  to  hide 
itself,  may  be  questionable  (see  previous  critical 
assessment  of  this  confusion),  there  is  some  truth  to  what 
is  being  said  and  may  have  a  direct  application  to  the  joy 
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function  of  the  escalating  nature  in  imperatival  forms 
(9.7-9  and  11.8-9),  i.  e.,  they  are  given  in  such  highly 
confusing  contexts  and  with  ever-increasing  force  so  as  to 
lead  the  interpreter  into  confusion  or  alert  the 
intelligent  ironic  reader  that  irony  is  being  indicated. 
Sometimes,  as  Vlastos  points  out,  one  misses  the  irony,  or 
one  cannot  figure  it  out,  e.  g.,  What  profit  is  there?  is  a 
rhetorical  question  related  to  the  joy  statements,  which  in 
their  contexts,  equals  none.  But  this  raises  the  question: 
Why  are  the  joy  statements  exempt  from  the  rhetorical  force 
of  these  rhetorical  questions?  Perhaps,  as  Vlastos  points 
out  concerning  riddling  irony,  the  purpose  of  the  joy 
statements  are  to  test  the  intelligence  of  the  audience  to 
see  whether  or  not  they  perceive  the  incongruity  between 
the  negative  ethos  and  context  of  his  book  and  the  joy 
statements:  joy  is  an  impossible  thing  to  achieve  in  such  a 
ridiculous  context;  or  if  the  joy  statements  are  complex 
irony,  may  indicate  some  truth  but  only  at  a  very 
superficial  level  as  indicated  by  the  bigger  life  questions 
of  the  book. 
C.  Some  Ironic  Commentaries  on  Qoheleth 
Two  commentators  have  written  specifically  concerning 
Qoheleth  and  his  use  of  irony:  Good  and  Spangenberg; 
though,  as  Spangenberg  points  out,  a  number  of  other 
commentators  identify  irony  in  Qoheleth,  e.  g.,  Braun, 
Crenshaw,  Gordis,  Fox,  Hertzberg,  Lauha,  Loader,  Lohfink, 
et  al.  68 221 
Good  says  there  are  three  axioms  in  Qoheleth:  Man  must 
find  meaning  to  life  within  that  life,  not  beyond;  one  must 
draw  distinctions  in  this  life  between  what  is  good  and 
bad,  righteous  and  wicked,  wisdom  and  folly;  and  the 
circumstances  of  life  come  from  God.  Good  defines  hevel  as 
'ironic'  on  the  basis  that  it  is  used  to  point  out  the 
incongruities  of  life:  when  it  is  used,  it  is  used  to 
describe  ironic  situations.  Good  views  Qoheleth's  main 
message  as  a 
...  musing  upon  a  society  dominated  by 
commerce,  an  acquisitive  society  that  sees  the 
meaning  of  man's  life  in  his  assertative 
achievement.  ...  Qoheleth's  irony  is  directed 
first  of  all  at  that  extension  of  commercial 
values  to  cosmic  validity  which  seems  to 
characterize  the  acquisitive  society.  69 
A  number  of  Good's  presuppositions  about  Qoheleth  are 
questionable;  and  as  Spangenberg  points  out,  Qoheleth  is 
not  only  attacking  a  commercial  society  but  also  the  'whole 
value  system  of  traditional  wisdom'"70  Good,  nevertheless, 
points  out  a  number  of  ironies  in  Qoheleth:  the  irony  that 
death  evens  out  the  balance  sheet  and  there  is  no  'profit' 
or  ultimate  'gain'  in  life  or  any  of  its  activities  ('Death 
writes  "Canceled"  over  the  entire  transaction,  71)  ;  the 
irony  that  wisdom  is  of  limited  value  because  the  same  fate 
overtakes  the  wise  man  and  fool  alike  and  wisdom  cannot 
insure  success  over  fate;  the  irony  that  man  often  misses 
the  meaning  of  life  in  drawing  the  good  distinctions  which 
are  in  accordance  with  God's  nature  by  trying  to  'dodge' 
them,  i.  e.,  instead  of  man  trying  to  accept  God's 
omnipotent,  determined  lot  for  them,  they  try  to  take 
control  of  their  own  affairs  (cf.  7.25-29). 222 
Good  ultimately  views  the  joy  statements  of  Qoheleth 
as  carpe  diem.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this:  one,  the 
natural  boundaries  of  life;  and  two,  that  God  gives  gifts 
to  be  enjoyed  by  humans.  While  Good  grants  that  there  are 
some  ironies  within  the  joy  statements,  e.  g.,  that  one  must 
live  with  sorrow  and  death  in  mind  (cf.  11.7-12.1),  he, 
nevertheless,  fails  to  see  the  irony  of  his  view  on  the  joy 
statements:  they  are  the  only  statements  in  the  book  which 
are  taken  on  face  value  and  not  ironically. 
Spangenberg  also  looks  at  irony  in  Qoheleth.  As  has 
already  been  pointed  out,  he  is  critical  of  Good  limiting 
Qoheleth's  irony  to  a  commercial  society  and  emphasises 
Qoheleth's  irony  toward  traditional  wisdom  circles. 
Spangenberg  is  critical  of  Good  on  a  number  of  other 
points,  e.  g.,  that  hevel  means  'ironic'.  Following 
Polk's72  critique  of  Good,  Spangenberg  argues  that  hevel 
does  have  the  negative  connotations  of  'vanity', 
'worthlessness'  and  that  it  is  Qoheleth's  use  of  hevel  and 
not  the  term  itself  which  is  ironic,  i.  e.,  Qoheleth  used 
the  negative  term  for  a  positive  purpose.  But  Spangenberg 
is  also  critical  of  Polk's  assessment  of  hevel  because 
.., 
his  conclusion  that  the  author  of  Qohelet, 
through  his  use  of  irony,  attempts  to  move  the 
reader  to  fear  God  reveals  that  he  has  not  really 
grasped  the  irony  in  Qohelet  but  has  become  a 
victim  of  it,  like  Franz  Delitzsch  who 
characterized  the  book  as  'The  Song  of  the  Fear 
of  God'  . 
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Spangenberg's  point  here  is  that  Polk  is  equating  'fear  of 
God'  in  Qoheleth  with  its  use  in  Proverbs,  and  Qoheleth  is 
reacting  against  the  traditional  wisdom  to  which  Proverbs 
ascribes.  Spangenberg  argues  that  to  grasp  accurately  the 223 
irony  in  Qoheleth  one  needs  to  be  aware  of  the  'sceptical 
stance  which  the  author  takes  on  account  of  the  claims  and 
hopes  of  the  traditional  wisdom  teachers'  ;  and  'statements 
about  death  play  a  crucial  role  in  this  sceptical  world 
view'  . 
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Then,  one  must  realize  that  closely  related  to 
Qohelet's  sceptical  stance  is  his  own  way  of 
reasoning.  Ilse  von  Loewenclau  points  out  that 
it  corresponds  to  that  of  Socrates.  Qohelet 
(like  Socrates)  often  plays  the  role  of  the  eiron 
(the  one  who  pretends  and  mocks;  the  one  who 
exposes  the  pretentious  alazon)  while  the  alazon 
(the  boaster,  the  man  who  thinks  he  knows  more 
than  he  does  know)  is  reflected  in  the  allusions 
to,  and  quotations  of,  traditional  wisdom 
material.  To  my  mind  one  can  indeed  classify 
some  of  the  irony  in  the  book  as  typically 
Socratic.  The  number  of  rhetorical  questions  in 
the  book  can  also  serve  as  an  indication  of 
Socratic  irony.  75 
Spangenberg  also  reminds  one,  although  questionably,  that 
It  is  important  to  remember  that  the  ironist 
wants  to  mislead  and  those  blind  and  deaf  to 
irony  often  become  its  victims:  'The  punch  of 
irony  depends  in  part  upon  some  failing  to  see 
it'. 
... 
When  context  is  not  taken  into  account 
one  can  easily  be  misled  by  some  of  Qohelet's 
statements  and  advice.  Thus,  the  counsel  'Fear 
God!  '.  76 
Of  course,  Spangenberg  is  responding  in  part  to  Polk;  but 
could  not  this  whole  quotation  be  applied  to  the  joy 
statements  of  Qoheleth?  Spangenberg  cites  a  number  of 
ironies  in  Qoheleth,  from  the  eiron  in  4.13-16,  the  irony 
in  the  'better-than'  sayings  in  7.1-4,  and  finally  the 
cosmic  irony  of  9.1-10. 
Spangenberg's  treatment  of  9.1-10  is  especially 
relevant  to  this  discussion  since  it  has  a  joy  statement  in 
a  highly  negative  context.  Like  Good,  Spangenberg 
interprets  the  joy  statement  indicatively  as  carpe  diem. 
'Cosmic  irony'  usually  deals  with  the  relationship  between 224 
God  and  humans,  whereby  humans  are  the  victims  of  God's 
capricious  determinism.  Spangenberg  employs  the  following 
syllogism  to  explain  his  carpe  diem  interpretation  of  the 
joy  statement  in  the  pericope  9.1-10: 
On  account  of  this  capriciousness  (v.  1)  and 
since  just  retribution  does  not  exist  (vv.  2-3) 
and  also  because  the  place  of  the  dead  is  also  so 
horrible  (vv.  5b-6),  Qoheleth  recommends 
enjoyment  of  life  (vv.  7-10).  77 
Again,  one  might  ask:  Why  is  this  the  only  statement  in  the 
pericope  taken  at  face  value  and  not  ironically?  Is  not 
this  joy  statement  a  prime  candidate  to  be  interpreted  as 
irony  in  such  a  context? 
A  critical  assessment  of  these  ironic  commentaries  on 
Qoheleth  will  now  take  place  before  an  examination  of  the 
possible  ironic  interpretations  of  the  joy  statements  is 
carried  out. 
D.  Critical  Assessment  of  the  Ironic  Commentaries 
There  are  a  number  of  ironies  to  Good's  analysis  of 
Qoheleth.  First  of  all,  his  axiom  that  the  meaning  of  life 
is  to  be  found  in  this  life,  is  cancelled  by  his  insistence 
that  there  is  no  meaning  within  this  life  (his  point 
regarding  the  literary  intent  of  the  rhetorical  question 
'What  profit  is  there?  '  and  the  power  of  death).  Also,  the 
questions  may  be  asked:  If  death  levels  the  playing  field 
of  life,  what  meaning  can  there  be  in  this  life?  How  is 
enjoyment  to  be  considered  'meaning'  in  life?  Is  this  not 
a  rather  superficial  and  highly  materialistically  based 
presumption?  What  about  Qoheleth's  assertions  that 225 
pleasure  and  enjoyment  of  material  things  are  hevel  in  and 
of  themselves  (cf.  2.1-11,17-23,26c;  4.4-8;  5.7-16;  6.1- 
12;  9.1-12)?  Why  should  the  joy  statements  be  exempt  from 
the  'everything'  (5:  M)  of  the  hevel  statements  (cf.  1.14; 
2.11,17,23;  4.4;  9.9;  11.8)?  One  may  also  ask:  How  can 
one  possibly  enjoy  anything  or  find  meaning  in  life  with 
all  of  the  negatives  around  and  attached  to  them?  Was 
Qoheleth  really  so  superficial  as  to  be  advising  the  simple 
enjoyment  of  food,  drink,  work  and  women  as  the  meaning  of 
life  with  so  many  other  problems,  issues  and  questions 
unanswered?  Was  he  really  that  shallow? 
Good  can  also  be  criticised  with  regard  to  what  he 
sees  as  the  second  axiom  in  Qoheleth,  namely  drawing 
distinctions  between  what  is  good/bad,  righteous/wicked, 
wisdom/folly.  Qoheleth  does  indeed  draw  distinctions  in 
life;  but  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  he  saw  any  value,  or 
at  least  only,  limited  or  lasting  value  to  them  (cf. 
Loader).  This  can  again  be  demonstrated  by  the  problematic 
of  death  for  Qoheleth. 
The  third  and  final  axiom  which  Good  sees  in  Qoheleth, 
that  all  the  circumstances  of  life  come  from  God,  can  also 
be  criticised.  There  is  nothing  wrong  with  the  axiom  per 
se,  it  is  axiomatic  (at  least  insofar  as  Qoheleth  saw  it); 
but  one  must  question  the  implications  of  the  axiom  for  the 
joy  statements.  It  is  fine  for  Good  to  argue  that  God 
gives  enjoyment  of  the  simple  things  in  life;  but  he  fails 
to  deal  with  that  very  problematic  text  6.2,  the  enveloping 
negative  contexts  and  conflated  joy  statements  with  hevel 
statements  (9.9).  As  has  already  been  shown:  Contrasting 226 
or  contradictory  contexts  are  hermeneutical  clues  of  irony; 
and  Good  fails  to  deal  with  this  possibility  for  the  joy 
statements. 
Spangenberg  also  needs  to  be  criticised  on  a  number  of 
counts;  though  he  is  correct  by  endorsing  Blenkinsopp  and 
Good's  statements:  'Death  undermines  the  structures  of 
meaning  by  which  the  wisdom  tradition  makes  sense  of 
life'.  78  The  most  profound  irony  of  Spangenberg's 
treatment  of  irony  in  Qoheleth  is  his  comment:  'When 
context  is  not  taken  into  account  one  can  easily  be  misled 
by  some  of  Qohelet's  statements  and  advice'.  He  applies 
this  to  Polk's  view  that  Qoheleth  relates  hevel  to  the 
'fear  of  God';  but  fails  to  reckon  or  apply  this  concept  to 
Qoheleth's  use  of  the  joy  statements:  Could  not  Qoheleth  be 
playing  the  eiron  here?  Could  not  Spangenberg  be  one  of 
the  'deaf  and  blind  to  irony'  he  mentions  above? 
The  most  important  part  of  Spangenberg's  article, 
which  needs  to  be  dealt  with  here,  is  his  treatment  of  9.1- 
10.  He  views  this  pericope  as  dealing  with  the  'problem  of 
retribution'.  Spangenberg  says,  according  to  Qoheleth, 
that  God  does  not  care  how  humans  behave  ;  and  to  this  he 
adds  Kroeber's  view  that  'Keine  Vergeltung  nach  der  Tat-und 
der  Tod  fur  Alle'  ('No  retribution  according  to  deeds-and 
death  to  all').  79  There  is  another  irony  here  when 
Spangenberg  further  adds,  with  regard  to  what  he  views  as 
the  wrong  interpretation  of  9.4  ('But  for  anyone  who  is 
counted  among  the  living  there  is  still  hope:  remember,  a 
live  dog  is  better  than  a  dead  lion'  80),  that 
Some  scholars  refer  to  this  verse  to  substantiate 
the  view  that  Qohelet  valued  life  and  that  this 227 
proverb  rectifies  his  negative  outlook  on  life 
encountered  in  4.2  and  7.1.  However,  this  is  not 
the  case  since  Qohelet  again  pretends  to  adhere 
to  a  viewpoint  other  than  the  one  he  actually 
holds.  81 
This  is  ironic  on  three  counts:  one,  Spangenberg  cannot 
possibly  know  what  views  Qoheleth  ascribed  to  because  of 
the  source  critical  problems  of  the  book,  distance  of  time, 
space,  culture  (i.  e.,  contextual  reconstruction),  lack  of 
access  to  Qoheleth  himself  (who  may  have  lied  or  withheld 
information  anyway);  two,  because  of  these  aforementioned 
problems,  and  the  subtleties  and  complexities  of 
interpreting  irony,  Spangenberg  cannot  possibly  be  certain 
which  interpretation  is  right  (his  or  others);  and  three, 
Spangenberg  fails  to  apply  this  concept  of  eiron  to  the  joy 
statement  at  the  end  of  the  pericope  in  9.7-10.  Moreover, 
Spangenberg's  use  of  syllogism  is  dubious  and  begs  the 
question:  Could  not  the  opposite  conclusion  of  his 
syllogism  be  the  right  conclusion  to  premises  one  and  two 
(one,  because  God  is  capricious  there  is  no  retribution; 
two,  because  the  place  of  death  is  so  horrible);  three, 
Qoheleth  therefore  plays  the  eiron  in  9.7-10  and,  'since 
Qohelet  again  pretends  to  adhere  to  a  viewpoint  other  than 
the  one  he  actually  holds',  he  says  it  is  impossible  to 
enjoy  anything  in  life  in  such  ridiculous  circumstances  by 
using  the  ironic  Gattung  of  the  joy  statements?  Indeed, 
Spangenberg  is  correct  that  9.1-10  is  cosmic  irony;  but  in 
that  context  should  not  the  joy  statement  be  held  in  the 
same  ironic  contempt  as  any  other  human  desire  or  activity? 
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joy  statement  exempt  from  irony  as  opposed  to  everything 
else  which  is  ironically  mocked  in  Qoheleth? 
Of  course,  as  Carroll  has  pointed  out,  one  may  ask  the 
question:  What  if  it  is  the  hevel  statements  that  are 
ironic  and  everything  else  in  Qoheleth  indicative?  82  The 
main  factor  which  argues  against  such  a  notion,  is,  unlike 
the  joy  statements,  which  are  positive  statements  given  in 
a  highly  negative  context,  the  negative  hevel  statements 
are  given  in  negative  contexts  which  do  not  indicate  that 
opposites  are  being  set  up.  In  other  words:  The  hevel 
statements  do  not  provide  any  hermeneutical  clues  that 
irony  is  indicated  by  their  context. 
E.  Possible  Ironic  Interpretations  (Gattungen)  of 
the  Joy  Statements 
Since  this  dissertation  thus  far  has  generated  more 
questions  than  answers,  this  subsection  runs  the  joy 
statements  of  Qoheleth  through  a  number  of  ironic  Gattungen 
in  order  to  see  if  there  are  any  correlations  between  them 
and  irony.  Before  one  begins,  however,  one  should  note 
that  some  Gattungen  of  irony  are  clearly  not  possibilities 
for  the  joy  statements:  satire  and  parody.  This  is  because 
they  are  more  a  genre  assigned  to  complete  works  and  not  a 
sub-Gattungen  per  se  or  isolated  statements. 
Simple  irony  is  where  'what  is  said  is  the  opposite  of 
what  is  meant'.  Could  not  the  joy  statements  be  simple 
irony?  The  negative  context  in  which  they  are  given  (a 229 
hermeneutical  clue  to  irony)  makes  that  interpretation  a 
distinct,  though  not  absolutely  positive,  possibility. 
Sarcasm  is  'a  bitter  or  wounding  remark;  a  taunt, 
especially  ironically  worded'.  The  overall  ethos  or  tone 
of  Qoheleth  appears  very  dour  indeed,  and  there  are  a 
number  of  places  where  passionate  negative  emotion  is 
demonstrated  (e.  g.,  1.18;  2.17,18,20,22,23;  4.1-8; 
5.12,15,16;  6.1-2;  7.3,26;  9.1,3,6):  Could  not  the  joy 
statements  be  a  bitter  taunt  ironically  worded,  as  in:  'Go 
ahead  and  have  a  good  time  -  if  you  possibly  could  in  the 
ridiculous  circumstances  of  life'? 
Could  the  joy  statements  be  a  joke?  This  is  perhaps 
the  least  likely  ironic  interpretation  of  the  joy 
statements  in  Qoheleth.  There  does  not  appear  to  be  enough 
hermeneutical  evidence  to  support  the  notion  the  joy 
statements  are  jokes;  though  it  is  possible  that  the 
audience,  or  individual  reader,  might  well  interpret  them 
as  such  because  of  the  very  negative  context  in  which  they 
are  found.  So,  while  there  may  not  be  enough  hermeneutical 
clues  to  interpret  the  joy  statements  as  a  joke  (sardonic 
humour,  a  sick  joke),  the  audience  might  well  interpret 
them  as  such;  though  the  concept  of  'exciting  laughter' 
does  not  seem  obvious,  and  is  perhaps,  remote.  This  does 
not,  however,  displace  the  above  mentioned  interplay 
between  the  book,  the  joy  statements,  their  context  and  the 
reader.  But  then,  again,  they  might  well  be  sardonic 
humour  -a  sick  joke  because  of  the  profound  problematics 
of  life  which  make  enjoying  it  impossible  unless  at  a  very 230 
superficial  level  (eat,  drink,  women)  :  83  life,  including 
the  joy  statements,  is  a  cosmic  sick  joke. 
Perhaps  the  joy  statements  are  mockery,  to  'jeer', 
'defy'  or  'delude  contemptuously';  and  this  might  fit  in 
with  some  form  of  sarcasm  as  outlined  above.  Thus  the  joy 
statements  act  as  a  taunt,  as  in,  again:  'Go  ahead  and  have 
a  good  time  -  if  you  possibly  could  in  the  ridiculous 
circumstances  of  life'.  This  would  be  a  mocking,  saying 
the  opposite  of  what  is  actually  possible,  by  quoting  the 
reverse.  Perhaps  the  joy  statements  in  Qoheleth  function 
as  mockery  on  many  different  levels,  as  Hoffmann  concludes 
for  the  ironies  in  Job:  the  self-mockery  of  the  author 
himself,  the  character  of  Qoheleth  (Solomon?  )  and  the 
audience,  again,  with  the  notion  of:  'Go  ahead  and  have  a 
good  time  -  if  you  possibly  could  in  the  ridiculous 
circumstances  of  life'.  Thus  the  joy  statements  would  fit 
in  with  the  0.  M.  E.  D.  's  definition  of  :'a  ludicrously  or 
insultingly  futile  action'  in  the  context  of  Qoheleth. 
Finally,  is  it  not  possible  that  the  joy  statements 
function  as  complex  irony,  where  'what  is  said  is  meant  and 
not  meant'?  Thus  the  joy  statements  would  be  interpreted 
something  like  this:  'Enjoy  if  you  can,  but  recognise  the 
irony  and  superficiality  of  this  enjoyment  on  the  basis  of 
the  ridiculous  circumstances  I  have  outlined  in  my  book'. 231 
4.  CRITICAL  ASSESSMENT  OF  IRONIC  CORRELATIONS  AND 
SCEPTICISM  IN  THE  JOY  STATEMENTS 
While  it  is  clear  that  the  joy  statements  come  in  highly 
negative  contexts,  it  may  be  argued  that  this  does  not  have 
the  literary  function  or  intent  to  indicate  irony,  but 
rather  to  bring  the  joy  advice  into  relief  and  thus  have 
the  literary  effect  of  intensifying  the  advise;  this  may 
also  be  the  literary  function  and  intent  of  the  ever- 
increasing  intensity  of  the  joy  statements  by  way  of  the 
use  of  impera  ti  val  forms. 
A  number  of  things  argue  against  such  a  position, 
however:  one,  the  fact  that  not  one  joy  statement  stands 
alone  in  a  purely  positive  context;  two,  Qoheleth's  view  of 
God  as  a  capricious  determinist  best  exemplified  in  6.2; 
and  three,  the  many  ironies  demonstrated  in  Qoheleth  and 
the  fact  that  the  joy  statements  come  in  a  context  which 
are  consistent  with  the  hermeneutical  clues  that  irony  is 
indicated. 
The  moral  concerns  expressed  by  Qoheleth  are 
consistent  with  some  forms  of  irony;  though  MacDonald  has 
argued  that  Qoheleth  advocated  amorality  on  the  basis  of 
divine  amorality.  84  Usually  the  moral  concerns  of  irony, 
however,  do  not  advocate  any  one  specific  solution  to  the 
problems  indicated  in  the  context  of  ironic  statements; 
rather,  the  ironist  simply  points  out  the  incongruities  of 
life,  perhaps  suggests  some  possible  ways  forward,  but  does 
not  dictate  because  the  incongruities  and  ironies  of  life 
demonstrate  the  folly  in  such  singularity.  This  confusing 232 
and  riddling  context  then  becomes  a  test  for  the 
intelligent  ironic  reader  to  see  whether  or  not  they  can 
perceive  these  incongruities.  This  seems  quite  consistent 
with  what  is  seen  in  Qoheleth.  Since,  however,  it  is 
impossible  through  source  criticism  to  discern  what  were  or 
were  not  Qoheleth's  own  views,  e.  g.,  his  use  of  quotations 
and  of  traditional  wisdom,  one  can  never  be  sure  that 
Qoheleth  was  testing  his  audience. 
There  are  two  main  problems  with  interpreting  the  joy 
statements  as  ironic.  The  first  main  problem  is  the  lack 
of  specific  contextual  information,  either  as  explicit 
statements  of  ironic  intent  or  direct  access  to  the 
historical,  cultural  context  or  to  the  author  himself, 
makes  it  very  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  ascertain 
irony  in  the  joy  statements.  The  distance  of  culture  in 
time  and  space  can  be  illustrated  in  the  relatively  recent 
(by  antiquities'  standards)  Neil  Young's  song  'Ohio' 
discussed  in  chapter  five.  The  distance  of  these  recent 
references  to  historical  contexts  and  cultural  influences, 
as  well  as  the  hermeneutical  guides  of  tonal  inflexion, 
facial  expressions  and  body  language,  only  illustrates  the 
acute  disparity  of  detecting  irony  in  the  Book  of  Qoheleth. 
The  second  main  problem  to  interpreting  the  joy  statements 
as  ironic,  is  that,  even  if  the  joy  statements  are  ironic, 
there  is  not  enough  contextual  information  (hermeneutical 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS  REGARDING  IRONIC  CORRELATIONS  AND 
SCEPTICISM  IN  THE  JOY  STATEMENTS 
The  determinate  factor  for  interpreting  irony  is  the  all- 
important  context  in  which  it  comes:  the  context  provides 
the  hermeneutical  clues  that  irony  is  indicated.  Without  a 
proper  knowledge  and  understanding  of  the  context  of  irony, 
one  can  miss,  misinterpret  or  under-interpret  irony  in  a 
given  text.  Even  if  one  has  a  'sophisticated  audience', 
the  potential  to  miss  or  misunderstand  irony,  is  great;  and 
thus,  many  readings  of  irony  are  indeterminate  or  must  be 
held  with  due  caution. 
Irony,  by  its  very  nature,  requires  interplay  between 
the  author,  characters,  situations,  dialogue  and  audience 
to  be  detected.  The  complexity  of  interpreting  irony  is 
only  heightened  by  an  examination  of  Good  and  Spangenberg's 
ironic  commentary  on  Qoheleth,  whereby  a  possible  irony  is 
raised  because  of  their  literal  carpe  diem  interpretation 
of  the  joy  statements  amidst  a  whole  number  of  other  ironic 
statements  in  Qoheleth:  the  irony  being  that  the  joy 
statements  are  the  only  ones  not  taken  ironically. 
The  intrinsic  doubt  in  interpreting  irony,  and  the 
many  questions  it  raises,  are  certainly  compatible  with, 
though  not  identical  to,  the  essence  of  scepticism  as 
outlined  in  this  dissertation.  So  there  is,  without  doubt, 
a  correlation  between  scepticism  and  irony:  Just  as  it  is 
clear  that  scepticism  employs  irony  to  make  its  points 
along  the  way,  so  too  irony  is  sceptical  in  and  of  itself. 
Irony  is  not,  nevertheless,  exclusive  to  scepticism,  which 234 
can  also  be  part  and  parcel  of  pessimism  and  cynicism  and 
can  be  manifest  in  the  Gattungen  of  satire  and  parody, 
which  may  in  turn,  represent  rejection  and  not  the  doubt 
and  questioning  intrinsic  to  scepticism.  The  possible 
ironic  correlations  in  the  joy  statements  may  not  be 
identical  to,  but  analogous  with,  Socratic  irony,  i.  e., 
complex  irony  where  what  is  said  is  meant  and  not  meant. 
The  Gattungen  of  irony,  which  uses  many  sub-Gattungen 
to  cloak  itself,  e.  g.,  indicative  statements,  sarcasm, 
jokes,  is  an  intrinsically  evasive  form  whereby  the 
speaker/author  has  the  intention  to  advocate  the  opposite 
of  what  is  literally  being  said,  and  may  include  the 
function  of  being  evasive  in  order  to  make  the 
hearer/reader  investigate  the  real  meaning  of  what  is  being 
said  and  to  discover  truth  or  knowledge  (or  joke)  for 
oneself.  Irony  can  occur  at  any  one  place  in  the 
interpretive  context  or  in  all  places:  situations  which  are 
the  context  of  the  irony  (e.  g.,  Job  1-2  -4  3-31  -3  42)  from 
the  author  himself,  the  characters  (e.  g.,  Job's  friends 
being  unaware  of  the  'cosmic  context'  of  Job's  suffering), 
with  the  audience,  or  in  self-irony;  with  or  without  the 
knowledge  of  irony,  with  or  without  deceit. 
If  this  chapter  has  raised  many  unanswered  questions 
with  regard  to  the  literary  nature  of  the  joy  statements, 
ironic  correlations  and  scepticism,  there  is  no  question 
that  any  ironic  interpretation  of  them  is  also  dubious. 
One  must  admit,  notwithstanding,  that  the  joy  statements 
come  in  a  suspicious  context;  and  suspicion  is  closely  akin 
to  scepticism,  and  suspicion  can  only  induce  scepticism 235 
(doubt  and  questioning)  towards  their  interpretation.  If 
there  is  not  enough  evidence  to  support  an  ironic 
interpretation  of  the  joy  statements,  then  there  is  surely 
enough  doubt  about  them  to  endorse  any  one  interpretation 
of  them,  and  thus  one  must  be  sceptical  about  them. 236 
CONCLUSION 
Scepticism  is  sound  in  principle,  insofar  as  its  doubting 
and  questioning  spirit  -  which  leads  to  dialectical 
engagement  of  subject  matter  under  consideration;  but  can 
become  absurd  and  abused  if  infinite  regression  is  applied 
within  it.  Scepticism  is,  nevertheless,.  absolutely 
essential  for  academics. 
All  biblical  texts  raise  questions  which  inevitably 
lead  to  doubt;  and  questions  and  doubt  are  intrinsic  to 
scepticism.  The  joy  statements  of  Qoheleth  bring  the 
problematics  of  biblical  interpretation  and  indeterminacy 
into  acute  relief;  though  the  conclusion  to  this 
dissertation  was  not  made  on  the  basis  of  the  literary 
theory  of  indeterminacy  (which  can  only  lend  support  to 
this  conclusion)  but  rather  on  the  basis  of  scepticism  and 
possible  ironic  correlations  in  the  joy  statements  of 
Qohel  e  th  . 
This  thesis  has  attempted  to  take  all  interpretations 
of  the  joy  statements  in  Qoheleth  seriously;  and  indeed, 
each  of  the  main  interpretations  have  much  to  commend  to 
themselves. 
Having  carried  out  detailed  exegesis  and  a  form 
critical  analysis  of  the  joy  statements,  they  appear,  by 
all  accounts,  relatively  straightforward  as  indicative 
statements  or  imperatives  with  occasional  rhetorical 
questions:  it  is  the  interpretation  of  them  which  remains 
in  question.  To  interpret  the  joy  statements  requires  a 
detailed  examination  of  their  immediate  and  overall 237 
contexts,  which  in  turn  generated  the  need  for  many 
additional  exegetical  notes.  Unfortunately,  the  editorial 
intrusion  card  will  always  be  an  ace  up  the  source  critic's 
sleeve  by  which  they  can  trump  any  other  interpretations  at 
will. 
Notwithstanding,  the  overall  literary  structure  of 
Qoheleth  (which  raises  many  redactional  and  source  critical 
questions),  the  literary  forms  which  the  joy  statements 
take  (indicative,  imperative,  rhetorical  question)  , 
immediate  and  overall  contexts,  as  well  as  the  content  and 
ethos  of  the  book,  shed  considerable  doubt  on  the 
straightforward  indicative  interpretation  of  the  joy 
statements  as  carpe  diem,  or  Qoheleth  having  an  essential 
message  of  joy  -a  position  which  raises  many  more 
questions  than  it  answers.  If  Qoheleth  did  not  intend  the 
joy  statements  to  be  ironic,  the  interference  of  the 
redactor  of  1.2-12.8  certainly  created  that  literary 
effect.  The  remaining  doubts  and  questions  by  necessity, 
nevertheless,  induce  scepticism  regarding  their  literary 
nature  and  interpretation.  Indeed,  Qoheleth  raises  many 
more  questions  than  it  answers  -  and  this  is  essential  to 
scepticism. 
The  subtleties  of  irony  as  a  communicative  form  makes 
detecting  irony,  or  interpreting  it,  a  difficult  task. 
This  is  even  more  acute  with  literature  far  from  the  modern 
West  in  time,  distance  and  culture.  Unlike  verbal  irony, 
where  there  is  an  immediacy  of  context,  tonal  inflexion, 
facial  expressions  and  body  language  as  hermeneutical  clues 
for  interpreting  irony,  ancient  literature  does  not  have 238 
these  luxuries  (unless  within  the  text  of  plays).  Thus, 
without  direct  access  to  the  existential  and  social  context 
of  Qoheleth,  one  must  remain  sceptical  as  to  the  exact 
interpretation  of  the  book  as  a  whole,  and  the  joy 
statements  specifically. 
Due  to  the  complexities  involved  in  interpreting 
literature  and  irony,  this  Ph.  D.  dissertation  was  unable  to 
prove,  one  way  or  another,  whether  there  is  irony  and 
scepticism  in  the  joy  statements  of  Qoheleth  (though  it  is 
clear  that  Qoheleth  has  sceptical  and  ironic  statements  in 
it)  or  what  Gattung  that  they  take  for  that  matter,  outside 
of  those  ascertainable  by  linguistic,  grammatical  and 
contextual  analysis  as  indicative  statements  (which  can 
only  ever  be  speculative  because  of  the  crude  Hebrew  verbal 
system  of  inflexion  lacking  mood),  rhetorical  questions  and 
imperatives;  though  the  highly  negative  context  suggests 
that  an  ironic  interpretation,  of  one  Gattungen  or  another, 
is  likely,  if  not,  probable. 
Whether  or  not  the  joy  statements  were  originally 
intended  to  be  ironic  statements,  if  taken  indicatively, 
they  ironically  mock  the  very  negative  context  in  which 
they  are  given  and  the  contents  of  the  Book  of  Qoheleth  as 
a  whole.  If,  however,  they  are  interpreted  ironically,  the 
joy  statements  are  liberated  from  the  ridiculous  contexts 
in  which  they  are  given  and  make  way  for  an  indicative 
carpe  diem  interpretation  of  them  (another  irony?  ).  So 
while  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  the  joy  statements  are 
ironic,  it  is  clear  that  they  may  be  interpreted  as  such; 239 
and  this,  as  one  interpretation  amongst  many,  might  be  the 
best. 
It  is  clear  that  one  of  the  functions  of  irony  is  to 
induce  doubt  and  raise  questions  -  and  is  compatible  with 
scepticism.  Whether  or  not  the  joy  statements  are  infused 
with,  or  intrinsically  sceptical,  is  in  question;  but  the 
spirit  of  scepticism  -  its  questioning  spirit  and  doubt  - 
is  always  open  to  the  possibilities,  and  in  this  case 
whether  Qoheleth  has  an  essential  message  of  joy  or  not. 
Nevertheless,  one  cannot  simply  endorse  the  positive 
interpretation  of  the  joy  statements:  one  must  remain 
cautious  and  sceptical  of  such  an  interpretation. 
Therefore,  even  if  there  is  no  scepticism  or  irony 
intrinsic  to  the  joy  statements,  these  considerations 
inevitably  lead  to  scepticism  regarding  them  -  and  thus  any 
interpretation  of  Qoheleth  as  essentially  having  a  message 
of  joy.  On  the  basis  of  exegesis,  literary  structure,  form 
criticism  and  analogies  with  philosophical  scepticism  and 
irony,  any  reading  of  the  joy  statements  must  be  considered 
indeterminate. 
No  one  has  cracked  the  mystery,  meaning  or 
interpretation  of  Qoheleth;  and  one  should  be  sceptical  of 
anyone  who  says  that  they  have.  So  whether  or  not  there  is 
scepticism  in  the  joy  statements,  one  must  be  sceptical 
about  their  interpretation;  just  as  one  must  remain 
sceptical  about  this  conclusion.  The  ultimate  irony  to  the 
slippery  conclusion  of  this  Ph.  D.  thesis  is  that  scepticism 
as  a  philosophy  supports  it. 240 
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